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FROM BLACKOUT AT PEARL HARBOR TO SPOTLIGHT ON TOKYO BAY: A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION IN U.S. NAVY PUBLIC RELATIONS POLICIES AND PRACTICES DURING WORLD WAR II

BY

R. DALE KLINKERMAN

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

(Journalism)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1972

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"I know in time of peace that Public Relations in the concept of the leaders of the Navy occupies a very subordinate place. That's very unfortunate because they have to change their thinking entirely when they get into war, and it's sometimes difficult for them to do that."

--Frank Knox

PREFACE

Shortly after graduating from the U.S. Naval Officer Candidate School in 1954, I became acquainted with the rollicking and satirical humor of William Brinkley's Don't Go Near the Water (New York, 1956), a best-selling novel about Navy public relations activities in the Pacific toward the close of World War II.

Brinkley served as a young Navy public relations officer on Guam in 1945. His hilarious descriptions of "paper-clip-throwing" and "booze-drinking" Navy officers assigned to coddle correspondents and manicure the Navy's image at war's end are not particularly flattering. Yet, as one reads his work, the clear impression comes across that by the time the battleship Missouri sailed into Tokyo Bay, the Navy had a rather sophisticated and dynamic public relations program in action.

This was not the case at the beginning of the war, as indicated in the following passage from the book:

> Before Pearl Harbor, reporters seldom came around the Navy, and those who did were treated as identified enemy agents dedicated to filching its innermost secrets. Even for a considerable time after Pearl Harbor an admiral might go along for months having to do nothing but fight the war and never encounter a reporter. But by the beginning of 1945 the Navy's attitude had undergone a wondrous change. The Navy,

> abruptly falling in love with the power of the press, had opened the floodgates and reporters were descending like schools of happy barnacles on the Pacific Fleet. (P. 44)

As an aspiring young public information officer myself (the duty title was changed in June 1945), I was most curious in 1954 as to what caused the almost 180-degree turn the Navy public relations ship took during World War II. Who gave the orders to the helmsmen? What kind of fuel in the form of techniques and methods was used? How far and where did it go after completing the turnabout?

As a full-fledged Navy public affairs officer (another title change in 1964) pursuing graduate study at the University of Wisconsin in 1968, I had the opportunity to satisfy my curiosity. Encouraged by Professor Scott M. Cutlip, a foremost authority on public relations history, and urged on by a Navy public affairs colleague, Lieutenant Commander Don Scovel, who broke sail before me with a study of Navy public relations prior to World War II, I ventured forth into the shoal waters of what seemed to be myriad boxes of files stuck away in musty corners of federal repositories in the Washington, D.C., area. The task was formidable; for many of these dusty boxes had never been opened before, and meaningful indexing was almost nonexistent. At times, I had apprehensions over the efficacy of attempting a study of such wide scope in a Master's thesis. But the archivists were so helpful and

the topic so interesting that I plunged forward with only passing trepidation. The experience has been personally very rewarding.

Without the aid of certain archivists, librarians and record-keepers, the research phase of the thesis would have been untenable. I particularly wish to thank the following individuals for their invaluable assistance in identifying and locating pertinent Navy records: Dr. Dean C. Allard, head of the Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and his able staff--Mr. Bernard Cavalcante, Mrs. Mildred Mayeux, Mrs. Mae Seaton and Mrs. Barbara Gilmore; Mr. F. S. Meigs and Mr. W. B. Greenwood of the Navy Department Library; Mr. Clayton Janes, Chief of Section One of the Reference Service Branch, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.; Mr. Harry Schwartz, staff member of the National Archives; and Mrs. Wilmar Day, File Supervisor for the Navy Department Office of Information. A special vote of thanks is due Mrs. Mildred Baruch, Chief of the Records and Reference Unit, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, for her help in gaining permission for me to screen the restricted set of personal papers of James Forrestal on deposit at the National Archives.

To Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, USN (Retired), former director of the Office of Naval History, and his information and administrative assistant, Miss T. I. Mertz, I wish to

express my appreciation for initial advice and counsel on the direction the study should take. In this regard also, Dr. Harold Nelson of the University of Wisconsin rendered valuable aid, especially in the areas of proper emphasis and possible limitations in scope.

I am deeply grateful to many participants in the World War II Navy public relations story who shared their experiences with me in personal and telephone interviews. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Rear Admiral Harold B. (Min) Miller, public relations officer for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Navy Director of Information at the close of the war. Admiral Miller not only gave freely of his time in several interviews, but also generously made available certain personal files which added a unique and vital perspective to the thesis. Others who provided firsthand information were Miss Helene Philibert, Mr. Daniel B. Kimball, Mrs. H. R. Thurber, Lieutenant Commander Gilbert Shaw, USCG, and the following retired Navy officers: Vice Admiral W. G. Beecher, Jr., Rear Admiral Robert W. Berry, Captains Jay B. Smith and Harold B. Say, and Commander Merle Machain.

My sincerest appreciation is extended to Captain Kenneth W. Wade, USN (Retired), and Commander J. W. Stierman, Jr., USN, for their understanding and encouragement during a very critical stage of the effort.

To Professor Cutlip, who as my thesis advisor

steered and guided me throughout with patience and wisdom, and to the other members of my thesis committee, Professors Douglas Jones and William Blankenburg, I am especially indebted for advice, counsel and assistance.

A special salute is given to interim typists Sharen Palmer, Susan Shumway, and Evelyn and Kathy Groenke, and to Mrs. Lloyd Renneberg for her capable preparation of the final manuscript.

My lasting gratitude is expressed to the U.S. Navy for providing me with the opportunity to obtain a graduate degree.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	The Silent Service Tradition	3
	Navy Public Relations Prior to World War II	4
	Aim and Scope of Study	7
	Footnotes	17
II.	ORGANIZATION FOR WAR	19
	From Isolationism to Preparedness	20
	Frank Knox Takes the Helm	22
	Navy Public Relations Begins to Mobilize	24
	Uniformed Civilians Professionalize the Function	26
	"Service Consistent With Security"	29
	Voluntary Censorship	30
	Publicity Ban on British Ships in American Ports	33
	Additional Restrictions and Some Positive Steps	35
	Establishment of the Office of Public Relations	36
	Naval District and Fleet Public Relations	41
	The Specter of a Separate Air Force	44
	Censorship of Outgoing Communications	45
	Organizational and Personnel Changes	47
	Blueprint on the Eve of Pearl Harbor	49
	Footnotes	51
III.	THE FIRST YEAR OF HOSTILITIES	58
	The Pearl Harbor News Blackout	59
	"Aid and Comfort to the Enemy"	60
	Navy Security Measures	62
	Establishment of the Office of Censorship	64
	Liaison With Other Government Information Agencies	67

Table of Contents

Chapter Page

I. [illegible] 1

II. [illegible] 17

III. [illegible] 28

Chapter | Page

Knox Takes Steps to Inform Public 69
New Public Relations Faces and Functions . 76
Admiral King, A Formidable Obstacle 82
German Submarines Stir Up News Controversy 87
First Casualty List and Initial Policy Declarations 95
Accreditation of War Correspondents 100
Establishment of the Office of War Information 104
Good News First, Then the Bad 107
Captain Lovette Succeeds Admiral Hepburn . 118
Other Personnel and Organizational Changes 119
Special Public Relations Tools and Activities 131
Publicity on New Ship Construction 133
A New Direction to the War 138
Footnotes 140

IV. FROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE 151

Press and Public Reaction Assessed 152
Lid of Security Lifts Slightly 154
Improvement in Navy Releasing Procedures Noted 156
A More Creative Public Relations Approach 160
Recruiting Drives and Other Promotional Activities 164
Industrial Incentive Program 169
Public Relations Manual Promulgated 173
Cutback in Public Relations Personnel . . . 174
Scope of Office of Public Relations Activities 178
A West Coast Director Named 182
Liaison With Motion Picture Industry and Newsreel Releases 184
"Visiting" Correspondents Accredited to Pacific Fleet 188
President Directs Closer Cooperation With OWI 190
Churchill "Scoop" Triggers New Attacks on U.S. Military 193
Tarawa, A Turning Point 197
Knox Scolds King About Submarine Publicity 200
A Change in the Censorship Code 204

Chapter Page

Chapter Page

The Beginnings of a Public Relations Offensive 205
A New Director, Admiral Merrill 208
Footnotes 210

V. THE FINAL PHASE OF THE WAR 219

Forrestal's Public Relations Philosophy . . 220
Merger Threat Spurs Navy to Action 224
Pearl Harbor Investigations 228
The Normandy Invasion 229
The Marianas' Campaign 231
A Period of Soul-Searching 235
Inspection Trip to the Pacific 238
A Forward-Looking Policy 242
"Full Speed Ahead" in the Pacific 247
Reorganization of the Office of Public Relations 251
A Request for Additional Personnel 258
Special Activities on the Home Front . . . 261
Navy Public Relations Policy Statements . . 264
Fleet Hometown News Center Established . . 270
Accolades for Iwo Jima and Okinawa 276
Truman's Views on Unification Evoke Navy Concern 284
"Admiral" Miller Succeeds Merrill 285
A New Name--Office of Public Information . 290
Negro Enlisted Correspondents 293
The Lifting of Security "Taboos" 295
Publishers Flock to the Pacific 302
Competition With the Army, Army Air Force and British 305
A Race to the Wire 313
Surrender in Tokyo Bay Aboard USS Missouri 317
Footnotes 319

VI. IN PERSPECTIVE 331

The War's Aftermath 332
An Overview 336
An Appraisal 345
Topics for Further Study 365
Footnotes 370

A NOTE ON SOURCES 375

BIBLIOGRAPHY 381

Chapter Page

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When asked early in World War II to state a public relations policy for the Navy, Admiral Ernest J. King succinctly replied: "Don't tell them anything. When it's over, tell them who won."[1]

It was a "tongue-in-cheek" remark by the Navy's crusty military chief, yet not as facetious as it sounded. It was indicative of Ernie King's true feelings on how the war should be fought--and won, in a climate of strictest security.

The Navy took a fearful beating at Pearl Harbor. Yet, the fleet remained the nation's first line of defense in the immediate months following the attack, desperately waging delaying actions in both the Atlantic and Pacific. It was not surprising that security became such a trenchant watchword for Admiral King. He was opposed to the publication of any data which might tip off the enemy as to the strength and disposition of his thin line of sea forces.

The admiral's reaction was not due entirely to the contingency situation, however. In many respects, it was a manifestation of what could be termed a "security syndrome"

CHAPTER 2

[illegible]

in Navy thinking, which had its roots in the tactical necessity for secrecy on the high seas. Probably to a greater degree than in any other form of military activity, success in naval warfare depends on the element of surprise. In the vastness of the oceans, where a 70-ship task force can operate in an area the size of a pinpoint on a global map, stealth in maneuvering is a vital ingredient for winning battles. Years of indoctrination in this intrinsically valuable operational tactic have contributed to a tendency on the part of many naval officers to make security the primary consideration in other areas of activity as well, such as the release of information.

Historically, wars always have been troublesome for the nation's information policy-makers. The age-old conflict between the people's right to know and the necessity for military security inevitably complicates any plan for an orderly and free flow of wartime information. Yet, paradoxically, the vital need to keep the public informed in war has been responsible for an increased sophistication in government information programs.

Such was the case in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Admiral King's initial security-oriented approach to the release of information eventually gave way to an elaborate public relations mechanism which actively and aggressively publicized the Navy's war role, particularly in the last year of the conflict.

What were the forces behind this evolutionary process? First and foremost, it would seem that a fundamental change in attitude in the sea service toward the public relations function was essential.

The Silent Service Tradition

Traditionally, the Navy has been known as the "silent service."[2] Its ships and men ply the seven seas thousands of miles from shore, in splendid isolation from the prying eyes of civilization. In such an environment, as remote as the nether world of Neptune, the qualities of strong dedication to duty, independence of thought and fierce pride in one's accomplishments naturally evolve. To brag about his deeds, however, is somehow beneath the dignity and decorum of the true Navy man. The record should "speak for itself" without the benefit of promotion.

The silent service tradition also is anchored in the old days of sail, when lack of communications caused lengthy delays in the transmission of news from abroad and at sea.

Even when speedier communications emerged at the turn of the century, the custom of silence continued for another reason--fear of reprisal from higher authority. "Few naval officers had any desire to stick their foot in their mouth. Quotations which reached the press often resulted in demands for explanations. A head stuck above

water was a target for a ready oar."[3]

As late as 1925, Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, chief spokesman for the newly emerging naval air force, was criticized severely by the Navy Department for trying to counteract in the press the onslaught against naval aviation by General Billy Mitchell. "As you know, to the average Naval officer the word 'publicity' is anathema,"[4] Moffett wrote concerning the censure. "I was brought up to hate it myself, and still hate it."

The silent service label is somewhat overdrawn, though. No government agency, and especially no military service, can operate in a vacuum. It is dependent upon the support of the public and its elected leaders for its sustenance. The Navy has acquiesced to this political reality since its inception and at times has proven itself quite adept at bringing to the attention of the public and Congress the necessity for seapower and the consequent need for ships and men to project it. It has, however, shunned such politicking except when it considered it to be absolutely essential.[5] In the same spirit, it has avoided formal public relations endeavors as being somehow a psychological violation of the silent service tradition.

Navy Public Relations Prior to World War II

There have been notable exceptions in Navy history to this negative public relations approach. Significantly,

many of these have occurred in times of war.

During the Civil War, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, a former newspaper editor, distributed communiques to reporters in Washington; and Admiral Farragut embarked a correspondent in his flagship to report eyewitness accounts of the capture of New Orleans.

In the Spanish-American War, correspondents freely embarked in Navy ships off Cuba, and a fleet of press dispatch boats darted back and forth from Key West to file stories. In Manila Bay, there were reporters on hand with Admiral Dewey to record his famous order to the captain of the Olympia: "You may fire when ready, Gridley!"

Admiral Mahan's books and articles on seapower at the turn of the century, although not written for public relations purposes in the strict sense of the term, did much to enlighten the American people on naval policy and its international implications.

In the early 1900s, spurred on by President Theodore Roosevelt's shipbuilding program, the Navy instituted a publicity campaign to aid recruiting. It also supported the formation of the Navy League, a civilian organization dedicated to educating the public on the need for a strong sea service. During this period, too, President Roosevelt utilized Navy ships for international port visits and naval reviews. This policy of "showing the

flag" culminated in the 'round the world cruise of the Great White Fleet in 1908.[6]

Still, before World War I, the Navy had very little in the way of an organized public relations function. In 1912, an officer of its General Board suggested that a special office be set up in the Navy Department for public information. He was given a polite reply, but no action was taken on his proposal.

With the outbreak of war in Europe and the resultant submarine menace in the Atlantic, public interest in naval affairs suddenly increased. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, a newspaper publisher, started holding daily press conferences in his office. Soon after the United States declared war on Germany, Daniels established a Navy News Bureau and staffed it with civilian experts who reported directly to him. The bureau's main duties were to service the Washington press and cooperate with the Committee on Public Information, earlier appointed by President Wilson and headed by journalist George Creel.

Following World War I, the Navy relapsed somewhat, but not completely, into its silent service tradition. The News Bureau continued to function on a much reduced scale until it was replaced in 1922 by an information section in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This small office was manned by only four persons, three naval officers and a

life" epitomized in the 'sound the martial circle of the
queen' motto first in 1600.[4]

early, before dusk on 3. the navy had only little
in the way of an organized public relations function. In
1811, an edition of the Chemical Annual Chronicle, a
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Navy Bureau developed to function on a much enhanced scale
until it was replaced in 1923 by an information service in
the office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This small office
was manned by only five persons. There naval writers had a

civilian assistant.[7] The Information Section continued with the same meager staff and very limited funds until shortly before World War II. In 1939, it was renamed the Public Relations Branch of ONI. At the same time, subsidiary offices to handle public relations were activated in all naval districts. This action indicated a growing awareness by the Navy that an expanded information function was necessary in light of the increasing international tensions.

Aim and Scope of Study

The Navy was not alone among the military services in being slow to recognize the importance of public relations. Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center contend that while "today's top military man provide a leadership responsive to public opinion . . . this trend represents a sharp break from the insulation which largely prevailed until World War II."[8]

It was almost a foregone conclusion that the public relations function in the nation's armed forces would be upgraded during the war. There were drastic changes in practically all aspects of the military system. Rapid weapons modernization, the emergence of air power as a decisive military strategy, and monumental logistics problems involving global supply lines were just a few of the factors which served to revamp military procedures and

civilian relations."[7] The introduction develops questions with the Army Reserve world and very limited trade unionism among British Regular Army in 1970. In 1970, it was reported that Public Relations Branch of HQ. It was also right wing-ness may contrast to Socialist Labour Party. This article illustrated a dominant movement by the Army Staff on Communist Infiltration Question and subsequently in light of the increasingly international tensions.

The Army was put also among the military services in Turkey also to encounter the importance of public relations. Part 6, Cyprus and Aden 8, Cyprus command case while "Today's Soldier" was provide a theoretical framework to public relations. . . This issue addressing a study based upon the literature which largely motivated world War II."[8]

It was almost a European constitutes that the public relations function in the nation's armed forces would be important during the war. There were foreign troops in practically all aspects of the military system. Lapid explains organizations, the encyclopedia of Air Power as a Brigade military service, and educational Institute Examination Lines involving closed supply line main line a few of the reasons which served to control military personnel and

concepts, including those of public relations.

The great influx of reservists and other civilians to active duty had a momentous impact on the process. The magnitude of the influence of these "uniformed civilians" can be imagined when one considers that the Navy alone grew from an average personnel strength before the war of 108,000 officers and men to a peak of 3,408,000 during the war.[9] This tremendous manpower increase created a host of recruiting problems with attendant public relations implications. Additionally, more than in any past war, an outlet had to be provided for the human desire to seek recognition for battle exploits.

There also was a massive personal involvement in the conflict by the American people who remained on the home front, resulting in heightened demands for war news by the press and the public. This appetite for information had to be satisfied, since the armed forces were absolutely dependent on industrial and other domestic support.

The effects of public opinion, the needs and views of the news media, and related pressures from higher levels of government all were instrumental in helping to shape the nation's wartime information policies. Major technological advances in communications since the last war, giving the news media expanded opportunities and techniques for reporting, compounded the process. In addition, political and social changes between the two wars made World War II a

struggle for human minds in a "new and revolutionary sense."[10]

Such forces, necessitating as they did a restructuring of public relations practices and procedures, were bound to have an effect on military attitudes toward the function as well. Two central questions may be posed, however, concerning any such attitudinal change in the Navy. Was there truly an altering of opinion toward public relations in the Navy's professional officer corps? And, if so, was it genuine and abiding, or merely a temporary accommodation with the dynamics of war?

A full investigation of these questions was beyond the scope of this study, since it would involve research into postwar Navy attitudes. However, there is some evidence from the wartime experience to indicate that the Navy's military leadership "went along with the World War II public relations tide," so to speak, only because of compelling circumstances which left it with little other choice. Vincent Davis states that while many changes did occur in the Navy during the war, "a number of the basic attitudes and perspectives that were formed within the Navy's officer corps during the half century before the attack on Pearl Harbor were only partially modified by the wartime experience."[11]

The primary objective of this thesis has been to document the changes that occurred in U.S. Navy public

relations policies and practices during World War II; and, in so doing, to investigate any causal relationships between these changes and basic Navy attitudes toward the public relations function.

It is hoped that this study also may provide some insight into the proper role of public affairs in the Navy and the other U.S. military services today. While such an evaluation has not been attempted here, it is suggested that any account of one service's experience with the necessity and desirability of a viable program to inform and influence the public in an all-out war might serve as a useful laboratory setting for future analyses of government information programs. Such examinations are especially pertinent today in the wake of widespread criticism of U.S. Government, and particularly U.S. military, handling of public affairs in connection with the war in Southeast Asia.[12]

In concentrating on the evolutionary aspects of Navy public relations in World War II, the following hypothesis was explored: Although the Navy began the war with the organization and directive to conduct an adequate information program, its efforts were mainly responsive rather than creative until circumstances dictated a more enlightened public relations stance in the latter stages of the conflict.

Implicit in this supposition is the contention that

the Navy initially emphasized the information aspects of its program over the broader range of public relations activities designed to mold favorable public opinion. Not until it conceived that its very existence was threatened by plans to merge the armed forces after the war did the sea service engage in specific "image-building" techniques.

The roles played by certain individuals in the World War II Navy public relations story were extremely important. In particular, the personal information philosophies of Admiral King and the two wartime Navy secretaries, Frank Knox and James Forrestal, had a major impact on the direction and scope of the Navy's information efforts. To a lesser degree, the personalities and skills of those performing the function, especially the civilians recruited from the mass media and associated fields, also had a definite bearing on the operation.

In this regard, a secondary objective, but one integrally related to the primary goal, has been to trace the development of the central, field and fleet organizations established to implement the Navy's wartime public relations policies. Special attention has been given the Navy's Office of Public Relations in Washington, D.C., since this centralized unit figured prominently in formulating many information policies as well as setting up procedures for their application.

Several questions arose during the examination of

these organizations. What methods and techniques did they employ? Which media of communications were used? What was the nature of their relationships with representatives of the news media and various public organizations? How important were their interfaces with other government information agencies, such as the Office of Censorship and the Office of War Information? To what extent did they coordinate their activities with the public relations offices of the other military services?

This last inquiry broached the subject of inter-service rivalry and its impression on the information function in all the armed forces during the war. Conflicting ideas among the services on how the war should be waged naturally had significant public relations overtones. This is an area deserving more extensive observation. It has been dealt with here only to the extent in which certain incidents reflecting interservice rivalry induced specific Navy public relations responses. Over-all, despite occasional disagreements between the Army and Navy in such matters as accreditation of correspondents, the services cooperated with each other quite well in the public relations arena.

In the final analysis, events in any war have the greatest impact on policies and actions. During World War II, there were definite cause and effect connections between specific battles and campaigns and public relations

directives and procedures, particularly with regard to the release of information. Therefore, it has been both advantageous and necessary to treat the entire subject within the context of the operational history of the conflict.

Any evolutionary theme implies progress. Due to the infeasibility of conducting surveys, content analyses or other scientific measurements within the framework of an already expanded study, no attempt has been made to quantify results of the Navy's wartime information program in terms of media exposure or public impact. The variety and types of efforts to publicize the Navy have been emphasized over the amount of publicity gained or its effectiveness. However, certain indicators of effectiveness --such as media comment, public opinion polls and internal evaluations--have been included, permitting a limited gauge to be made of the success of the Navy's efforts.

A key definition in the thesis is that of "public relations function." Cutlip and Center define the term as "the planned effort to influence public opinion through socially acceptable performance based upon two-way communication."[13] With some qualifications, this is the basic concept of the function used here. As already stated, the major thrust of the Navy's program early in the war was directed at informing the public rather than influencing opinion. Also, there was not as much emphasis at that time

on "two-way" communication, although the need to measure the public pulse was recognized at high levels in the Navy, and a press and public opinion analysis section did exist in the Office of Public Relations. The criterion of "acceptable performance" was considered by those directing the Navy's program as being essential to an effective effort. However, during World War II this criterion was sometimes taken for granted because public support of military performance was usually enthusiastic, despite press and other criticism of specific strategies and tactics. There were instances, however, when performance became a matter of concern for public relations personnel.

The term "public relations" is used by the author because that was the title given to the function in the Navy immediately prior to and throughout most of the war. The name was officially changed to "public information" in June 1945, and the function is currently referred to in the Navy as "public affairs." Although the distinction between "public relations" as describing the over-all function and "public information" as applying to the provision of data to the news media and the public was apparent during the war, the two terms often were used interchangeably.

The methodology employed in this study consisted mainly of historical analysis of primary source documents relating to the subject. This original material was supplemented by personal and telephone interviews with various

individuals who were either directly associated with the Navy's wartime information program or had knowledge of its operation. Other than newspaper and magazine articles, a few unpublished manuscripts and brief references in several books, there is a dearth of secondary literature pertaining to the topic. A more detailed discussion of reference material is contained in the "Note on Sources" at the end of the thesis.

A chronological narrative mode of presentation was chosen for its sequential value in developing the evolutionary theme. The period covered is from July 1940 to September 1945 with some overlapping at both ends.

In the next chapter, we shall take a look at the mobilization of the Navy's public relations program on a wartime basis. Chapter Three deals with the handicaps of censorship and security under which the program operated during the first year of the war and the subsequent criticism leveled at the Navy for withholding and managing the news. The middle years of the war are covered in Chapter Four, with the emphasis on expansion and reorganization of the Navy's information effort and the gradual improvement in the war's outlook for the Allies. Chapter Five brings our story to its successful conclusion, chronicling the tremendous revitalization of Navy public relations under Secretary Forrestal in the final year of hostilities.

It is time now to give the signal, "All engines ahead, flank!" Let us examine the prewar climate before Pearl Harbor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]Col. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.), Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, Md., 1966), 258.

[2]Although this label was applied specifically to the submarine service in World War II, there are numerous references to its usage in describing the Navy in general. The Navy's own training manual for enlisted journalists states that prior to World War I "the Navy adhered to the 'silent service' tradition in its relationships with the American people." (U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Journalist 1 & C, Washington, 1961, p. 5). See also, Lt. Cmdr. L. Rohe Walter, USNR, "Public Relations in War and Peace," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 69:1580 (1943).

[3]RAdm . Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), "Typewriters and the Navy," Shipmate (October 1965), 11.

[4]Ltr., RAdm. William A. Moffett, USN, to Capt. Powers Symington, USN, February 16, 1925, quoted in Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), 46-7. Hereafter cited as Davis, Policy.

[5]Davis, Policy, 81. The apolitical nature of naval officers is stressed in more detail in a later book by Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), passim. Hereafter cited as Davis, Lobby. Davis contends that seafaring men everywhere have a sense of isolation and independence which sets them apart from the rest of society.

[6]Lt. Cmdr. F. Donald Scovel, USN, "Helm's A'Lee," unpublished Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968, pp. 2-37 passim.

[7]The civilian information assistant was Miss Helene Philibert, who continued in that capacity for the Navy Department until after World War II. The background presented here on Navy information activities from 1912 to World War II is from "History of Navy Public Relations," a talk by Miss Philibert at the U.S. Navy Public Relations Course, Washington, D.C., July 23, 1946. A mimeographed copy is contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of

Notes to Chapter I

[illegible] Robert Todd Smith, Jr., Comp. (Lee.), Preliminary of Military and Naval Operations [illegible], pp., 1901). 109.

[illegible] Although this label was applied specifically to the submarine service in early WWI, there are obvious references to its usage in describing the Navy in general. The Navy's own printed manual for enlisted personnel avers that prime to World War I "the Navy adhered to the 'silent service' tradition to its detriment with the American people." [U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department's Training Manual, 1941, p. 19. See also, Comp. L. Rose Pulte, 1968, "Style Relations in and Navy Terms," Lee. Naval Institute Proceedings, 67(1941)].

[illegible] Hobbs, Edward H. Editor, USN (Ret.). "Steps Along the Navy," Shipmate (October 1969), 11.

[illegible] Lee., Robt. Stalling L. Gordon, USN (Ret.) to Comp. Powers Hapgood, USN, February 19, 1970, quoted in Vinson, Carla, Bureau Building and the U.S. Navy, 1919-1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), 65-6. Hereafter cited as Vinson, Building.

[illegible] Davis, Burke, Gl. The political nation of naval affairs is stressed in this study in a light taken by Vincent Davis, The Admirals Corps (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), passim. Investigator cites to Pulte, Lobbies. Davis concludes that materials may contribute more a sense of hesitation and indecision which sets them apart from the mass of society.

[illegible] Cole, R. Taylor, Comp. Cam. "Duke's A'Jam," unpublished master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1951, pp. 2-27 passim.

[illegible] The division information employer was Miss Burton Phillips, who testified to that capacity for the Navy Department until after World War II. The testimony presented here on Navy intelligence activities from 1919 to World War II is from "History of Navy Public Relations," a talk by Miss Phillips at the U.S. Navy Public Relations Course, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1951. A mimeographed copy is contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of

Information, "Historical Records of the Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, Box 157, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.

[8]Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), 609.

[9]FAdm. Ernest J. King, USN, U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945 (Washington, 1946), 4 and 217.

[10]Lester G. Hawkins, Jr. and George S. Pettee, "OWI--Organization and Problems," Public Opinion Quarterly, 7:16 (1943).

[11]Davis, Lobby, 157.

[12]For a discussion of public affairs problems that have arisen over United States involvement in Southeast Asia, see Dale Minor, The Information War (New York, 1970).

[13]Cutlip and Center, Effective Public Relations, 2.

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

Navy public relations functioned in an austere climate during the two decades following World War I. Pacifism, isolationism and public apathy toward the military were the prevailing moods of a nation preoccupied with internal affairs.

Added to this restraint were severe economic pressures. There simply was not enough money to operate more than a token information program. "It was easier to get the Chief of Naval Operations to talk to the press than it was to get requisite supplies with which to make copies of his statements,"[1] claimed Miss Helene Philibert, a civilian public relations assistant for the Navy from 1917 to 1947.

In 1937, a survey of information activities in forty-three federal government offices revealed that the Navy and War Departments were among eighteen agencies scoring below average in four measured categories of public relations practice.[2] In the Navy, emphasis was placed upon response rather than creativity. The director of the Information Section in the Office of Naval Intelligence

(ONI) wrote to a University of Wisconsin professor in 1938: "This department conducts no publicity campaigns, being concerned specifically with the dissemination of factual information."[3]

Actually, the Navy did appreciably more than just dispense information between the two world wars. The flight of the NC-4 in 1919 and other efforts in the 1920s to promote naval aviation in the contest with Billy Mitchell were special projects initiated to cultivate public support. Also, correspondents were embarked in fleet exercises and on flying reviews; cooperation was extended to feature motion picture and newsreel producers; and a task force of some thirty ships was sent to New York in 1939 for the World's Fair. For the most part, however, "propagandizing" was left to the civilian arm of the Navy, the Navy League.[4]

From Isolationism to Preparedness

The austerity for the Navy's public relations program ran parallel to hard times for the Navy itself. Some of the most valuable units of the fleet had been scrapped following the Washington Naval Limitations Conference in 1922. Subsequently, the size of the Navy was reduced even below treaty strength.

In 1933, however, a gradual upswing in naval fortunes began. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, an old friend of the sea service, allotted $238 million of the

funds appropriated in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 for ship construction. In 1934, Congress authorized building the Navy back up to treaty strength; and when Japan withdrew from the naval limitations agreements in 1936, all legal barriers to naval construction were removed. In January 1938, the President proposed a $1 billion naval appropriations bill to Congress. The bombing by the Japanese of the American gunboat Panay in December 1937 helped to ease the way for its passage.

However, the spirit of isolationism and public apathy toward the military was still strong throughout the country, even as late as September 1939 when war broke out in Europe. It was not until the fall of France in June 1940 that the mood of the nation changed from complacency to alarm. The President then initiated a positive program to convince the public that continued isolation from the rest of the world was a dangerous policy for the United States.

On July 19, 1940, Congress enacted into law the Two-Ocean Navy Act, authorizing a 70 per cent increase in ships and naval aircraft that would enable the fleet to carry on simultaneous campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific. It was the largest naval building program ever undertaken by any nation.[5]

The parsimonious existence which the Navy had led since the close of World War I had come to an end; and the

austere climate in which Navy public relations had been operating was due for a concomitant change.

Frank Knox Takes the Helm

Eight days prior to the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Act, newspaper publisher Frank Knox succeeded Charles Edison as Secretary of the Navy.[6] Mr. Knox was a prominent Republican who had been his party's vice-presidential candidate in 1936. His appointment, and the concurrent naming of fellow Republican Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War, were political moves on the part of FDR, who wanted two members of the opposition party in his cabinet prior to the forthcoming Presidential election.

Mr. Roosevelt had additional motives for nominating Knox. He saw in the former Rough Rider and ardent admirer of Theodore Roosevelt a potential secretary who would support enthusiastically his non-isolationist foreign policy. The President also respected Knox's public speaking and public relations ability and planned to assign his new cabinet member to sound out public opinion on proposed measures with trial-balloon speeches.

Mr. Knox, by virtue of personality and background, was well-suited for dealings with Congress, the public and the news media. To a certain extent, this public relations role turned out to be a primary one for him; since the President, with his lifelong love of all things naval, had

been in the habit of personally contacting the admirals on operational matters. Mr. Roosevelt continued this by-passing of the secretary throughout most of the war, dealing directly with Admiral King and Admiral William D. Leahy, who was appointed Chief of Staff to the President in July 1942.[7]

Whatever his disappointment, if any, over the direct Presidential exercise of Navy control, the new secretary showed no reluctance in assuming the public relations mandate. He immediately began holding weekly press conferences in his office and, only twenty days after taking the helm, he sent a reminder to all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department to furnish pertinent data to the Public Relations Branch of OWI for dissemination to the news media.[8] Three weeks later, he issued a memorandum allocating duties and responsibilities of the Navy's civilian executives. "Public Relations" was one of seven specifically assigned to the secretary himself.[9]

Knox's personal stewardship over Navy public relations during his first year in office was enunciated clearly in an address he made in the summer of 1941:

> I consider it to be one of the most important functions I have--to have the Navy adequately and accurately portrayed to the public. This Navy of ours belongs to the public, and what it is doing for the defense of the public, with a very few reservations, should be made known to the public.[10]

The secretary took a positive step toward ensuring that the Navy's story would be made known to the public shortly after he assumed office by directing a mobilization of the public relations organization for contingency operations. Before describing this mobilization, it is worthwhile to note that on August 22, 1940, James Forrestal, a highly successful investment banker and also a newspaperman early in his career,[11] became the first Under Secretary of the Navy, a new post created as part of the emergency planning.

Navy Public Relations Begins to Mobilize

For several months, news media and public interest in the Navy had been increasing as a result of the mounting international tensions and consequent concern over national defense. As early as 1939, an annual report of the Public Relations Branch stated that the number of press inquiries had expanded considerably in the past year and that 900 news releases were made compared to 550 the year before. The number of releases increased to 1,216 during Fiscal Year 1940, and in May of that year a request was made for a "statistical research unit" to be added to the Public Relations Branch to handle the ever-increasing volume of press queries. A month earlier, another internal memorandum cited the growing demand for Navy photographs as the reason for needing additional photographers throughout

the fleet.

The Office of Naval Intelligence gradually had been expanding its small public relations staff in recognition of the increased demands being placed upon it. The four personnel who had manned ONI's Information Section since 1922 multiplied to eight in the middle of 1939, and in July 1940 the number had risen to thirteen.[12] More increases in personnel were on the way.

The summer of 1940, in fact, could be termed the "turning point" when Navy public relations changed directions from a peacetime to a wartime footing. The financial blight that had plagued the function for so many years had been eased by the passage of the First Supplemental Appropriations Act on June 28. On July 16, Commander Harry R. Thurber relieved Commander Leland P. Lovette as officer-in-charge of the Public Relations Branch, with instructions to "build the office up for an emergency."[13]

War plans for military public relations had been drafted as far back as 1924. These early plans, with certain revisions, were approved by the Army-Navy Joint Board in 1939 and signed for the Navy by Secretary Edison. They languished in the Executive Branch and were never approved by the President, but portions were utilized by the Navy.[14]

The plans called for the establishment of a Navy Office of Public Relations to be headed by a rear admiral

the times.

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The plans relied for the establishment of a Daily
Editor of Public Democrats to be headed by a town Democrat

with a deputy director and five operating sections. Naval reserve officers with experience in public relations or allied fields were to be recalled to active duty to head the various sections of the wartime office.

Uniformed Civilians Professionalize the Function

Commander Thurber began screening the records of reservists; and, although there was no legal requirement for them to do so at that time, certain individuals were asked to return to active service to augment the Public Relations Branch. The first to accept was a retired Regular Navy officer, Lieutenant (junior grade) Victor F. Blakeslee, who reported in August 1940 to head the newly created Scripts Section. A naval reservist, Lieutenant Commander William M. Galvin, former secretary of the Navy League, came in September as chief of the Analysis Section; and Lieutenant Commander E. John Long, a reservist who had been on the executive staff of National Geographic, took control of the Pictorial Section in December.

In February 1941, Lieutenant Commander James G. Stahlman, USNR, editor and publisher of the Nashville (Tenn.) Banner and former president of the Newspaper Publishers Association, volunteered to return to active duty as director of the Naval Districts Section. At the same time, Lieutenant Commander Norvelle W. Sharpe, a reservist who had been an independent radio consultant, returned to run the Radio Section. A short time later,

another reservist, Lieutenant Commander Wallace S. Wharton, a member of the (Portland) Oregon Journal editorial staff, again donned his uniform to serve in the Press Section.[15]

In early April, Frank Knox wrote to his managing editor at the Chicago Daily News, Harold O'Flaherty, that a direct commission as lieutenant commander awaited his arrival into the public relations fold, and that he would be on active duty no longer than six months.[16] Mr. O'Flaherty accepted the commission and began acting as a special assistant to the Director of Public Relations a few weeks later. Another friend of Mr. Knox, Frank E. Mason, former president of International News Service and at that time vice-president of the National Broadcasting Company, was asked by the secretary to serve part-time as his special assistant for public relations in a civilian capacity. Mr. Mason performed this function as a dollar-a-year man throughout Knox's tenure, dividing his time between Washington and his NBC office in New York. He also assisted the Office of Public Relations (OPR) in many endeavors, particularly in the radio field.[17]

Also in April 1941, in anticipation that there would be an influx of correspondents, broadcasters and photographers into the fleets in the event of war, initial steps were taken to place experienced personnel with the forces afloat. Accordingly, arrangements were made to recall reserve Lieutenant Commanders Waldo D. Drake, a

Los Angeles Times staffer, and Stuyvesant B. Wright, of Paramount News, to serve as public relations officers for the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets respectively.[18] Drake reported to Honolulu in August 1941, and Wright to Norfolk, Va. a short time later after first spending several months in OPR as head of a motion picture sub-section.

Fleet photographic needs had been considered at the beginning of the mobilization in August 1940, when at Commander Thurber's urging the Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter authorizing the recruiting of photographic personnel from the motion picture industry for the naval reserve. There had been a long-standing offer from the National Geographic Society and March of Time, Inc., to train such personnel for the Navy.

The recruiting effort in Hollywood was quite successful, and a sizable number of highly-skilled photographers were formed into special photography units on a standby status. The first three of these units were scheduled to report to the fleets in the spring of 1941, but instead were diverted to the Office of the Coordinator of Information by John Ford, the Hollywood director and a naval reserve lieutenant commander. It was not until late fall of 1941, when the well-known photographer, Carlton Mitchell, Jr., accepted a lieutenant's commission in the naval reserve and took charge of the Navy's combat photography program, that the first photographic units actually

appeared in the fleets.[19]

"Service Consistent With Security"

The official mission of Navy public relations basically had remained the same for a number of years--to provide the public through the use of the mass media all information about the Navy compatible with security. In July 1940, the Public Relations Branch adopted as its motto: "Service Consistent With Security." At the same time, it was decided that in view of the international situation and the nation's response to it, "attempts to 'sell the Navy' to the country were irrelevant and should be firmly and scrupulously avoided."[20]

Behind this decision evidently lay the realization that it was no longer necessary to promote the Navy in the eyes of Congress and the public in order to get more ships, planes and men. It also reflected, perhaps, an awareness that in a wartime setting the public would brook no "press-agentry gimmicks" in military information programs.

The added personnel and expanded functions of the Public Relations Branch necessitated a larger physical plant as well. Accordingly, in August 1940, the office was moved from the three cramped rooms it had occupied in a remote second-floor corner of the Navy Department Building on Constitution Avenue to a spacious seven rooms on the

first floor of the building near the main entrance. The new location was much more accessible to members of the news media.[21]

Voluntary Censorship

Secretary Knox had begun the organization of a very liberal public information program, but security was soon to prove a powerful restraining force. Reacting to the deteriorating world situation, the Navy already had initiated a series of security measures in early 1938 that broke with long-standing policy. Cameras were forbidden aboard ships and shore stations without specific authorization; the cloak of secrecy was thrown over many facets of new ship construction; and, in an unprecedented peacetime move, correspondents were barred from fleet maneuvers.[22]

In the spring of 1939, the number of ships scheduled to visit New York for the World's Fair was suddenly reduced from 119 to 30 due to diversion of a large portion of the fleet to Pacific waters. In September of that year, all general visiting to units of the Navy's shore establishment was discontinued. In September 1940, further prohibitions were placed on release of information about new construction: only the names and general classification of new ships were allowed to be published.[23] On December 20, 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral

Harold R. Stark, sent a letter to the naval service voicing concern over "the increasing amount of classified information which is being reported in the press, over the radio, and in news photographs."[24]

As a result of the rising concern throughout the Navy over security violations and upon the recommendations of Commander Thurber and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Secretary Knox initiated a program of "voluntary censorship" for members of the news media. On December 31, 1940, he sent a confidential letter to over 3,200 media agencies throughout the country, asking their cooperation in the "avoidance of publicity" after January 15, 1941, on the following subjects--unless announced or authorized by the Navy Department:

(1) Actual or intended movements of vessels or aircraft of the U.S. Navy, of units of naval enlisted personnal or divisions of mobilized reserves, or troop movements of the U.S. Marine Corps;

(2) (Mention of) "Secret" technical U.S. naval weapons or development thereof;

(3) New U.S. Navy ships or aircraft;

(4) U.S. Navy construction projects ashore.[25]

Reaction to this unique letter was either favorable or unfavorable, according to whose point of view is considered. Commander Thurber claimed that replies were almost 100 per cent favorable. The primary questions that arose, according to him, addressed the possibility of plans by other government agencies to issue similar "lists."

whether there would be a central Navy clearance office for items of questionable security, and what changes, if any, would be made in the Navy list in the future.[26]

George E. McMillan, on the other hand, asserted that the letter was "widely criticized, especially on the grounds that the bans were too general, and could not be followed."[27] He observed that Knox was compelled to respond to the criticism and quotes from a statement issued by the secretary on February 9, 1941:

> From a few sources has come an unfounded charge that the Navy Department was making an effort at peacetime censorship. Nothing is further from my own mind or from the purposes of the Navy Department. But those of us charged with the proper conduct of the Navy, who are fully cognizant of the gravity of the current emergency and its potentialities, cannot but be greatly concerned about the making public of certain vital information . . . of value to (potential enemies) and definitely damaging to the progress and maintenance of our national defense.

To further explain the new policy, Secretary Knox and Commander Thurber embarked on speaking campaigns. Also, the Washington National Press Club scheduled an "off-the-record" forum on the problems of press censorship.[28]

The War Department quickly jumped on the Navy's "voluntary censorship" bandwagon; and in early May, Editor & Publisher quoted both branches of the service as reporting "an almost universal practice of submitting questionable news for clearance before publication."[29] The article went on to say that while reporters did not enjoy as free access in both the Navy and War Departments as they

had a few months before, the news product was greater with more news releases issued and press conferences held.

At least one journalist, however, may have been subtly "tweaking the Navy's nose" on voluntary censorship when he wrote in the manner of a Marc Anthony speaking at Julius Caesar's funeral:

> They (the Navy) have a pleasantly courteous public relations section staffed with gentlemen and ladies who are your idea of what a Navy officer ought to be. They are always ready to give you what they think is good for you to have. . . . Censorship? There is no such thing. If you must call it anything, call it sympathetic and graceful direction.[30]

After Pearl Harbor, Saturday Evening Post credited Mr. Knox's system of "voluntary cooperation" with helping to "train the American newspaper editor to police himself . . . to recognize the difference between news that would give 'aid and comfort to the enemy' and news that wouldn't."[31]

Publicity Ban on British Ships in American Ports

Upon passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in March 1941, mention of the presence or movements of British warships and merchant ships in U.S. waters was added to the Navy's "avoidance list."

The ban on publicity about the British men-of-war, which were undergoing war-damage repairs in American naval shipyards, was destined to plague the voluntary censorship program more than any other subject. The news media,

aggressively interested in the firsthand battle stories the British had to tell, claimed that the presence of the vessels was common knowledge in the ports of arrival.

When the badly damaged English battleship Malaya steamed into New York harbor in broad daylight, and her sailors were subsequently seen in the bars of Manhattan, the New York Daily News printed a photograph of the ship and carried a story on her arrival. A few other newspapers followed suit, but the majority refrained from publishing the information. Secretary Knox rebuked the papers that used the story, and there was "no recurrence of this kind of violation of the Navy's voluntary system."[32]

Numerous protests were filed with the Navy Department over the continuing ban, however, especially from media in New York, Norfolk, San Francisco and Seattle, the primary port cities involved. In Seattle, a newspaper even contended that a boat carrying newsmen was shot at by a Navy guard when it encroached in restricted waters where a British ship lay at anchor.[33]

The secretary, after considerable consultation with British naval authorities, succumbed to the pressures from the press and modified the policy in late September 1941. He promptly announced the names and location of a dozen of the British warships and added that "access by the press to British vessels . . . will be granted on the initiative of the British Commanding Officer concerned."[34] In October,

he modified the policy further by stating the Navy would issue news releases on the presence of individual British ships seven days after they arrived in port.[35]

Additional Restrictions and Some Positive Steps

On June 4, 1941, one week after President Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency, the Navy took still another action toward restricting publicity. Secretary Knox announced that press releases concerning contracts between the Navy Department and individual contractors would be discontinued. Since October of the previous year, it had been a normal procedure for joint Army-Navy releases to be made on any national defense contract amounting to $1 million or more. Also in June 1941, monthly summaries to the press of vessels under construction and merchant ships delivered for use as auxiliaries were dropped for security reasons.[36]

While the emphasis had been on the curtailment of information in the first few months of 1941, the naval leadership was making certain positive public relations moves. On March 17, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter to the naval service stressing that public relations was a function of command and cautioning against a too rigid interpretation of the phrase, "compatible with military security." Two days later, Admiral Stark again addressed the subject, this time in a letter to naval

district commandants. He enjoined the regional commanders to upgrade their information programs by considering the placement of public relations officers in each state, large publishing center, or zone where there was an important naval activity. A 29-page "Guide to Navy Public Relations" was enclosed as a tool.[37]

Establishment of the Office of Public Relations

On May 1, 1941, Secretary Knox transferred the Navy Department's public relations function from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Office of the Secretary, where it would be under his direct control. In so doing, he followed the footsteps of the War Department in setting up an independent and centralized Office of Public Relations.[38]

Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet as a four-star admiral and more recently Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District at San Francisco, was appointed "Director of Public Relations," in effect relieving Commander Thurber. The admiral reported for duty in Washington in the middle of May and promptly issued a statement saying, "We shall be as liberal with information for the press and public as the law and situation allow."[39]

Although he had no formal experience in public relations, Admiral Hepburn was a judicious choice as the

Navy's information chief. As the senior officer on the Navy list, he was widely respected by his fellow admirals, an important prerequisite for the job. As fleet commander in 1936, he had initiated a broader and more liberal press policy.[40]

The organization of OPR initially corresponded closely to that of the Public Relations Branch in ONI. There were seven sections in the new office: press, radio, pictorial, analysis, scripts, administrative and naval districts. However, there was now a staff of fifty-five compared to the thirteen in July 1940 when mobilization of the function began. Another thirty-eight were on the way.[41]

Admiral Hepburn had three executive assistants: Hal O'Flaherty; Frank Mason; and Lieutenant M. W. Gordon, Jr., a Regular Navy officer who served as the admiral's aide and also headed the Administrative Section. In addition to conducting the business management of OPR, Gordon handled accreditation to the fleets of news media representatives and worked with the Marine Corps in formulating plans for its combat correspondents.

Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Berry, USN, who had been in charge of the Press Section in the Public Relations Branch since May 1940, continued in that capacity in the new office. His staff had grown from three officers and one civilian assistant in July 1940 to nine officers and

two civilians in May 1941. Seven weeks later, there were thirteen officers, seven civilians and six enlisted men in the section. Many of these were former active newspapermen.

The Press Section prepared, cleared and distributed news releases, answered press queries, and arranged press conferences. It was divided into three components: a "city-room" staff of officer-reporters who covered the various naval offices and bureaus in Washington on a regular "beat-system" basis; a watch section of officers who manned telephones around-the-clock to answer inquiries; and a reference division which had been set up in February 1941 under Miss Helene Philibert to compile background data.

The 24-hour watch section was activated on May 8, 1941. It had been a 16-hour watch since November of the previous year. One of its functions was to prepare a nightly news summary from the United Press wire in the office for transmission to all Navy ships and outlying stations.

The Radio Section, still headed by Morvelle Sharpe, arranged for Navy participation in network programs, wrote scripts for radio addresses by naval personnel and for radio recruiting material, answered broadcast queries, and conducted liaison with commercial broadcasters. One of the four assistants to Lieutenant Commander Sharpe was a civilian, J. Harrison Hartley, a former NBC special events

expert.

The Pictorial Section had been operating since December 1940 under John Long. It distributed still photographs, motion pictures and display posters, and cooperated with newsreel companies and motion picture producers. By May 1941, Lieutenant Commander Long had a staff of five. Also in May, an art program, the foundations of which were laid earlier in the year by Commander Thurber, was initiated in the section. An eminent etcher and water-color artist, Vernon Howe Bailey, was given a contract to paint activities of the Navy's shore establishment. By June, other civilian artists were added; and in September 1941, artist Griffith Baily Coale, president of the National Society of Mural Painters, accepted a reserve commission as a lieutenant commander to direct a group of Navy combat artists in recording fleet activities on canvas.

As the demand for Navy photographs and motion pictures mounted in the spring of 1941, the photographic facilities available to OPR proved to be inadequate. Secretary Knox subsequently convened a special board to study the Navy's photographic needs.

Bill Galvin continued as chief of the Analysis Section, which he started in September 1940. He now had four officer assistants. The section compiled a daily summary of what appeared in the news media and elsewhere

about the Navy and on other pertinent topics. It also produced special "feedback" reports on specific subjects, such as "Typical Reactions to Russo-German War" and "Editorial Reactions to Landing in Iceland." The first issues of the daily analytical summaries were called "Navy News Bulletins." On May 27, 1942, the name was changed to "Daily Digest."

The digest was provided to senior Navy officials and to all Navy public relations officers. Everything that was considered indicative of public opinion--even Secretary Knox's fan mail--was read, analyzed and reported. In Lieutenant Commander Galvin's words: "Our job is to follow public opinion trends as they have reference to the Navy's policies, programs, expansion. We try to keep our finger on the public pulse."[42]

A 1943 report on the Analysis Section stated that its staff regularly screened thirty-one newspapers and twenty magazines in preparing the Daily Digest.[43] When the Office of War Information was established in June 1942, editorials clipped from about 400 newspapers by that agency became an additional source of information. The War Department's Bureau of Public Relations monitored radio programs and newsreels for both the Army and Navy. Public opinion polls also were screened.

OPR's Scripts Section wrote speeches for Navy officials, cooperated with authors and publishers, and

prepared special pamphlets. It also served as the clearing house for all written material other than press releases. Victor Blakeslee remained in charge of this section, assisted in May 1941 by three reserve officers and one civilian.

The Naval Districts Section had been organized in late February by Jimmy Stahlman to coordinate the public relations efforts of the fifteen naval districts in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone and Hawaii. It also acted as the liaison branch between the Washington office and the fleet public relations officers, and cooperated with welfare, patriotic, civic, fraternal, educational, entertainment and other civic organizations. Wherever possible, however, these civic liaison contacts were decentralized to the districts.

The district public relations offices were, in total, functioning below peacetime operating levels when Lieutenant Commander Stahlman was dispatched on a fact-finding tour in early 1941. As a result of his trip, several reserve officers in the field were ordered to active duty in the districts, and a gradual buildup of the regional offices was begun.[44]

Naval District and Fleet Public Relations

On May 9, 1941, shortly after the function of public relations was removed from the Office of Naval

Intelligence, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the district commandants to transfer their public relations offices also from intelligence to a separate status directly under the commandants themselves.[45] By this action and the establishment of public relations offices in the fleets a few weeks later, the framework for the wartime Navy public relations organization was virtually complete.

But the districts were slow to implement their public relations responsibilities. Consequently, on June 7, Secretary Knox sent a message to the commandants to "please proceed immediately to complete plans for staffing of district public relations offices with necessary officer personnel and clerical help." On August 22, he forwarded to the field and fleet commands an organization plan for setting up public relations offices afloat and ashore, a list of functions for these offices, and a summary of "ready clearance topics."[46]

Basically, each district and fleet office was organized into three sections--press, radio and photography. In naval districts where more than one large metropolitan area had to be served, establishment of field offices was encouraged. Already, on June 30, the Third Naval District in New York had drawn up plans for subsidiary public relations sections in Albany, Buffalo, New London, and Newark. It was envisioned that forty officers, seven

enlisted men and eleven civilians would be needed to man the New York and zone offices.[47] The Eleventh Naval District in San Diego also was quick to set up regional offices in the Los Angeles and Phoenix areas.

By September 1, 1941, most of the naval districts had fully staffed public relations offices functioning very much as they would throughout the war. For the most part, personnel manning the district offices were carefully selected. The Third Naval District public relations officer, for instance, wrote to Hal O'Flaherty: "I have personally hand-picked every officer on my staff and I have endeavored to secure only the most intelligent men that I could lay my hands on, as well as men of several years experience in their respective professions."[48] The burgeoning staff of OPR in Washington also was hand-picked as much as possible, in keeping with the desire of Secretary Knox to place the most talented and experienced people available in public relations.[49]

In late July 1941, a conference of district public relations officers was held in Washington, D.C. The Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Hepburn, top-flight executives from the news media, public relations representatives from the Army and Marine Corps, and New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, among others, addressed the assemblage.[50] At the meeting, it was estimated that the wire services were carrying about 40 per cent of the news releases and other

press material issued by OPR. The naval districts were encouraged to disseminate the remaining 60 per cent to newspapers and radio stations in their areas.[51]

The Specter of a Separate Air Force

On several occasions since the end of World War I, the Navy had faced what it considered to be a major threat to its role in national defense--the recommendations for creation of a separate air force out of the Army and Navy air arms. In the spring of 1941, the issue again was very much alive in the form of several bills pending before various congressional committees.

Navy efforts to counteract the pressures for an independent air service inescapably involved public relations and turned out to be one of the first major tasks assigned to Admiral Hepburn. On June 6, Secretary Knox wrote to Walter Lippmann and other journalists, personally inviting them to a June 12 luncheon in New York at which the admiral would discuss the "arguments for and against a unified Air Service." On July 7, the Analysis Section of OPR issued a special Navy News Bulletin entitled "A Cross-Section of Public Reaction to the Unification of Army Air Forces." And in August, Hepburn sent to the district commandants two Navy position papers, "The Navy and the Separate Air Force" and "The Case Against the United Air Force." In his accompanying letter, he stated that the

material may be used "in any manner which you deem best . . . in connection with public relations activities."[52]

The Eighth Naval District at New Orleans took the admiral literally and offered one of the papers to Southern editors with the suggestion that it would make good editorial material. One of the editors, affronted by the suggestion, declared: "I am amazed that a thing so resembling the handout editorials of the German press dictators should come from an American institution."[53] Hepburn, embarrassed by the incident, simply offered the opinion that the New Orleans press officer had used "bad judgement."

Nevertheless, the public relations effort to submerge the separate air force idea continued. In October, Admiral Hepburn wrote to the Commandant of the Third Naval District:

> . . . both Life and Time are helping us with favorable publicity on the question of unified air service. Time has been given extraordinary opportunities for gathering data on this subject in the Pacific and something is in hand with Life along the same line. The Saturday Evening Post also has come into the fold and a writer for that magazine is now afloat on an aircraft carrier where he will have exceptional opportunity to gather material not available to others.[54]

Censorship of Outgoing Communications

For some time the Army and Navy jointly had been planning their censorship responsibilities in the event of war.[55] The Navy, as the "first line of defense," would be

responsible for cable and radio communications censorship, while the Army would take charge of censoring the mails.

In order to prepare for its role, the Navy had secretly initiated training for a select group of New York newspapermen who were to be commissioned as naval censors when the time came. All queries concerning the "hush-hush" school, conducted at Third Naval District Headquarters, were left unanswered. The Chicago Tribune quoted the district public relations officer, Lieutenant Commander John T. Tuthill, Jr., USNR, who owned a string of small weekly newspapers on Long Island, as saying: "I don't know there is such a school."[56] The Tribune concluded by editorializing, "This disinclination for publicity . . . might be based on the navy's fear of being accused of jumping the gun on a censorship appropriations request pending before Congress."

The leaks in the press and from congressional sources about the Navy's plans for censorship of overseas communications pressured Secretary Knox to issue a special statement. In it, he emphasized that no censorship of domestic news was involved, other than the voluntary form currently in effect. He once again thanked the news media for their cooperation in the voluntary censorship program and concluded with an "interesting" bit of rationale:

> (I believe) . . . that the press and other news services will welcome a strict censorship of outgoing communications, not only in the realization that such censorship

> is in the best interests of national security but in the knowledge that with the leakage of vital information effectively bottled up within the United States, a greater freedom for the dissemination of legitimate news will result.[57]

Two more subjects were added to the voluntary avoidance list by OPR in October and November--the number of planes in the Navy and Marine Corps and information concerning the arming of merchant ships.[58]

Organizational and Personnel Changes

On August 23, 1941, it was announced that Admiral Hepburn would be placed on the retired list on November 1 but would continue on active duty as Director of Public Relations. In November, he was joined in the office by another retired rear admiral on active duty, Henry A. Wiley, who headed a new Industrial Morale Section. Admiral Wiley was assisted by four reserve officers.

The new section was an outgrowth of recommendations made in the spring of 1941 by Lieutenant Commander Leslie P. Jacobs, an officer in the Analysis Section, that addresses be made by notable Navy personnel at private industrial plants holding Navy contracts and that efficiency awards for excellence of production be presented by the Navy. The first awards extended under this new program were the forerunners of the World War II Army-Navy "E" Awards. In October, Secretary Knox assigned to the Director of Public Relations the responsibility for coordinating the Navy's activities in building industrial morale by serving as a

clearing agent and advisor for the speaking engagements and various competitive awards. He also directed Admiral Hepburn to act as liaison officer between the Navy Department and other government agencies on civilian morale matters.

By November there was a staff of ninety-one employed by the Office of Public Relations: five Regular Navy officers; thirty-six reserve officers; and fifty civilians, mostly in clerical positions. The office now occupied eleven rooms in the Navy Department building.

The press officer, Bob Berry, moved up to the position of Assistant Director of OPR in October when he was promoted to commander, and his former job was taken over by Wallace Wharton. A separate Motion Picture Section was created on August 2, removing this responsibility from the Pictorial Section. The head of this new section was Ensign Alan Brown, USNR. Hal O'Flaherty was released to inactive duty to return to the Chicago Daily News on October 22, as he had been promised by his old boss, Frank Knox.[59]

Also in October, Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Vining, USNR, who had been the Fifth Naval District public relations officer in Norfolk since late April, transferred to London as the first information officer for the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. He was replaced in Norfolk by Lieutenant Commander Wilson Starbuck, USNR.[60]

Blueprint on the Eve of Pearl Harbor

As Pearl Harbor Day approached, the Navy's mobilization for public relations had been completed. In terms of experienced personnel, it was a formidable organization. There were almost 100 persons in the Washington office, 127 officers alone in the fifteen naval district offices and their various branches, and 5 public relations officers attached to the fleets.[61] Perhaps the proportionally small number of personnel with the operating forces, however, was indicative of the central question that faced the function on the eve of Pearl Harbor: What information "compatible with security" could be released in wartime?

A firm believer in public relations, Secretary Knox indeed had set up an organization calculated to fully chronicle the Navy's story in combat. Yet, Mr. Knox also was torn on the horns of the security dilemma. At the conference of public relations officers in the summer of 1941, he had gone out of his way to stress that he would use the full measure of his influence as secretary to change the attitudes of some Navy officers who believed they would stay out of trouble if they refused to talk to the news media.[62] Yet, he religiously pursued his policy of voluntary censorship of information he considered needed to be kept secret.

The inconsistency in Mr. Knox's philosophy was perhaps more apparent than real. Nevertheless, there was

no evidence on the eve of Pearl Harbor that his enthusiastic promotion of the value of public relations had penetrated the "security syndrome" of the admirals in charge of the fleets that would soon be making the news. It would seem reasonable to assume that the secretary's ambivalence over security versus information at least partially influenced the attitude of the admirals.

Whatever the reason, the secretary's liberal public relations program did not have the support of many of the Navy's high-ranking officers as the nation prepared for war. In their minds, the increasing threat of U.S. involvement in the European war during the past year required that the Navy adopt intensive security measures. And as our relations with Japan rapidly reached the breaking point, secrecy enshrouded the operations of the fleet in the Pacific. After Pearl Harbor, this secrecy intensified throughout the fleets, resulting in extensive criticism of the Navy's public relations program during the first year of hostilities.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1]Helene Philibert, telephone interview, Falls Church, Va., June 13, 1968.

[2]James L. McCamy, "Variety in the Growth of Federal Publicity," Public Opinion Quarterly, 3:285-88 (1939). The categories were: types of public relations programs; types of releases to newspapers; types of releases to radio stations; and the use of film strips, exhibits and posters.

[3]Ltr., Lt. Cmdr. Leland P. Lovette, USN, to Frank Thayer, May 23, 1938, U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, "Historical Records of the Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, Box 154, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "Philibert Collection."

[4]For a detailed look at Navy public relations in the two decades preceding World War II, see Lt. Cmdr. F. Donald Scovel, USN, "Helm's A'Lee," unpublished Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968, pp. 71-131. The activities of the Navy League, including its efforts on behalf of the Navy in World War II, are documented in Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States (Detroit, 1962).

[5]RAdm. Julius A. Furer, USN (Ret.), Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, 1959), 42-57 passim. Hereafter cited as Furer, Administration. The political techniques used by FDR in gaining enactment of the January 1938 naval appropriations bill are discussed in Simon Bourgin, "Public Relations of Naval Expansion," Public Opinion Quarterly, 3:113-17 (1939).

[6]Frank Knox was a veteran newspaperman. After graduation from college and brief Army service in the Spanish-American War, he worked as a reporter for the Grand Rapids (Mich.) Herald. He purchased the Sault St. Marie (Mich.) Journal in 1901; and, after serving as general manager of the Hearst newspapers and publisher of the Hearst Boston papers, he bought a controlling interest in the Chicago Daily News in 1931 (mimeographed biography of Frank Knox, Philibert Collection, Box 155).

[7]The circumstances surrounding the appointment of Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy and his use by FDR in primarily a political and public relations role are treated

[illegible]

in Furer, Administration, 10-46 passim. An example of a trial-balloon speech by Knox was one he made on April 24, 1941, espousing the desirability of providing U.S. Navy convoy service for British supply ships. Interestingly, an analysis of public mail responding to the speech, conducted by the Navy's Office of Public Relations, showed an over 2-1 ratio opposing the convoys (memo., Cmdr. Harry R. Thurber, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, May 2, 1941, Philibert Collection, Box 155).

[8]Memo., Secretary of the Navy to All Bureaus and Offices, Navy Department, July 31, 1940, Philibert Collection, Box 154.

[9]Furer, Administration, 61.

[10]Frank Knox, remarks made before a conference of naval district public relations officers, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1941, quoted in Henry H. Douglas, "Public Relations, United States Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 67:1432 (1941). Hereafter cited as Douglas, "Public Relations."

[11]Forrestal worked for newspapers for three years following graduation from high school in 1908. Later, while a student at Princeton, he was on the staff of the Daily Princetonian (Furer, Administration, 65).

[12]Various internal memoranda of the Public Relations Branch of ONI, contained in file "Public Relations Policy, 1930-1940," Philibert Collection, Box 154.

[13]Cmdr. Harry R. Thurber, USN, "Navy Public Relations, July 1940-May 1941," undated memorandum report to the Director of Naval History, quoted in part in Scovel, "Helm's A'Lee," 166-184. Hereafter cited as Thurber, "Navy Public Relations."

[14]Memo., George Marvin to Director of Naval History, undated, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[15]Scovel, "Helm's A'Lee," 125-27.

[16]Ltr., Frank Knox to Harold O'Flaherty, April 7, 1941, Frank Knox Papers, Manuscript Section, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 4.

[17]T. I. Mertz, personal interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1968. Hereafter cited as "Mertz Interview." Miss Mertz, administrative and information assistant to the

Director of Naval History until her retirement in January 1971, served as a civilian information assistant in the Navy Office of Public Relations during World War II.

[18]Scovel, "Helm's A'Lee," 130.

[19]The foregoing information on the beginnings of the Navy's wartime combat photography program was obtained from three sources: Ltr., Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Bureau of Navigation, August 28, 1940 (Serial 19315), and memo., Ens. Allan Brown, USNR, to Lt. Cmdr. Harold O'Flaherty, USNR, September 25, 1941, OOR-5 (139), Philibert Collection, Boxes 154 and 155 respectively; and Hertz Interview.

[20]Thurber, "Navy Public Relations," 168.

[21]Ibid., 167.

[22]New Haven (Conn.) Journal Courier, February 23, 1938. For a detailed look at the new Navy security restrictions at this time, see Security Letters 1-6, 1938, from Chief of Naval Operations to All Ships and Stations, contained in file "Public Relations Policy, 1930-1940," Philibert Collection, Box 154.

[23]Various letters, memoranda and naval messages, Philibert Collection, Box 154.

[24]Ltr., Chief of Naval Operations to All Ships and Stations, December 20, 1940 (Serial 1240416), ibid.

[25]Ltr., Frank Knox to multiple addressees, December 31, 1940 (Serial 0293916), quoted in Thurber, "Navy Public Relations," 179-180. Thurber also discusses the rationale behind the dispatch of this letter: The Joint Army-Navy Board had agreed in 1937 that any future wartime press and radio censorship should be voluntary and self-imposed, at least in the beginning; it was assumed that the United States would become involved in World War II on the side of the British; in World War I, such a list of avoidable subjects was not issued until seven weeks after the war had begun; and, finally, it was reasoned that "an educational period in voluntary censorship would be mutually beneficial to the agencies concerned and the Navy."

[26]Thurber, "Navy Public Relations," 180.

[27]George E. McMillan, "Government Publicity and the Impact of War," Public Opinion Quarterly, 5:387 (1941). Hereafter cited as McMillan, "Government Publicity."

[28]Thurber, op. cit.

[29]Walter E. Schneider, "Editors Suggest Improvements in Voluntary Censorship Plan," Editor & Publisher, May 3, 1941, p. 5.

[30]Arnold Kruckman, extract from Glass Digest (February 1941), Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[31]Robert Humphreys, "How Your News is Censored," Saturday Evening Post, September 26, 1942, p. 17.

[32]McMillan, "Government Publicity," 383.

[33]Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 12, 1941.

[34]"A Peek Under the Navy Lid," Newsweek, September 29, 1941, p. 53.

[35]Ltr., Director of Public Relations to All Navy Public Relations Officers, October 22, 1941, U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, General Files (EF-117), Record Group 80, War Records Branch, Naval Records Section, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as "Record Group 80."

[36]Navy Department press release, June 4, 1941, and memo., RAdm. Arthur J. Hepburn, USN, to Office of Public Relations, June 3, 1941, both contained in file "January-June, 1941," Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[37]Ltrs., Chief of Naval Operations to All Ships and Stations, March 17, 1941 (Serial 247216), and to Naval District Commandants, March 19, 1941 (Serial 380616), ibid.

[38]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to All Bureaus and Offices, Navy Department, April 28, 1941 (Serial 959416), Record Group 80. The Army's Bureau of Public Relations was established on February 11, 1941, under the supervision and control of the Secretary of the Army (James R. Mock and Cedric Larsen, "Public Relations of the U.S. Army," Public Opinion Quarterly, 5:277 (1941). Hereafter cited as Mock and Larsen, "Army Public Relations.").

[39]Douglas, "Public Relations," 1434.

[40]Ibid. Also, Mertz Interview.

[41]Scovel, "Helm's A'Lee," 129.

[42]Lt. Cmdr. William M. Galvin, USNR, remarks made before a conference of naval district public relations officers in Washington, D.C., July 28-31, 1941, recorded in mimeographed minutes of conference, p. 125, Philibert Collection, Box 155. Hereafter cited as "1941 PRO Conference."

[43]U. S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, Naval Districts Section, Public Relations Bulletin, No. 4, February 1, 1943, p. 1, ibid., Box 156. This bulletin was a monthly newsletter issued by OPR during the war for public relations officers of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.

[44]Various sources were consulted in detailing the organization of the Office of Public Relations in May 1941: Thurber, "Navy Public Relations," 166-184; Douglas, "Public Relations," 1434-37; "Navy News for Your Newspaper," American Press (July 1941), p. 5; and personnel directories of OPR dated May 3, 1941, and June 15, 1941, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[45]Ltr., Chief of Naval Operations to Commandants, Naval Districts, May 9, 1941 (Serial 410509), U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, Operational Archives Branch, Classified Files of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Files of the General Board, Series 441. It is interesting to note that a subsequent letter from the Director of Naval Intelligence (June 24, 1941, Serial 1545016, also in the above series file) transferred the responsibility for a long list of naval reserve officers on inactive duty to the Office of Public Relations. On the list were Lieutenant Commanders Arthur Godfrey and Walter Winchell and Lieutenant (junior grade) Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.

[46]Naval message, Secretary of the Navy to Commandants, Naval Districts, June 7, 1941 (L60906200), Philibert Collection, Box 155; and ltr., Secretary of the Navy to multiple addressees, August 22, 1941 (A3-1), Record Group 80.

[47]"Organization Chart for Public Relations Office, Third Naval District," June 30, 1941, Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[48]Ltr., Lt. Cmdr. John T. Tuthill, Jr., USNR, to Lt. Cmdr. Harold O'Flaherty, USNR, October 8, 1941, Record Group 80.

[49]Hertz Interview.

[50]Douglas, "Public Relations," 1435. The War Department initiated these wartime public relations conferences with a meeting of Army public relations officers in Washington, March 11-14, 1941 (Mock and Larsen, "Army Public Relations," 279).

[51]"Distribution of Navy Department Press Releases by Naval District Public Relations Officers," mimeographed handout distributed at conference of naval district public relations officers, July 28-31, 1941, Washington, D.C., Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[52]Ltr., Director of Public Relations to Commandants, Naval Districts, August 14, 1941, OOR-6(39), contained in file "Separate Air Force," ibid., Box 157. Copies of the congressional bills referred to above (H.R.s 4532, 4962, 4987 and 5101 and S.1635, 77th Congress, 1st Session), along with the June 12, 1941, letter from Frank Knox to Walter Lippmann, the special Navy News Bulletin and the two Navy position papers are also contained in this file.

[53]"A Peek Under the Navy Lid," 53.

[54]Ltr., RAdm. Arthur J. Hepburn, USN, to RAdm. Adolphus Andrews, USN, undated, contained in file "Separate Air Force," Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[55]The Navy and War Departments had been working with the Post Office and Justice Departments since shortly after World War I on wartime censorship plans. On June 4, 1941, President Roosevelt approved a plan submitted by the Joint Army-Navy Board and appointed the Postmaster General to head a committee to finalize details of the plan the following November (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War, Washington, 1946, pp. 206-07).

[56]Chicago Tribune, September 5, 1941.

[57]"Navy's Plans for Overseas Communications Control Progressing," Navy Department news release, October 15, 1941, Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[58]Internal memoranda of the Office of Public Relations, October 24 and November 17, 1941, ibid.

[59]The above data on personnel and organizational changes in OPR were obtained from various letters and

memoranda, ibid., and from Thurber, "Navy Public Relations," 183.

[60]U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, "United States Naval Administration in World War II," unpublished narrative history of the Fifth Naval District, 45-46.

[61]"Directory of Public Relations Officers, District and Fleet Units," November 26, 1941, Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[62]Frank Knox, 1941 PRO Conference, p. 3.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST YEAR OF HOSTILITIES

On December 7, 1941, 360 Japanese carrier-based aircraft, operating from a naval striking force at sea, heavily attacked ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and military installations at Pearl Harbor and other locations on Oahu, Territory of Hawaii. Four battleships, one minelayer and one target ship were sunk; four battleships, three cruisers, three destroyers, one seaplane tender and one repair ship were damaged. The Navy Yard and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor; Naval Air Station, Ford Island; Naval Patrol Plane Station, Kaneohe; Marine Corps Airfield, Ewa; and Army airfields at Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows all were damaged. One hundred eighty-eight naval and Army aircraft were destroyed. Killed or missing were 2,004 Navy men, 222 Army personnel and 108 Marines. The Japanese lost five midget submarines, twenty-eight aircraft and fewer than 100 men.[1]

This is what happened at Pearl Harbor, but the American people were not given the complete story officially until a year later.

The Pearl Harbor News Blackout

Within hours after the attack, the Navy's plan for censorship of all outgoing cable and radio communications was placed in effect. Also, when queried by reporters, Army and Navy public relations officers simply replied that they had no information and had been instructed "not to talk on any subject."[2] The Navy further refused to allow the press to reprint a broadcast by Washington commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr., in which he had given considerable details of the attack obtained from congressional sources.[3]

Finally, on December 15, the Navy did announce that three destroyers, a minelayer and a target ship were sunk, one battleship had capsized and other vessels had been damaged. In the interim, however, eyewitnesses brought back firsthand accounts of much greater damage, and American radio stations and newspapers freely reported the exaggerated claims of the enemy picked up on Japanese radio broadcasts. The disparity between the official announcements and the unofficial accounts led to wild rumors that persisted for many months. It also contributed materially to the dissatisfaction with war news policies by both the press and public that marked the first year of the conflict.[4]

Public disapproval was slow in developing, however. Anger, fear and patriotic fervor were manifest in the hearts and minds of most Americans immediately following

Pearl Harbor. In a poll conducted by the Office of Facts and Figures in early January 1942, 53 per cent of the public agreed that withholding details of our losses and damage at Pearl Harbor was justifiable in order to avoid helping the enemy.[5] Twenty-nine per cent even went so far as to state that the people had no right at all to expect the story on losses any sooner than they got it. Only 7 per cent felt that there was no excuse whatsoever for delaying the initial news for a whole week, while 6 per cent said they could understand why the government wanted to hold it back but thought it did more harm than good.

A related question about future handling of news concerning military losses was quite revealing of the public's ambivalent attitude over the news versus security issue. Almost 74 per cent of those polled believed that military losses should be announced as soon as confirmed, as long as the news doesn't actually help the enemy. Interestingly enough, 13 per cent felt that bad news of this nature should be withheld until some good news could be released with it, while a sizable 10 per cent considered the best policy would be not to announce news of our losses at all.

"Aid and Comfort to the Enemy"

The early public acceptance of the necessity to maintain security was due in some measure to President

Roosevelt's speech the day after Pearl Harbor in which he outlined initial rules for news about the war. First, the accounts must be true, he said, and secondly, they must not give "aid and comfort to the enemy." Significantly, when asked who was to determine what information would fall in the latter category, the President replied that it would be up to the higher officers of the Army and Navy.[6] Thus, at the very outset, the decision whether or not to release war news was left to military sources.

The first area of secrecy, however, resulted from a direct order issued by the President himself. No casualty lists were to be published. It was reasoned, with considerable justification, that the enemy might induce from a complete list of names the ships and stations to which the dead and wounded were attached. Only the death of Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd was announced immediately. The first official casualty lists were not released until three months later.[7]

Many Army and Navy officers were convinced that the Japanese could have occupied Pearl Harbor if they had followed up their air attack with an invasion. The reason the enemy didn't, according to these officers, was that he did not know the full extent of the damages he had inflicted, despite his propaganda claims.[8] This assumption on the part of the American military was responsible in the

early stages of the war for a very strict interpretation of what information would give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Navy Security Measures

The Navy especially clamped down the lid of secrecy, particularly in the fleets and at advance bases where naval censors commandeered every outlet of communications. In Washington, Secretary Knox rescinded his September relaxation of the ban on publicity for British and Allied warships in U.S. waters, asking once again that there be no mention of the presence or movements of these vessels. Later in December, he requested the news media to refrain from publishing reports and rumors of U.S. forces sinking enemy submarines, unless they could be attributed directly to an official government spokesman.[9]

The secretary also took steps to ensure internal security. On December 17, he directed the district commandants to acquaint all naval and civilian personnel under their commands with their individual responsibility for observing naval and national security.[10] In the directive, he modified two of the voluntary censorship categories he had asked the press to guard against a year earlier. The publicity restriction on "new U.S. Navy ships or aircraft" was extended to "strength of military disposition," and the restraint on "U.S. Navy construction projects ashore" was changed to "productive capacity for

certain items used by the Navy." Still caught on the horns of the dilemma, however, Knox closed his instructions by cautioning the commandants not to let their security indoctrination procedures interfere with the dissemination of unclassified news by the district public relations offices. "The Navy must at all times keep the public informed on all matters not involving actual Naval or national security," he admonished.

The Navy's main difficulties with the press at this time centered around the censorship of cable, wireless and telephone messages leaving the North American continent. Foreign correspondents in particular complained bitterly about the delays in clearing messages, failure to notify writers of deletions in their material and the almost insurmountable difficulties encountered with foreign language dispatches. A group of British journalists appealed directly to Secretary Knox to alleviate the situation, and representatives of the Foreign Press Association conferred with other Navy officials.[11]

Meanwhile, the Army took the initiative in attempting to establish better press relations during this critical period. On December 19, officials of the War Department invited editors and publishers of all daily newspapers to discuss the status of war correspondents and "other things touching upon relations between the Army and

newspapers.[12] The Army also freely answered reporters' inquiries in Chicago shortly after Pearl Harbor, while Navy public relations representatives there said "no news will be released until the situation is clarified in Washington."[13]

Establishment of the Office of Censorship

The situation was clarified somewhat on December 19 when the President established the Office of Censorship under Byron Price, Executive News Editor of the Associated Press. The White House order provided for a Censorship Policy Board, whose membership included the two service secretaries, and a Censorship Operating Board to be made up of representatives of each government agency involved in censorship.[14]

The Office of Censorship soon was to take over from the Navy the troublesome task of controlling outgoing and incoming cable and radio communications. As for domestic censorship, Mr. Price, a firm advocate of freedom of the press, had extracted a commitment from President Roosevelt that policing of the press and radio should be undertaken by the news media themselves. Thus, on the home front, press censorship continued to follow the "voluntary cooperation" program instituted by Secretary Knox a year earlier, with the newspaper editors having the benefit of twelve months experience at deciding what news was printable and what was not.[15]

Mr. Price, however, did not rely on the newsmen's experience or Knox's guidelines for voluntary censorship. In January 1942, after consultation with the Army and Navy and other government agencies as well as prominent editors and broadcasters, he issued a Code of Wartime Practices for Press and Radio. The code spelled out certain classes of information which the news media were requested not to divulge unless made available to them by appropriate authority. Of special pertinence to the Navy were the following restricted categories:

> (1) The movements, identities and cargoes of naval and merchant ships, including those of our allies and enemies; and the sinking or damaging of these ships from war causes.
> (2) Details of new ships under construction, including advance information about launchings and commissionings; and the physical setup or technical details of shipyards.[16]

It should be emphasized that the censorship code applied to the press and not the Navy. If under the code the press was asked not to publish certain information, that same information could be released by the Navy if it so desired. By the same token, a story cleared by the Navy could be published even if it contained information which was restricted by the code.[17]

Mr. Price attached a proviso to his code in which he promised that news on all of the prohibited subjects would ultimately be released by the government. "But in war," he said, "timeliness is an important factor, and the

Government unquestionably is in the best position to decide when disclosure is timely."[18] The Navy's decisions on the timing of its releases, as we shall see, were to draw much criticism during the first year of the war.

The Office of Censorship had no responsibility for issuing information. This was a departure from the procedure followed in World War I, when the functions of censorship and information were combined under the Creel Committee on Public Information. The separation of the functions in World War II resulted from President Roosevelt's acceptance of the censorship plan drawn up by the Joint Army-Navy Board in 1937 and presented early in 1941.[19]

There were a number of naval officers directly attached to the Office of Censorship throughout the war for the purpose of security review. Relations between the Navy's Office of Public Relations and the "censorship people" were very good, according to Captain Harold B. Say, USNR (Retired).[20] The news media for the most part dealt directly with the Navy if they had any questions about the security status of Navy topics. At other times, newsmen would first contact the Office of Censorship, and that office would then call the Navy to check out the item. For these calls, Captain Say claimed, his office had an informal code worked out with "censorship" to circumvent the reluctance of Navy operational officers to release material.

If OPR wanted the subject in question released, Say would simply ask the censorship caller, "Are you asking me or telling me?" Once the Office of Censorship cleared an item, the Navy would say nothing about it.

Liaison With Other Government Information Agencies

When the United States entered the war, there were six civilian agencies of the federal government involved in propaganda and information activities. The most recent of these to be formed was the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), established in October 1941 under poet Archibald MacLeish to coordinate the work of the other information organizations.[21]

The policy-making body for OFF was its Committee on War Information, composed of representatives from various government agencies, including the Army and Navy. The Navy representative, appointed by Secretary Knox, was Adlai Stevenson, who later served as Governor of Illinois and was twice a Presidential candidate.

To offset the impact of Pearl Harbor and the resulting cloak of secrecy surrounding naval operations, Mr. Stevenson proposed a "project in public education" to restore the public's confidence in the Navy.[22] The thrust of this propaganda effort was to be directed at the Navy's many functions, responsibilities and limitations in a global war. Assisting Mr. Stevenson on the project was

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Christian Herter, OFF's liaison officer in the Navy Department and later Secretary of State under President Eisenhower.

The first step in the effort was to be a campaign to emphasize the "colossal character of war operations in the Pacific" by stressing the magnitude of geography, time differentials and other considerations concerning the world's largest ocean.[23] The task was labeled "Project Proposal No. 2" of OFF, and Admiral Hepburn assigned Wallace S. Wharton, the head of his press section, to act as OFF's liaison officer for the project.

Evidently this rather intriguing attempt at domestic propaganda never saw fruition, for the author was unable to find additional references to it beyond the two memoranda cited. It did serve as an example, however, of the type of liaison conducted between the Office of Public Relations and the other government information agencies in the early stages of the war.

Lieutenant Commander Wharton also was assigned to represent Admiral Hepburn at daily meetings held after Pearl Harbor at the headquarters of Colonel William Donovan, the President's Coordinator of Information (COI). In late January 1942, Bill Galvin, the Analysis Section chief, replaced Wharton as liaison officer with Donovan's group. Since the COI had been assigned the task of handling foreign propaganda, one of the chief functions of the Navy

contact officer was to provide Navy news and information for dissemination abroad by short-wave radio.

Similar to the Office of Censorship, the COI also had a number of Navy officers attached directly to his staff. One of these, as we have already seen, was Lieutenant Commander John Ford, the Hollywood motion picture director, who headed the Visual Presentation Section and had sixteen naval reserve officers under his direction in that COI unit. Colonel Donovan's principal assistant also was a naval reserve officer.[24]

Knox Takes Steps to Inform Public

Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Secretary Knox flew to Hawaii for a firsthand assessment of the situation. He returned convinced that secrecy on fleet operations in the Pacific would be paramount for some time to come and that it would be necessary to withhold other forms of information about the Navy's war effort as well. At the same time, he was determined to provide as much news for the public as possible within these security parameters.

One of the first actions he took was to bring Dempster MacMurphy, business manager of the Chicago Daily News, to Washington to survey Navy public relations needs, assets and liabilities. MacMurphy did not remain long; he quickly ran into opposition from many of the Regular Navy

officers in the bureaus and offices and never really got his study off the ground.[25]

The basic format for the release of Navy war news, the communique, took shape within a few weeks after Pearl Harbor, however.[26] A Communique Officer, Lieutenant Commander R. D. Hill, Jr., USNR (Retired), was assigned to the Press Section of OPR to prepare at least one official communique daily. For this purpose, he was provided with battle information and combat narratives by the Publicity Security Officer on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), and also received daily summaries from the Office of Naval Intelligence. After drafting the communique, Hill sent copies to the Office of Censorship and the COI prior to its release by the Navy press relations officer.[27]

The key man in the naval communique system was the COMINCH Publicity Security Officer. It was his responsibility, subject to higher authority on the fleet commander's staff and to appeals from the Director of Public Relations, to decide the content and timing of the communiques. He also represented the security policies and views of COMINCH in dealings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and later the Office of War Information. In addition, he prepared a weekly summary of Navy activities for use by the Secretary of the Navy at his press conferences. This important post was filled by three

officers during the war: Captain Theodore T. Patterson, USN, of the COMINCH Plans Division, who had newspaper experience before entering the Naval Academy--from December 1941 to June 1943; Captain John S. Phillips, USN, who became the first official Publicity Security Officer in the newly created Combat Intelligence Division of the fleet staff in June 1943; and Captain J. F. Walsh, USN, from March 1945 to the end of the war.[28]

To supervise the issuance of communiques and other Navy war news releases by the Office of Public Relations, Secretary Knox enticed Lieutenant Commander Paul C. Smith, USNR, editor and general manager of the San Francisco Chronicle, to return to active duty as head of the Press Section. He arrived ten days after Pearl Harbor to relieve Lieutenant Commander Wharton, who had already begun functioning as liaison officer with OFF and the COI. In a memorandum to the chiefs of Navy bureaus and offices, the secretary announced the arrival of Smith in glowing terms: (He) "is one of the most widely known and greatly respected editors of the country and he has come to serve at a very great personal sacrifice."[29]

In the same memorandum, Knox asked each bureau and office chief to set down the security rules he wished to be observed for news coming out of his department. He added:

> With these precautionary measures taken, I want each Bureau Chief to arrange so that the Public Relations Department will be provided freely with all

> information available that has news value. How much of this information is to be released will be passed upon by Admiral Hepburn. . . . In this way I think we can set up a news handling system which will function smoothly and will achieve the purpose I have in mind. That purpose is to give to the newspapers and other sources of public information the maximum news of Navy activities that can be made public with due regard for Navy Security and the protection of essentially secret matter.

The response to this memorandum was in most respects negative. The restrictions proposed by the naval military leaders, if instituted, would have been sufficient to render the entire Navy public relations program ineffective. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, submitted a list of thirty-eight subjects about which he believed no information whatsoever should be furnished to the press. According to Admiral Hepburn, this list covered "the entire field of news which is pertinent for inclusion in official communiques if the public is to be kept reasonably informed upon the progress of the war."[30]

Admiral Hepburn went on to say that the Navy's early war communiques had been criticized for "meagerness, woodenness and evasiveness," and that steps would have to be taken to improve the system for receiving information. He recommended that there be given to an officer-messenger of OPR current information from all bureaus and offices on the status of the war. The very same day, Secretary Knox forwarded the admiral's letter to all bureaus and offices with the terse statement: "The comments and recommendations

in Reference (a) are approved. Chiefs of Bureaus and Offices will take steps to insure effective cooperation with the Office of Public Relations."[31]

Frank Knox's frustration with the "security syndrome" of the military leadership seemed to reach its zenith in the early stages of the war, and he included the Army in his bitterness. In February 1942, he wrote to a friend:

> With respect to the public relations policy, my difficulty as a life-long newspaper reporter is to get the men of the two armed services to recognize that this is not a private war to be carried out surreptitiously, but that, after all, the country belongs to the public and the public is entitled to know all that we can tell them without giving away secrets to the enemy. But in simple terms, the task is to sell the idea that the people are to be told all that can be told them . . . instead of as little as possible--the less the better.
>
> The latter, unfortunately, is the peacetime attitude of the Army and Navy. In a system where promotion is dependent upon records, the instinct of the Army or Navy Officer when confronted with a reporter and a request for news is that if he says nothing he can't be hurt, but if he says something, it may be used to his disadvantage. Therefore, they have pursued a policy of silence consistently.[32]

The secretary himself, however, was at the center of a controversy that developed in January and February 1942 over the time of release of naval communiques. Since the war began, the Washington correspondents for morning newspapers had accused the Navy of timing its releases to benefit the evening papers, one of which was Knox's Chicago Daily News.

The issue came to a head on February 12, when

rumors spread that the Navy planned to release at noon the next day information about the Gilbert and Marshall Island raids on January 31. A group of morning newspapermen, led by Fred Pasley, acting chief of the New York Daily News Washington bureau, organized a telephone harassment campaign in an attempt to get the Navy to hold up the release until the following evening so that the morning papers could print it first. Pasley had additional word that the only two eyewitness correspondents embarked on the raids were reporters from the Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Times. He caustically told the Navy Press Section: "It's not going to look well if the release is so timed that an exclusive eyewitness account by a Knox man appears in a Knox paper and in papers served by a Knox syndicate."[33]

The persistence of the morning newspaperman paid off. It was decided to issue the initial communique about the raids on the evening of February 12, giving bare details for morning papers, and to follow up with a more complete release at 9:30 the next morning for the afternoon journals. A memorandum for the press the next day struck back at the battling journalists by saying, "The Navy Department considered this manner of release a fair distribution of the news to all concerned. Obviously, not everyone can be pleased in such a manner. Consequently, there's the explanation, and that's that."[34]

Secretary Knox had gotten wind of the controversy a

week earlier. On February 5, he wrote to Admiral Hepburn:

> Although I am certain that this precautionary suggestion is not necessary as far as either you or your senior officers are concerned, nevertheless I wish you would take the necessary steps in the Office of Public Relations so that under no circumstances will the representatives of the Chicago Daily News receive any more favorable treatment from Public Relations officers of the Navy Department than is received by the correspondents or writers of any similar newspaper under similar conditions.[35]

The secretary exhibited a personal concern for many facets of public relations during the early part of 1942. He sent a letter to all ships and stations encouraging commanding officers to be on the alert for publicity photography opportunities, citing several occasions on which there were no photographers on hand to record newsworthy events. He also was extremely interested in a fund-raising drive for the Navy Relief Society. The campaign was chaired nationally by Clarence Dillon of Dillon, Read & Company, New York, but involved considerable liaison work by the naval district public relations officers. Walter Winchell, an inactive-duty naval reserve lieutenant commander, was New York chairman.

Another program which required public relations cooperation by the Navy during 1942 was the effort on behalf of War Savings Bonds. Admiral Hepburn assigned one of his officers, Lieutenant Commander Eugene Zachman, USNR, to conduct public relations activities for the Coordinator for War Savings Bonds, Rear Admiral Charles Conrad, USN (Retired).[36]

New Public Relations Faces and Functions

When the war started, applications for commissions as public relations officers literally swamped both Washington and the naval districts. At the same time, the number of public relations officers was frozen, as were other specialties in the Navy. But within a few weeks, many of the younger officers serving in public relations assignments were detached for sea duty and other combat jobs. The rapid turnover in personnel, especially in the district offices, was complicated by the increased information workload brought on by the war. To compensate for these conditions, Secretary Knox initiated a policy of accepting for duty in public relations those officer candidates who had minor physical defects sufficient to disqualify them for sea duty.

The over-all quality of Navy public relations personnel thus began to decline somewhat from what it had been before the war, when officers were hand-picked for their special talents and capabilities. Evidence of the change was apparent in a memorandum written by Frank Mason in the fall of 1942 in which he aired a New York Times complaint about "young, inexperienced and irresponsible" naval reserve public relations officers.[37] The basis for the newspaper's criticism was the fact that one of its stories had been reviewed by a former Times office boy who had succeeded in getting a Navy commission.

The complaints over immature public relations officers, coupled with the difficulty in keeping certain of the young men in shore billets, caused the Office of Public Relations to consider limiting future assignments in the function to officers over the age of forty. Fortunately, this plan was nipped in the bud, partially by Paul Smith who wrote directly to Secretary Knox outlining strenuous objections to the policy.[38]

Experience was an instrumental factor in the decision early in 1942 to bring Leland P. Lovette, now a captain, back into OPR to relieve Commander Bob Berry as the Assistant Director. Berry remained as an executive assistant to Admiral Hepburn. A former head of the Public Relations Branch in ONI who had the respect and confidence of the Washington Press Corps, Captain Lovette--as a destroyer squadron commander--had two of his ships sunk in the attack on Pearl Harbor. According to Editor & Publisher, he brought back with him "that spirit of outraged indignation that animated anyone who witnessed the treacherous attack . . . and he infused this feeling in the entire public relations staff."[39]

Lovette found the public and the news media "in a high state of doldrums as a result of Pearl Harbor, and demanding details of all encounters."[40] He immediately promised that he would ensure the factual accuracy of future communiques and news releases, so that they would

"stand up in the light of history."

Other personnel changes in OFR early in 1942 saw Mr. J. Harrison Hartley take over the Radio Section from Lieutenant Commander Norvelle Sharpe and Lieutenant Commander William A. Bernrieder, USNR, relieve Lieutenant Commander James Stahlman as head of the Naval Districts Section. Stahlman reported to New Orleans as Eighth Naval District public relations officer.

Meanwhile, the increased demands of the news media following the outbreak of war dictated certain changes in the functions and activities of some of the sections in OFR. Hartley estimated that demands for services by the radio industry alone trebled after Pearl Harbor.[41]

Since the four major radio networks, all located in New York City, were devoting more and more broadcast time to the war effort, including naval activities, it became apparent that a branch office in New York to concentrate on the problems peculiar to network radio would have considerable value. The Army had already set up such a branch directly under its Bureau of Public Relations. The Navy followed suit on May 25, 1942, establishing in New York the Branch Radio Section, Office of Public Relations. The new office was under the direction of Lieutenant Morgan S. A. Reichner, USNR, former radio officer for the Third Naval District public relations office who had his own advertising firm in New York City before returning to active duty

in 1941.

In the spring of 1942, the Navy had three regular half-hour programs per week on network radio. "The First Line" was featured by CBS, while the Blue Network carried "Meet Your Navy" and Mutual aired "Anchors Aweigh." Hartley wisely recommended to Captain Lovette that additional programs not be added "for fear of our material becoming too spread out."[42]

The broadcasting industry, in addition to airing regular service-oriented programs, provided invaluable assistance to the military in recruiting and other campaigns. Early in the war, for instance, there was a shortage of binoculars in the rapidly expanding fleets. The Navy decided to ask the public for their binoculars on a loan basis for the duration and turned to radio to make the appeal. The broadcasters responded with such effectiveness that "within a month a steady supply of binoculars was reaching the Naval Observatory."[43]

Requests for assistance from magazine publishers also multiplied rapidly during this period. In March 1942, a new Magazine Section was formed in the Washington office, replacing the old Scripts Section. Victor Blakeslee, the long-time head of Scripts and now a lieutenant commander, was placed in charge of the new section. And as was done with radio, a Branch Magazine Section was set up in New

York, with Lieutenant James Van Alen, USNR, as director.

The upgrading of service to magazines was particularly timely at this stage because naval personnel were beginning to return from combat zones with action stories of great interest to magazine editors. Within six months of its establishment, the Magazine Section of OFR was handling 250 manuscripts per month, both for magazines and books. Its biggest story of the year was an interview with Lieutenant Commander John D. Bulkley, USN, the PT-Boat skipper who directed the evacuation of General MacArthur from the Philippines. Arrangements were made for Bulkley, during a visit to Washington, to work with a writer from the section in developing the story. Readers Digest printed it in full; and later the book They Were Expendable was published about the adventures of Bulkley and other PT-Boat personnel.[44]

In another organizational change, a sub-section of the Pictorial Section was located in the Larz Anderson Mansion on Massachusetts Avenue to supervise the Navy's combat art program, war posters, and special displays and exhibits. Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert L. Parsons, USNR, was designated officer-in-charge of this activity. The new sub-section stemmed from a recommendation on December 29, 1941, by the Committee on War Information that the Office of Facts and Figures coordinate the preparation and distribution of all government war posters.

The combat art program, meanwhile, was now in full swing after its initiation in the fall of 1941. Lieutenant Commander Griffith Bailey Coale already had painted scenes depicting a convoy enroute to Iceland and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Four young artists, Lieutenants (junior grade) Dwight C. Shepler and William F. Draper of Boston and Albert K. Murray of New York, and Ensign Mitchell Jamieson of Washington were commissioned early in 1942 and sent to sea to record dramatic incidents in combat areas. It is interesting to note that these artists were well received in the fleets partially because they could omit confidential details in a painting that a photograph might reveal. Another prominent artist, John Taylor Arms, known for his etchings of architectural subjects, was engaged under Navy contract to etch various types of combat vessels, both under construction and in a completed state.

An additional function undertaken by Navy public relations shortly after our entry into the war was the providing of publicity for special recruiting drives. Less than a week after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Hepburn wrote the district commandants that their immediate publicity emphasis should be on the Navy's need for men. In April 1942, he dispatched two letters stressing the requirement for publicity on the Class V-1 and Class V-5 recruiting programs for non-aviation and aviation officers respectively.

By April 1942, there were fifty-seven officers, ten

enlisted men and seventy-three civilians in the Office of Public Relations--exclusive of the branch personnel in New York--for a grand total of 140, an increase of forty-nine since Pearl Harbor. Of the fifty-seven officers, only nine were Regular Navy, showing the reliance by the Navy on uniformed civilians performing public relations duties.[45]

Admiral King, A Formidable Obstacle

In each war, certain men emerge as strong and natural leaders of a particular aspect of their nation's war effort. In naval operational matters in World War II, such a man was Admiral Ernest J. King.

King was personally selected by President Roosevelt to relieve Admiral Husband Kimmel as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet[46] following the disaster at Pearl Harbor, and furthermore was made directly responsible to the President himself. Three months later--on March 12, 1942--he also was designated to replace Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations. This unprecedented move of combining in one man the Navy's two top military commands gave King a greater concentration of power than had ever been vested in any previous American naval officer.[47] It also had significant implications for the Navy's wartime public relations program, since all policies for the release of information had to have at least King's tacit approval if not his wholehearted support. In the first stages of the war, that

approval was very difficult to come by.

The natural aversion to publicity shared by seafaring men seemed to be personified in Admiral King. Added to this was his absolute preoccupation with security following Pearl Harbor. He especially wanted to avoid the appearance of any information which might reveal to the Japanese that their codes had been broken or let the Germans know about our anti-submarine techniques.[48] He was most sincere in his conviction that lives could be saved and battles won by withholding or delaying the release of many details about our wartime operations. "If I can save one life by restricting public relations, I will,"[49] he remarked at one point early in the war. It was a sentiment not easily argued against, and one shared by many others.

Inevitably, King's negative approach to public relations was destined to clash with Frank Knox's more liberal views on the subject. It was one of the few instances of basic disagreement between the two men during the war.[50] The secretary had concurred with the President in the choice of King as the top naval military leader and had great respect for the admiral's unusual abilities and long experience, despite the fact that he was often by-passed by him on operational and many administrative matters.

King and Knox never really reconciled their differences over release of information policies. Theoretically,

of course, the Secretary of the Navy had final say on what was to be released and what withheld. In actual practice, however, King's views usually prevailed, particularly during the first two years of the war. For instance, through 1943 he was able to maintain a policy of permitting virtually no stories of an operational nature to be cleared in the theaters of combat. Each one had to be referred back to Washington, where his deputies censored them in conjunction with the Office of Public Relations. More often than not during this period, the admiral's deputies voted on the side of caution and refused material that the secretary's representatives and later they themselves would have passed.[51]

Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer, USN (Retired), recorder of the Navy's wartime administrative history, definitely states that Admiral King's desires on the release of information were accommodated in the long run.[52] Furer cites as evidence for his conclusion the fact that the Director of Public Relations ultimately was ordered to report both to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. At least one parochial vote for Secretary Knox as the winner in the dispute, however, was registered in a postwar letter to Mrs. Knox discussing the public relations disagreements between the two men. "King was always adverse to publicity. He was built that way. Frank, with his newspaper background, naturally had different

views which, of course, prevailed."[53]

An example of King's distrust of Knox as a newspaper publisher occurred at a top level and top secret briefing on Guadalcanal early in the war. The secretary missed a point and asked the admiral to go into more detail. King looked at him and said, "Of course, you realize this is completely off-the-record, Mr. Secretary!"[54]

Early in 1942, Admiral Hepburn had a meeting with King at which the fleet commander agreed that it would be all right to "loosen up a little" on releasing policy. A few days later, the Chicago Tribune took a regular naval communique about defenses on Midway and added to it some information obtained from secret messages seen months earlier by an employee who was a former naval officer. The resulting story should have been submitted for clearance by the newspaper, but instead was passed by an assistant news editor who thought it was simply a rewrite of the official communique. Upon reading the article, Admiral King immediately called Admiral Hepburn and roared, "I didn't mean to loosen up that much!"[55]

Frank Knox also took exception to what he considered carelessness on the part of the Tribune in publishing secret information. In late 1942, he wrote to Will Hays complaining that:

> Bertie McCormick's praise of the Navy falls on rather deaf ears. On two separate occasions, he has not let any concern for the Navy and security of the

> men who man our ships prevent him from publishing information of the highest value to the enemy.[56]

When the carrier Lexington was sunk in the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8, 1942, news of her loss was withheld for thirty-five days, even ten days after her survivors and thousands of others who saw her go down arrived in San Diego on June 2. The rationale for this delay was based on the top secret fact that a powerful Japanese fleet was prowling the mid-Pacific evidently bound for a major strike against Midway. Since the Lexington had been sunk by one of our own destroyers after sustaining critical damage, Admiral King assumed that the enemy did not know of her loss. At least, he wanted the Japanese to think that the carrier would be available to defend the U.S. outpost. Whether or not the enemy fell for the trick, it is true that they turned tail and ran in the ensuing Battle of Midway. King was convinced that their ignorance of the loss of the Lexington led them to overestimate the size of the American force, and thus he felt justified in keeping quiet about the earlier sinking. Nevertheless, the lateness in the announcement caused a tremendous furor to be raised by the press and many Congressmen.[57]

Also in the spring of 1942, King was urgently concerned about the attack on Allied merchant shipping mounted by German submarines near our Atlantic Coast. As a result, he issued a stringent directive prohibiting all publicity

about our own submarine operations. This directive was so literally interpreted that the security review officer in OPR could not even get fiction stories about submarines cleared.[58]

Within the limits of his security policies, however, the admiral tried to be helpful to the news media, according to his biographer, Walter Whitehill. Although he did not hold any formal press conferences during the war, he frequently met on an informal basis during 1942-1944 with a group of Washington correspondents at a friend's house in Alexandria, Va., giving them background briefings on current naval operations. This relationship resulted in the following "citation" being presented by these correspondents to "Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King" after the war:

> For conspicuous bravery and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in performance of which he daringly ignored his own natural instincts, and alone and singlehandedly, at a moment when adverse winds of publicity were threatening to sink the whole fleet, exposed himself to a frontal assault by the picked shock troops of the journalistic enemy led by some of the most reprehensible and blood-thirsty Washington correspondents, and from that moment on, never retiring to cover from their incessant salvoes of crossfire, stormed the enemy in its own defenses and in the decisive and little-known Battle of Virginia conquered and captivated them completely.[59]

German Submarines Stir Up News Controversy

One of the earliest and probably largest headaches for the Navy's Office of Public Relations and the U.S. Office of Censorship during the war began in early 1942

over procedures for releasing information about merchant ship sinkings by German submarines off our Atlantic Coast.

On January 15, 1942, the pages of newspapers were filled with reports about the close-in German submarine activity, with the lead story being the sinking of the Coimbra east of New York. The press, it would seem, was not violating the censorship code, issued only a few days earlier, because that code permitted publication of news announced by "appropriate authority." The problem was that Byron Price had failed to identify in his code just who would be considered proper authority. When the merchant ships began going down and survivors drifting back ashore, every small-town police chief and young Coast Guard lieutenant along the coast suddenly became "appropriate authorities" for the release of such news, which in turn was verified by the district public relations office in New York without prior check with Washington.[60]

The Office of Naval Intelligence immediately fired off a "broadside" at Admiral Hepburn, demanding that "proper steps be taken to withhold from publication news of enemy operations in United States coastal areas."[61] In response, the Director of Public Relations sent a dispatch on January 16 to the commandants of coastal naval districts, establishing the policy that all announcements concerning merchant ship sinkings and enemy submarine operations in their waters would henceforth be made first by the Navy

Department in Washington.[62] Hasty consultation with the Office of Censorship had secured a tentative agreement that all such releases would be channeled through the Press Section of OPR, with the Navy now designated as the sole "appropriate authority" for news of this nature. OPR quickly followed up its message to the coastal commandants with detailed instructions on how to handle such delicate matters as survivor interviews and eyewitness accounts (see note 17).

On January 17, the Office of Public Relations apologized to the press for the misunderstanding surrounding the Coimbra incident, in the form of a "not for publication" explanatory memorandum issued by Paul Smith. The new head of the Press Section, while stating that the Navy Department in Washington was without authentic information about the sinking, nevertheless did not excuse the Navy's responsibility for the resulting confusion--in which some newspapers carried the story while others killed it in the absence of official confirmation. Lieutenant Commander Smith's tactful approach to the situation enabled him to solicit press cooperation in withholding such stories in the future until they could be cleared by his office, "even though the incident may be within the view of shore observers, and even if the information has been given by local officials, Naval or otherwise."[63]

The controversy also elicited an apology from Byron

Price, who in a statement to managing editors admitted that "the confusion recently over submarine activities has been due to a series of errors on the part of all concerned, including the Office of Censorship."[64] Price assured the editors that the necessity to clear stories with Washington applied specifically to the subject of enemy action against merchant ships and sinkings of enemy submarines. Naval authorities in outlying possessions could still clear and distribute news without checking with Washington, and the naval district public relations officers retained the authority to release naval information of other types within their areas.

The security rationale behind the withholding of news about merchant ship sinkings was valid only if one agreed with the Navy's premise that the primary enemy intelligence reports on the subject came from the skippers of German submarines who fired the torpedoes. Reports from these sources quite naturally were open to question. Even if the enemy commanding officer was absolutely sure that the ship he attacked did indeed go to the bottom, which could not always be the case, he was reluctant to break radio silence to inform his superiors because of the peril in which this would place his own vessel. If he chose to wait until he returned to port, the information could be delayed for weeks. In addition, he might not make it back to port at all, in which case the information about a

particular sinking would never reach enemy headquarters.[65]

The main flaw in the Navy's logic was that quite probably German Intelligence pieced together considerable information about these sinkings from their agents ashore, who did not need to read the newspapers or listen to the radio to get their information. There were plentiful eye-witness accounts and survivor stories floating around. The wide circulation given to these accounts and stories made it very difficult for the press to accept the ban and delays on publicity about ship sinkings. At least one editorial writer, in denouncing the policy, not only insisted that Hitler knew how many ships the U-boats had sunk, but further claimed that the American public should be given the information too in order to jar it out of its complacency.[66]

The Navy had another reason in addition to security for delaying the sinking announcements, however. The Maritime Commission had requested that no release be made about the incidents "until the commission has had an opportunity to notify the ship's owners and operators, who in turn will inform the insurance underwriters and next of kin."[67]

Still another twist to the merchant ship problem arose in early March. Despite the restrictions, some newspapers persisted in printing uncleared stories obtained from survivors of the sinkings, including lurid details

which began to erode the morale of the entire Merchant Marine. This prompted Admiral Hepburn to write to the district commandants:

> It has lately developed that the type of publicity resulting has created a serious situation with respect to the morale of merchant crews. Cases have occurred where serious difficulty and delay have been experienced in securing crews. The principal source of trouble is the emphasis by the press upon the "horror" aspects of casualties as gathered from survivors. Conversely, (there has been) the comparative dearth of news items showing heroic actions or good morale.[68]

The only solution open to the admiral on the survivor interview problem was to attempt to bring these interviews under Navy control as much as possible. Accordingly, he issued instructions in his letter that the district public relations officers interview the survivors first and then preside over their initial contacts with the press.

Admiral Hepburn took a major step in late March to neutralize some of the press dissatisfaction over the new controversial merchant ship issue. In a memorandum to all district public relations officers, he implored them to search for ways to make the press understand the reasons and "reasonableness" of the current policy.[69] His plea was significant in that it represented the first evidence since the war began of a growing realization that quite possibly the press and the public had not been presented with sufficient information to give them a basis for gracefully accepting censorship.

In early June, the releasing procedure for ship sinkings, which at last had been operating smoothly, received a jolt from an unexpected source--Congress. On the night of June 9, Washington Senator Homer T. Bone issued an announcement about a ship sinking from his office. He felt qualified to do so, because the survivors had landed in his home state and the Navy had provided him with information about the incident. Further, the watch officer in the Office of Censorship passed the story because he quite properly judged members of Congress to be "appropriate authorities." No crisis developed over this loophole in the policy, but the Navy was forced to release its own story on the sinking within a couple of hours after the Senator's release.[70]

The Navy also received criticism from the press concerning its operational measures to combat the U-Boat menace. Over 300 merchant ships and tankers in the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and along the U.S. Atlantic Coast had been sunk between mid-January and late June of 1942. In the wake of these losses, columnists Arthur Krock and Walter Lippmann urged the sea service to compensate for the shortage of destroyers by using small boats to locate and fight the German submarines. The Navy countered with the claim that such small craft were not seaworthy enough and did not have the listening devices, speed and armament to deal with the modern submarine. The onslaught of the

columnists continued, however; and on June 27, the Navy announced that it was relaxing its restrictions to allow 1,000 small boats and crews to qualify for anti-submarine patrol. "In so doing," Fortune declared, "it may have been rolling with the columnists' punches, hoping to stop criticism."[71]

The merchant ship issue continued to cause certain problems throughout 1942. Early in May, the taking of photographs for publicity purposes of damaged ships which managed to return to port had been prohibited. This directive was so literally interpreted that it had to be canceled in late June because no photographs at all of these ships were being taken. Since the Navy needed such photographs for intelligence purposes, the order was modified to allow commercial photographers, who were often the only ones at the scene, to take pictures--provided they were submitted for clearance. On June 1, the press was requested not to identify the ports where survivors landed except in very general terms such as "an East Coast port." This irritating restriction was finally rescinded in late December when the instances of sinkings close to our shores were considerably reduced.[72]

The reason for this reduction, however, the increasing success of our anti-submarine warfare measures, continued to be cloaked in secrecy. On June 3, 1942, the Secretary of the Navy sent a message to all naval commands

stating, "No information concerning activities of U.S. submarines will be released for publication prior to initial release by SecNav."[73] Admiral Hepburn attempted to relax this stringent policy by submitting a detailed plan to Secretary Knox in July which would have permitted considerable background information to be given out on anti-submarine capabilities.[74] What happened to this plan is not known. It is known, however, that at least as far as our own submarine actions are concerned, the "silent service" label applied early in 1942 remained appropriate throughout the war.

The Navy did make public in late summer the first casualty list of Merchant Marine personnel killed or missing as a result of enemy action. And, it is interesting to note that shortly after the Germans launched their attack on coastal shipping, the prewar restrictions against publishing photographs of merchant ships armed or being armed was purposefully lifted.[75]

First Casualty List and Initial Policy Declarations

Complete lists of dead and wounded were a troublesome security and public relations problem from the very start of the war. Right after Pearl Harbor, the Army and Navy had agreed on a procedure for releasing casualty lists while at the same time protecting security and providing for next of kin to be notified before the public announcement.

However, on December 12, President Roosevelt ordered that no general release of casualties by names be made, merely total numbers and categories. In late January 1942, the Office of Facts and Figures asked the War and Navy Departments to join with it in making a recommendation to the President to allow publication of such lists by names.[76]

Meanwhile, the Navy had been holding up announcements of naval losses until lists of survivors could be thoroughly checked and the next of kin of all casualties notified. Due to the Navy policy of permitting frequent shifts of personnel between ships and stations in the fleets and outlying areas and other factors peculiar to sea warfare, there were often long delays in obtaining accurate information on casualties. Thus, in the middle of March 1942, news releases concerning the loss of nine naval vessels were pending because the next of kin had not yet been notified.[77]

Admiral Hepburn became concerned over what he termed "an increasing tendency on the part of the press and public to suspect that the Navy was withholding unfavorable news regarding ship losses because of the grim picture it presents."[78] He based this concern on an analysis of editorial comment and personal conversations with leading journalists and radio commentators. An example of the editorial comment which disturbed the admiral appeared in the New York Times on March 12: "Unnecessary suspicions,

unwarranted delay, and confusion over what information the Navy Department actually does release is not calculated to stiffen American morale in a long hard war."[79] The day after this editorial appeared, Admiral Hepburn recommended to Secretary Knox that naval losses be announced as soon as confirmed, provided that no security considerations were involved (see note 77). Every effort would be made to inform the next of kin prior to the public announcement, but this would no longer be an absolute prerequisite for the news release.

A few days later, the Committee on War Information of OFF issued a press release stating that the government pledged to give the American people the bad war news as well as the good, so long as it would not give aid and comfort to the enemy.[80] It was the first comprehensive government statement of policy on war information and represented the first official admission that there was press and public dissatisfaction with the manner in which war news was being handled.

The release included a long-awaited decision regarding the publication of casualty lists. Lists of servicemen killed in action would be made public on the condition that the news media would not issue nationwide summaries of casualties. They were to confine themselves to publishing only the names from their own areas.

On May 2, the Navy released its first casualty list

of the war, covering the period from December 7, 1941, to April 15, 1942. The list consisted of the names of dead, wounded and missing, as a result of enemy action, of the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps. In consonance with the earlier decision, it carried with it the stipulations that newspapers and local radio stations must use only names whose next of kin reside in their respective circulation and broadcast vicinities, and that magazines and radio networks should restrict themselves to names of national significance or interest. The promise was made that additional lists would be compiled as rapidly as possible upon receipt of information and the notification of next of kin.[81]

By this time, however, a firm procedure had been worked out to hold up the lists only thirty-six hours after telegrams were sent to the next of kin. The lists were compiled by a sub-section in the Press Section of OFR headed by a civilian, Mr. Robert Templeton.

A second major announcement in the Office of Facts and Figures March press release about war information policy was that future "joint bulletins," giving a general review of the military situation in various theaters of operation, would be issued from time to time by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

The policy declaration also spelled out in detail for the first time the reasons for withholding certain

types of news. The rationale given for restricting specific naval news showed much evidence that Admiral King's rigid ideas on what should and should not be released were very much in ascendancy at the beginning of the war. For instance, any news of the sinking of American combat ships was ruled out until it would no longer be of any value to the enemy. Damage sustained by U.S. Navy ships would be reported when it occurs in sight of the enemy, but the extent of the damage normally would not be announced until repairs had been made.

Three reasons were advanced for the policy of withholding any news of enemy submarine sinkings. The first two had considerable validity: these actions were difficult to verify; and the enemy would probably send another submarine to replace one that he knew for sure was lost. The third reason was not so easy to rationalize. It was claimed that withholding news of enemy submarine sinkings would have an "adverse psychological effect" on the enemy. Presumably, it was felt that in the absence of any news, anxiety would build up in the enemy camp when a submarine failed to return to its home port as scheduled.

The press release underscored one indisputable factor behind some of the delays in naval news. So often, it was absolutely essential for a ship or task force to maintain radio silence in order not to tip off the enemy as to its location. Consequently, reports of sea engagements

were frequently not filed until a vessel reached port.

The press and public had no quarrel with the basic philosophy of not giving out information that would aid the foe. As we shall see, however, they were shortly to disagree with some of the Navy's judgments as to what information fell in that category. But first, let us look at another step being taken at this time to further the information flow, the refining of procedures for handling war correspondents.

Accreditation of War Correspondents

There had been a system in effect for some time in the Administrative Section of OPR for accrediting correspondents to the fleets and for special embarkations. In the emergency period prior to the war, many media obtained Navy accreditation for correspondents on a "wait and see" basis. When the war began, these accredited reporters flocked to Hawaii and other points, eager to embark with the fleets.

Due to the critical operational situation and the emphasis on security, there were few embarkations in the Pacific in the first months following Pearl Harbor, however. Correspondents were required to fit their material into the framework of official communiques from the battle areas, and often were able to fill in details on those communiques only days and sometimes even weeks after

particular operations took place. By order of the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the communiques always had to precede press copy, which first had to be submitted to the fleet public relations officer for checking by the fleet censor.[82] Press copy of an operational nature, even after this censorship at the source, had to be sent back to the Office of Public Relations for clearance.

There was at least one early complaint filed by a correspondent over the initial procedures for handling press copy in the Pacific. In late February 1942, Admiral Nimitz referred two articles written by John O'Donnell of the New York Daily News, which had been disapproved by the censor, back to Admiral Hepburn with the remark that the reporter "proposes to discuss their disposition with the Secretary of the Navy."[83]

It was obvious to both the Navy and the Army that procedures for handling war correspondents needed to be updated. As a consequence, in April 1942, a common policy for accreditation and other details connected with these correspondents was worked out between the two services; and a Joint Army and Navy War Correspondents Credentials Board was established to consider each request for accreditation. In announcing the policy to naval commands, Secretary Knox directed maximum cooperation with accredited war correspondents consistent with security. He emphasized

that "this cooperation is to be interpreted as including authorization for embarking these accredited correspondents on board vessels or other craft of the United States."[84]

Each correspondent was required to sign three waivers prior to receiving his accreditation. He had to waive all claims against the government for losses, damages or injuries incurred while attached to a military unit; he had to subject himself to abide by the provisions of U.S. Navy Regulations and other pertinent instructions in the area of his attachment; and he had to agree to submit his material for censorship.

Censorship rules for war correspondents were agreed to jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments and the Office of Censorship in May 1942. The basic regulations required that all press dispatches filed from outside the continental United States had to be cleared through the cognizant U.S. military or naval commander at the point of filing. If a dispatch was received without evidence of such clearance, however, it could be passed by the Office of Censorship in the United States.

In September 1942, the Navy further required war correspondents embarking with the fleets to have a license signed by the fleet public relations officer or the fleet censor. This was in addition to regular accreditation credentials issued by the Army-Navy correspondents board. Also, radio broadcasts by commentators embarked with the

forces afloat had to have the approval of the Director of Public Relations. In November, both the Army and Navy began requiring the submission of governmental Personnel Security Questionnaires from correspondents desiring accreditation for the purpose of conducting background investigations on them.[85]

The system for handling war correspondents was working smoothly by the fall of 1942, and a large number of press and radio reporters operated out of Hawaii under the control of the Pacific Fleet commander. However, it was still difficult for correspondents to embark in a Navy ship under combat conditions, despite Secretary Knox's encouragement to commanders to allow them to do so. A reviewer of the book, Queen of the Flat-Tops, lamented in December 1942:

> One of the minor disappointments of the year has been the dearth of good stories in the Pacific. Here in an ocean lapping at the feet of half the people of the world is being fought the greatest naval war of history. That war has encompassed for us the disaster of Pearl Harbor, the hopelessness of Cavite, the desperate heroism of Macassar Straits and the Java Sea, the elation of Midway--here were stories that had everything but reporters.[86]

There were complaints from photographers, too, that not enough attention was being given to the picture agencies, which pooled their coverage by means of a "Still Picture Pool." The Associated Press, Acme, International News Photos and Life initiated the pool under rules set forth by the Army and Navy. There were more than thirty

such pool photographers, but as late as October 1942 only four were accredited with the Pacific Fleet.[87]

Establishment of the Office of War Information

Not long after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt stated that he was opposed to the "establishment of one large department of information which would issue, as in the last war, all information put out by the government."[88] He seemed to prefer that each office and department of the government speak through its own information service.

As we have seen, however, the government was often criticized during the first few months of the conflict for its handling of war information. In particular, news of military and naval operations were considered by many to be "belated, confusing, or inadequate."[89] The charge was hurled also that the government was "sugar-coating" the news by withholding or minimizing information about our more serious losses, including those at Pearl Harbor. The Committee on War Information of OFF wrestled with the problem of developing a common information policy, but press and public dissatisfaction continued to grow.

Finally, on June 13, 1942, the President consolidated the information functions of several agencies, including the Office of Facts and Figures, into one Office of War Information (OWI).[90] The new office, headed by the well-known broadcaster Elmer Davis, operated directly under

the President as part of the Office of Emergency Management.

The Director of War Information was made responsible for coordinating the information activities of all federal departments and agencies. However, each department and agency retained control of information programs relating to its own authorized activities, subject to the policies formulated or approved by OWI. Significantly, the determination as to whether specific military information would be of aid to the enemy was left in the hands of the War and Navy Departments, where it was placed by the President right after Pearl Harbor. There was a stipulation, however, that the Director of War Information would be consulted by the Army and Navy on releasing matters.[91]

Shortly after he took office, Elmer Davis proposed to the two services that he be provided a daily report of all military operations, after which it would be determined by mutual conference what news should be released and what should not. The services agreed to this procedure as it applied to military communiques to be issued by their own information agencies. However, they were extremely reluctant to give OWI any information which they did not wish made public, because they considered Davis to be the primary official advocate of full disclosure and hence a "major government security problem."[92]

The meetings of OWI's Committee on War Information

Policy--set up on the same lines as the old OFF Committee on War Information--were not productive, according to Davis, because the Secretaries of State, War and Navy appointed their respective information chiefs to be their representatives on the committee. "(These were) gentlemen who, whatever their competence in operations, had little to say about the information policies even of their own departments. . . ."[93]

Although Elmer Davis' first dispute was with the Army over the capture and trial of Nazi saboteurs who landed from a submarine on the East Coast,[94] his major problems during the remainder of 1942 were with the Navy, as we shall see in the next section.

While OWI did not have the authority that Elmer Davis desired in the matter of press releases, it did maintain strict control over all government participation in commercial radio. Every program proposed by any office or agency had to be channeled in writing through OWI, and each script had to be reviewed and cleared by its radio bureau. That bureau also served as the central point of contact for government relationships with the broadcasting industry.[95]

Daily contacts were maintained from the very beginning between the various sections of the Navy Office of Public Relations and their counterparts in OWI. Bill Galvin, now a commander, served as Admiral Hepburn's

liaison officer with OWI, as he had done earlier with the Coordinator of Information and OFF. Seven officers from the Office of Naval Intelligence, including one admiral, were assigned to OWI for security purposes.[96]

Good News First, Then the Bad

As mentioned in the last section, suspicion grew on the part of the press and public early in the war that the government was "sugar-coating" the news for morale purposes. While the full extent of our losses at Pearl Harbor was not known, there was a whispered belief that they were much greater than announced. In the eyes of many, the Japanese must have known what damage they did at Pearl Harbor; therefore, it naturally followed that the only reason the complete story was being withheld was to prevent the public from knowing the true seriousness of our military situation. When the Navy made an announcement on April 18, 1942, that certain of the ships damaged at Pearl Harbor had been repaired and were back in service, Bob Casey of the Chicago Tribune cynically laid a story on the censor's desk in Hawaii stating, "The Navy announced today that seven of the two ships sunk at Pearl Harbor have been put back in commission!"[97]

The Navy, probably inadvertently, contributed greatly to the "sugar-coating" theory, when it released early reports that more than sixty Japanese ships had been

sunk by Allied fleets in the Battle of Makassar Strait on January 24, 1942. The true figure was four, but this final tally was not arrived at until all battle reports were authenticated. The incident was a prime example of the difficulty in substantiating losses at sea, especially in the Pacific during the early stages of the war, when many battles were fought at night or at distances in which contesting ships were out of sight of each other. The experience also led to more caution on the part of naval commanders in the future in reporting enemy losses and hence to delays in receiving and announcing the losses back home.[98]

In early March, a representative of the Office of Facts and Figures accused the Navy of giving out all of the good news and little of the bad in its communiques.[99] Cited in particular was the communique reporting the Battle of Badeong Strait on February 19, which left the Japanese fleet withdrawing to the north apparently frustrated in its attempt to invade the island of Bali. The actual invasion followed closely, however, without subsequent statements from the Navy.

Some of the confusion in reporting results of naval battles in the Pacific during these first few months was due to a lack of coordinated releasing policy with our Allies. At this stage of the campaign, American, British, Dutch and Australian combined fleets (the ABDA forces) were

desperately attempting to harass the Japanese march into the Netherlands East Indies. After the Battle of Coral Sea in early May, news of the engagement was released in both Washington and Melbourne. The Australian communique reported that U.S. Army bombers played a major role in the victory, a fact unmentioned in the U.S. Navy announcement. Intelligence reports received later indicated that no Army bombs fell on any Japanese ships.[100]

The major Navy information problem developing out of the Battle of Coral Sea--the sinking of the Lexington and subsequent withholding of that fact for thirty-five days--has already been discussed.

The Battle of Midway, June 4-6, 1942, was hailed as a major victory for U.S. forces, which it was. Four Japanese aircraft carriers and one cruiser were sunk; and Admiral Yamamoto's force retreated westward early in the battle, abandoning plans to invade Midway. Newsreels in late June and early July glorified the victory with "excellent aerial shots showing enemy ships maneuvering frantically to escape American ships and planes, and finally going up in flames."[101]

An important factor in the Japanese defeat at Midway was the breaking of their naval code by American cryptologists shortly before the Battle of the Coral Sea, enabling the U.S. Navy to obtain advance information on the order of battle for the enemy fleet.[102] Returning from the

Pacific after Midway, a correspondent wrote a detailed account of the Japanese order of battle which was published in the Chicago Tribune, Washington Times-Herald and New York Daily News. The information was attributed to "reliable sources in naval intelligence." The Navy immediately reacted by recommending to the U.S. Attorney General that an investigation be conducted to determine whether the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended in 1940, had been violated. A grand jury, convened in Chicago in August 1942, ruled against any indictment of the Tribune or any other newspaper "because of the great public interest involved concerning the story that the Navy had advance knowledge of the strength of the Japanese fleet."[103]

The good news of Midway was cheering to the American people, but it was offset shortly after the battle by the announcement that the Lexington had been sunk earlier in the Battle of the Coral Sea. However, the Navy was not to reveal until 100 days later--on September 16--that still another carrier, the Yorktown, had been sunk in the Battle of Midway itself.

The rationale behind the long delay in announcing the sinking of the Yorktown was that it had only been damaged in the actual battle and was not sunk until three days later when it was torpedoed by a lone Japanese submarine. Again, the Navy's security experts assumed that the enemy did not know of the loss, especially since they

had every reason to believe that the submarine which accomplished the sinking was destroyed itself a short time later. Further, initial plans were being made at the time for the first U.S. offensive against the Japanese in the Solomon Islands. A major part of the strategy, of course, was to deceive the enemy as to our strengths and weaknesses. If there was any doubt in his mind that the Yorktown had been sunk, why resolve that doubt by an official confirmation, the reasoning went.

The above rationale might have been accepted by the press and the public if the Japanese themselves had not announced shortly after the Battle of Midway the sinking of a U.S. aircraft carrier. One newspaper editorial put it this way:

> (The) announcement that . . . the carrier Yorktown had been sunk . . . hangs up a new record in delayed communiques. The official excuse for this tardy announcement would have us believe that it was not until this week that the Navy Department was sure that the Japs knew the Yorktown had gone down. Yet on June 8th this newspaper carried a dispatch reporting that the Japanese radio had definitely announced the sinking of a large U.S. aircraft carrier the day before. Just who was the Navy trying to kid--the Japs or the American people?
> . . . There is the uncomfortable suspicion that the American people, instead of being told the truth as soon as the truth can be told, are being fed bits of good news and bits of bad news according to a scientific dietary program worked out by morale experts who look upon us as a mixture of boobs and fraidy-cats.[104]

The opinion that military information was being tampered with for morale purposes was compounded by the fact that only twenty-four hours before the announcement

about the Yorktown's loss. Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, Pacific Fleet destroyer commander, held a press conference in Washington at which he claimed the U.S. fleet in the Pacific was now superior to that of the Japanese because of the severe enemy losses. Commenting on the timing of Blandy's statement, the above editorial asked: "Could he have been sweetening in advance the sour communique that was coming?"

Columnist Arthur Krock took the position that the public would better understand the Navy's security reasons for withholding news of our losses if they had been given the true picture of the severity of the disaster at Pearl Harbor.[105] In expressing this view, he struck closely to the heart of public dissatisfaction with war news policies. The American people were by this time very personally and emotionally involved with the war, even if their individual roles on the home front were in many cases limited. They collectively seemed to resent any evidence of a lack of confidence in their ability to "take it" on the part of the government. In the words of one editor, "Even when we're losing, we don't see any sense in covering up the scoreboard."[106]

By no means was all press comment about the Yorktown communique unfavorable, however. In fact, according to a report of newspaper editorial reaction to the announcement conducted by the Analysis Section of OPR,

58 per cent of the editorials screened were favorable to the Navy compared to 42 per cent against.[107] An excellent example of an opinion in complete agreement with the Navy's position appeared in the Long Beach (Calif.) Press-Telegram:

> Delayed confirmation of the sinking of the aircraft carrier Yorktown . . . provides an excellent illustration of the importance of censorship and the holding up of news which would be of value to the enemy. It is true, the Japanese loudly proclaimed the loss of the Yorktown immediately following the Midway encounter, but subsequent events proved that they merely were guessing. They knew that the carrier was in that region, and to report its loss not only would provide something to brag about at home, but there was, they believed, the small likelihood that such an announcement would bring forth an admission or denial from the United States Navy. As the result of wise censorship, however, the world was kept in ignorance of the Yorktown's fate, and the Japanese in the west Pacific were kept in a state of suspension. Not being certain of the whereabouts of the carrier, they were obliged to map their strategy on the assumption that it was available for action.[108]

Although complaints over the delay in the Yorktown announcement were quite vocal, the Navy was to receive an even greater public relations "black eye" over its handling of the account of the Battle of Savo Island on the night of August 8-9, 1942. The Japanese scored a major victory in this battle when seven of their cruisers and one destroyer approached an Allied fleet in the middle of the night completely undetected. Three American cruisers--the Astoria, Quincy and Vincennes--and one Australian cruiser, the Canberra, were sunk. One other U.S. cruiser and two American destroyers were damaged.

The Australians promptly announced the loss of the Canberra; but the day after the battle, Admiral King merely admitted that one American cruiser had been sunk and two others damaged along with two destroyers and a transport. At this point, he was not withholding anything, since this represented the total extent of the information he had. A few hours after his initial announcement, however, the admiral was informed that the two damaged cruisers had gone down also. He then made a decision not to release this fact, because he reasoned the Japanese would have returned to attack the American transports debarking Marine reinforcements on Guadalcanal if they had known the two cruisers were not there to protect them.[109] When no further statement was forthcoming from the Navy, the public was left with the impression that the battle was actually an American victory, since King's original announcement stated that the Japanese force had withdrawn.

This time, according to Newsweek, Elmer Davis had a "showdown" with the Navy, eventually forcing it to release on October 12 the news and names of the three cruisers sunk at Savo Island.[110] He described this confrontation in a confidential letter to his wife, in which he offered an interesting insight into the personality of Admiral King:

> . . . we have a major row on with the navy; I had a long argument this afternoon with Admiral King which got very acrimonious yet somehow remained friendly. He runs the navy so thoroughly that they are all afraid of

> him, and maybe it was something of a relief to him to find someone who wasn't. This is a very serious matter, however, and will have to be resumed next week and taken right to the top if they do not come around.[111]

Twenty-four hours after the announcement on the Savo Island sinkings, the Navy countered with good news in a communique about the Battle of Cape Esperance. Davis claimed that he did not know about the Cape Esperance victory when he pressured the earlier release. Nevertheless, due to the close proximity of the two announcements, both OWI and the Navy were charged with delaying bad releases until they could be offset by more palatable news.[112]

Davis also had been kept in the dark about the sinking of the carrier Wasp and the damaging of the battleship North Carolina on September 15 near Guadalcanal; and the disabling of the carrier Saratoga in earlier action. According to the OWI director, he did not hear about these events "until returning travelers brought back the news."[113] He added:

> We had always agreed with the Navy that no details about ships damaged should be given out; but it was . . . essential that we . . . know what had happened, so as to form a judgement on what should be published; if this concealment had continued OWI would have had to go under different direction.

Davis again "talked" to the Navy about the situation, after which information on the losses was updated.

On October 26, 1942, the carrier Hornet was sunk

after the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Two days later, the Navy announced that she was only damaged. That same night, speaking in New York, Davis told an audience that all losses of major Navy vessels reported as of noon that day had been released. He later explained that at the time of his statement he did not know about the sinking, but instead had been told that the carrier was in tow and might be saved.[114]

The episode occurred only a few days before the November 4th congressional elections; and Davis pressed Admiral King to release news of the Hornet's sinking to avoid the accusation that the administration was holding it up for political reasons. When King refused, Davis went to see President Roosevelt personally on the matter. The President agreed that the loss of a carrier should be announced but that the ship's name should not be released. The Navy did announce the sinking on October 31, prompting Davis to comment that now "OWI was over the hump with the Navy, so far as major issues were concerned . . . Never again was news withheld from us, nor was there much disagreement about its release."[115]

After the elections in November, Davis discussed the various delays of news about naval actions in a national radio broadcast. While he asserted that military security was the only factor in these delays, he claimed that news of some of the ship losses was withheld longer

than necessary. Significantly, he added that criticism of the news policies regarding the naval war in the Pacific reached a crescendo just before the congressional elections.

His assertion was backed up by the results of monthly surveys on public satisfaction with war information conducted by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research. In December 1941, 69 per cent of the American people thought the government was supplying sufficient information about the war.[116] This approval figure declined steadily as the war progressed, however, until it reached a low of 49 per cent in October 1942. Following Davis' successful fight with the Navy over the Hornet announcement and the publicity given to the North African landings, the figures jumped dramatically to 70 per cent in November and leveled off at 69 per cent again in December, the same as it had been a year earlier.

Yet, there was still considerable gnashing of teeth in the Navy over the wisdom of timely announcements of ship losses. An article in Seapower, Navy League magazine, in discussing the congressional and other criticism over news policies and the Navy's entire strategy in the Pacific, opined that this "clamor . . . goaded and worried" the Navy into prematurely announcing the sinking of the Hornet when it was "certain that no Jap eye actually witnessed her end, and the announcement might easily have cost the blood or

life of many a U.S. sailor."[117]

Captain Lovette Succeeds Admiral Hepburn

In August 1942, Admiral Hepburn, the first director of the Office of Public Relations in its new status under the Secretary of the Navy, was named to be chairman of the Navy's General Board. Picked as his successor was Captain Leland P. Lovette. The choice represented a decision on the part of Secretary Knox in favor of experience over rank. Captain Lovette, it will be remembered, served first as press chief and then director of the old Public Relations Branch in ONI. He returned to public relations duties from command at sea in February 1942, serving as Assistant Director to Admiral Hepburn.

Captain Lovette immediately addressed himself to the overriding issue facing Navy public relations at the time. He told the press: "Your Government is trying to give you the facts--when they do not in any manner give aid and comfort to the enemy . . . The good news and the bad will be told."[118] He still had some "rough-sledding" ahead before this issue was resolved.

Shortly after he became director, Lovette, at the suggestion of Secretary Knox, began the first of three tours around the nation for the specific purpose of eliciting opinions from the news media on how to improve the Navy's public relations program. His first trip took him

throughout the Middle West, where he held many conferences with press and radio representatives and answered questions on news policy and the war in general. On subsequent tours in the early fall, he traveled to the West Coast and along the East Coast.[119]

Other Personnal and Organizational Changes

With Captain Lovette moving up to the post of director, Commander Bob Berry, who had been acting as an assistant to Admiral Hepburn since Lovette's arrival, became the Assistant Director of OPR. His title was changed to "Deputy Director" in October. Lieutenant Commander W. G. (Slim) Beecher, Jr., USN, who also had a tour in the old Public Relations Branch from 1938 to 1940 and then several sea commands, returned to OPR in early July and assumed Berry's former position of Assistant to the Director. Captain Lovette also appointed Lieutenant Commander R. D. Hill, the communique officer, to be his special assistant for liaison with Admiral King's two staffs. Hill still prepared the naval communiques, but now worked independantly from the Press Section.

Another significant personnel change occurred in August when Paul Smith, the erstwhile editor and general manager of the San Francisco Chronicle, suddenly resigned from the Navy and his position as head of the Press Section, to take a similar job with OWI. The unpredictable Smith

throughout the middle East, where he held many conferences with peace and radio correspondents and answered questions on home policy and the war in general. On adjournment there is the early visit to Cromwell to the Mess Canes and close the Case Cases.[13]

Cadet Promotions and Organizational Changes

With Captain Lewis moving up to the post of director, Commander Bob Berry, who had been serving as assistant to Admiral Popham since Lewis's arrival, became the Assistant Director of OPS. His title was changed to "Deputy Director" in October. Lieutenant Commander W. A. (Bill) Smedes, Jr., USN, who also had a tour in the old Public Relations Branch from 1939 to 1940 and then covered the Commands, returned to OPS in early July and assumed Berry's former position of Assistant to the Director. Captain Lewis also appointed Lieutenant Commander R. D. Hill, the communique writer, to be his special assistant for liaison with Admiral King's new staffs. Hill will prepare the naval communiques, but now worked independently from the Press Section.

Routine adjustments pertaining to personnel changes occurred in August when Fast Quick, the erstwhile pilot and general manager of the Sea Cadets Chronicle, suddenly resigned from the Navy and his position as head of the Press Section, to take a similar job with OWI. The unpredictable Quick

quit OWI three months later to enlist in the Marine Corps as a private. Selected to replace him as head of OPR's Press Section was Lieutenant W. Marvin McCarthy, USNR, who had served as a press officer in the section since the start of the war.

In November, Lieutenant Commander William L. Huggins, Jr., USNR, relieved Lieutenant Commander Bernrieder as head of the Naval Districts Section. In December, Lieutenant Max Miller, USNR, author of I Cover the Waterfront and other novels, reported for duty in the Magazine Section. The writer had been training recruits in Sheepshead Bay, New York, when he was "discovered" by the Magazine Section, "which took immediate steps to put his talents to work for public relations."[120]

The year 1942 saw the creation of three new sections and the loss of an old one in the Office of Public Relations. One of the new sections was formed out of the Pictorial Section, which now concentrated only on still photography and art. In the fall, a separate Combat Photography Section was set up to supplement the work of Navy photographers and civilian war correspondents. It had been recognized for some time that photographic coverage of the Navy's war role left much to be desired. Accordingly, the combat photography program begun a year earlier was expanded to include ten field units consisting of one photographic officer, two enlisted motion picture

photographers and one still photographer. The teams were trained in New York by March of Time, Inc., with Louis De Rochemont, the producer of the newsreel, serving as advisor. They were then assigned to the fleets, naval forces and other naval activities. Lieutenant Carlton Mitchell, Jr., USNR, formerly with the Carl Byior public relations firm in New York, who had supervised combat photography in the Pictorial Section for the last year, was chosen to head the new section.

The decision to upgrade the Navy's photographic coverage of the war coincided with the promulgation of General Order 179, which replaced General Order 96 on August 26, 1942, as the governing document for the photographing of naval subjects. The revision was much more flexible. It canceled the "carte blanch" authority which naval officers had in the past to halt picture-taking on naval installations at any moment they believed security was being violated. They now could interfere only if they had definite reason to believe that such photography would pass out of naval control or jurisdiction before it could be reviewed. The new directive made clear that all Navy photographs taken by commercial photographers, including war correspondents, had to be forwarded to OPR for security review. Further, photographs showing damage or loss of U.S. Navy combat ships or classified fleet operations had to be routed via the office of the Commander in Chief,

U.S. Fleet.

In early August, a new section--Special Events--had been added to meet a need for community relations services. One of its first assignments was to establish liaison with the Navy League in making plans for the forthcoming Navy Day celebrations. The section also obtained Navy speakers for civilian audiences and handled tours, exhibits and other promotional projects, including ones on behalf of the Navy Relief Society. Its first director was Lieutenant Commander Frank J. Courtney, USNR.

In the fall, another new section--Review--was created. This section was established to more effectively accomplish security review of all types of copy and manuscripts referring to the Navy, thereby centralizing in one section the clearance of material formerly handled by the various sections to which it pertained. Review also took over the task of clearing speeches by naval personnel to insure conformance with policy and the protection of naval security matters, and maintained liaison with the Office of Censorship and OWI on classified matters. Lieutenant Commander Victor Blakeslee transferred from his position as head of the Magazine Section to take over Review; and Lieutenant Commander Walter Karig, USNR, reported to OPR to replace Blakeslee in Magazine. During the first three weeks of its existence, over 500 manuscripts, press stories, magazine articles, radio scripts,

U.S. Navy.

In early August, a new position--Special Events--had been added to meet a need for community relations services. One of the first assignments was to establish liaison with the Navy League in making plans for the Fleet-coming Navy Day celebrations. The service also developed Navy exhibits for stylish weddings and bridal events, exhibits and other promotional projects. Recruiting duty on behalf of the Navy Relief Society. The first director was Lieutenant Commander Fred G. Courtney, USNR.

In the fall, another new position--Service--was created. This section was established to more effectively accomplish security review of all types of copy and manuscripts relating to the Navy, thereby centralizing in one section the clearance of material formerly handled by the various sections to which it pertained. Service also took over the task of clearing speeches by naval personnel to insure compliance with policy and the protection of naval security matters, and maintained liaison with the Office of Censorship and Out on classified matters.

Lieutenant Commander Victor Blakeslee transferred from his position as head of the Newsmen Section to take over Service and Lieutenant Commander Walter Kelly, USNR, reported to out to replace Blakeslee in September. During the first three weeks of its existence, over 100 manuscripts, press scripts, magazine articles, radio scripts,

advertising copy and speeches were channeled through the Review Section.

The section lost to OFR during the year was the one headed by Rear Admiral Henry A. Wiley that began in the fall of 1941 as "Industrial Morale" and later assumed the title of "Board for Production Awards." In July 1942, Secretary Knox established a new Incentive Division directly under his control to supervise the coordination of Navy liaison with the civilian defense industry. He appointed Rear Admiral Clark H. Woodward, USN (Retired), as chief of the division, while Admiral Wiley became Chairman of the Board of Awards.

The Incentive Division was tasked with improving the Navy's labor relations, which were not very good at the start of the war. It was organized into three sections. The first, called Creative Material Production, dealt in the areas of production and labor incentive. It released data on war materials directly to war industry companies, letting them and their employees know how their particular products performed in combat situations. The second section, Operations, was involved in plant visits and rallies, tours of war plants by naval heroes, civic meetings and other special activities. The third section, Press, handled liaison with the labor press and forwarded material to industrial house organs.[121]

The creation of the Incentive Division removed a

function from the Office of Public Relations in Washington, but the naval district public relations officers retained their responsibilities in the area of industrial morale. For instance, they handled all liaison with Army public relations officers surrounding joint Army-Navy Production Award ceremonies and in many cases issued press releases and other material connected with these presentations. In the fall of 1942, Brigadier General Robert L. Denig, USMC, Director of the Marine Corps Division of Public Relations, represented the Navy Department in an extensive tour of companies whose production records were named outstanding.

It will be recalled that in August 1940 the Public Relations Branch of ONI moved to larger and more accessible quarters on the first floor near the main entrance to the Navy Department Building. The rapid expansion in numbers of personnel in OPR following the commencement of hostilities necessitated still another move two years later. This time, with the exception of the Arts sub-section which remained in the Lars Anderson Mansion, the office began occupying the "zero wing" at the extreme eastern end of the Navy building. Easy accessibility was retained, since there was a separate entrance at this end of the building. The move actually was not completed until March of 1943.

On April 30, 1942, a major Navy organizational change took place when Secretary Knox established a separate Air Operational Training Command reporting directly

to the Navy Department in Washington. The step was part of the policy shift in the Navy in 1942 to concentrate on building aircraft carriers instead of more battleships and to generally upgrade the role of naval air power. A rear admiral, headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, was assigned as Chief of Air Operational Training, with subsidiary commands scattered throughout the country.

The new setup required changes in the Navy's public relations organization as well. "Flight" public relations officers assigned to the various air commands now functioned directly under their station commanders and the Office of Public Relations in Washington instead of under the naval district public relations officers as they had in the past. The Naval Districts Section of OPR supervised their activities in close coordination with the Bureau of Aeronautics; and an Aviation Assistant to the Director of Public Relations, Lieutenant Robert A. Winston, USN, was assigned as a special liaison officer. The change in effect placed naval air public relations in a special status which it has maintained to the present day, with officers assigned to conduct air public relations activities normally being naval aviators rather than public information specialists. A detailed "Guide for Flight Public Relations" was issued on August 1, 1942, setting forth directives covering Pre-Flight and naval aviation publicity.

Another change in Navy public relations occurred on September 23, 1942, when the Bureau of Navigation (later redesignated the Bureau of Naval Personnel) established its own Public Relations Division. The move had been recommended in August by a survey team from the firm of Booz, Fry, Allen & Hamilton, which had been retained to help streamline the bureau's administration of the Navy's manpower resources. The study group pointed out that the bureau had a "profound effect" on public relations in the sea service. "Next to the degree of success in combat operations, . . . the policies and methods employed in handling the personnel of the Navy are the most important single factor in determining what the public thinks of the Navy."[122]

When the war began, the Bureau of Navigation was flooded with inquiries from the public, press, members of Congress and other government agencies. It was ill-prepared to handle this volume of questions and soon gained a reputation for being "rather indifferent" to such requests for information. In early 1942, when the Office of Public Relations instituted its "beat system" of covering Navy bureaus and offices in Washington, many of these queries were answered by officers from its Press Section. However, these young OPR officers came to be considered "nuisances" by many senior officers in the Bureau of Navigation, who resented their aggressiveness in

seeking out details of personnel policies.

Upon creation of the bureau's Public Relations Division, resentment over the intrusion into personnel matters by public relations officers gradually disappeared; and the Bureau of Personnel became more responsive to the public needs. A naval reserve lieutenant commander who had been a lawyer in civilian life was appointed to head the new division. He was assisted by four other officers and two enlisted men along with stenographers.

In addition to answering queries and furnishing news about the bureau and Navy personnel information to OPR, the division assumed responsibility for the naming of ships and designation of their sponsors; the preparation of the Bureau of Naval Personnel Bulletin (later renamed All Hands) and a daily bulletin for the information of officers within the bureau called "The BuPers Daily Register"; the operation of a congressional information service; and the supervision of a Documentary Photography Section, whose function was "to obtain and assemble for the permanent records of the Bureau documentary portrait photographs of Naval personnel especially active in the war."[123]

The U.S. Coast Guard took steps to upgrade its public relations program in the summer of 1942 also, with a directive on the subject being disseminated to the service by the Coast Guard Commandant. A year earlier, Captain

Ellis Reed-Hill, as Public Relations Officer of the Coast Guard stationed at headquarters in Washington, was the only officer in the entire service performing the function full-time. He had one civilian assistant. By late September 1942, two junior officers were added to his staff, but one operated out of New York. There were plans to assign three others to New York, two each to Boston and Chicago and one to each of the other continental Coast Guard Districts. Since the Coast Guard had been transferred to U.S. Navy control in November 1941, all of its public relations activities came under the jurisdiction of the respective naval district public relations officers. Any Coast Guard release or statement had to be cleared through them or the Office of Public Relations in Washington.[124]

Marine Corps public relations also was under the cognizance of OPR and the naval districts, in accordance with a directive issued by the Secretary of the Navy on July 24, 1942. However, the Marines--with a small but aggressive public relations organization--operated more independently of the Navy than did the Coast Guard. In late summer of 1942, there were five Marine public relations officers attached to Headquarters of the Marine Corps in Washington under General Denig. Most of them were young second lieutenants who were being trained for field assignments. As they moved on, they were replaced on the headquarters staff by new second lieutenants who likewise

served an apprenticeship in public relations.

The Marine Corps Division of Public Relations was organized differently from the Navy OPR. There were no separate sections; each of the five officers performed general duties. There also were five regional public relations offices--in Philadelphia, New York, Atlanta, Chicago and San Francisco. These were manned by one public relations officer with a single assistant, usually a second lieutenant. In addition, the Corps assigned non-commissioned officers as "Public Relations Sergeants" to local recruiting stations throughout the country.

By the summer of 1942, the famed Marine Combat Correspondent program was fully operative, too. The program was begun after the fall of Wake Island and the Philippines, engagements in which the Corps was "placed in a very embarrassing position of having practically no information to feed to the press of any kind."[125] This experience led to the recruitment of newspapermen and news photographers who had a "minimum of two years" experience for assignment to Marine detachments outside the continental United States as enlisted Combat Correspondents. These journalists were sent through regular training at Parris Island, brought back to the Division of Public Relations for a brief indoctrination, and then dispatched in pairs as reporter-photographer teams to the combat units. The first stories and pictures generated by these Marine fighting

served to democratize to public relations.

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By the summer of 1941, the final marine combat-readiness program was fully operative, too. The program was begun after the fall of Wake Island and the Philippines, conferences in which the Corps was "played in a very embarrassing position of having practically no information to feed to the press at any time."[123] This experience led to the construction of newspapermen and news photographers who had a "minimum of two years" composite time assignment to Corps detachments outside the continental United States as enlisted Combat Correspondents. These journalists were sent through specific training at Parris Island. Brought back to the division of Public Relations for a brief indoctrination, and then dispersed in pairs as corporal-photographer teams to the combat units. The films stories and pictures generated by these Marine flights

correspondents came out of Guadalcanal.

Marine Corps headquarters was somewhat concerned in the fall of 1942 over what it considered to be a lack of cooperation on the part of naval district public relations officers in the clearance of Marine press material. In the words of Major George T. Van der Hoef, an assistant to General Denig in the Division of Public Relations, there were certain incidences in which Marine stories "were turned over to the Navy Department Public Relations man in the field and have perhaps not received as sympathetic consideration as possible."[126] The bone of contention was that assertions by Marine officers that specific material did not violate censorship rules were not being given proper credence.

On July 30, 1942, the President signed into law a bill creating a Women's Reserve in the Navy. The WAVES, as they came to be known, from their very beginning affected the Navy's public relations program in one way or another. OPR was deluged with requests for photographs of uniforms to be worn by the distaff Navy members almost before the ink on the President's signature was dry. Initial release of these photographs was made in Washington with considerable ceremony. In October, the Bureau of Naval Personnel requested assistance from OPR in bringing up to strength the lagging recruiting quotas for the Women's Reserve officer training program. And in November, the first WAVE

public relations officers began reporting to various naval commands. Ensign Nona Baldwin, USNR, former member of the Washington bureau of the New York Times, joined the Press Section of OPR on November 6 to handle press matters related to the Women's Reserve.

After the initial expansion following Pearl Harbor, the number of personnel in the Office of Public Relations leveled off at a fairly constant figure. On July 1, there was a total of 145, again exclusive of branch office personnel in New York. This figure dropped to 135 in October, reflecting the loss of the Industrial Morale Section. Of these, fifty-six were officers (five Regular and fifty-one reserve), sixty-two were civilians and seventeen were enlisted men. By the middle of November 1942, there were 215 naval officers serving in public relations in the naval districts, air commands, and fleet and overseas forces. Again, as a year ago, the vast majority of these were in the continental United States. There still were only two officers attached to the fleets in the Pacific, and the Atlantic Fleet was now without a public relations officer at all.[127]

Special Public Relations Tools and Activities

Weekly Press Seminars--regularly scheduled "off-the-record" discussion periods for members of the Navy Department press corps--were begun in the summer of 1942

by OPR. These meetings proved to be extremely popular with the media representatives, since they provided background information of a confidential nature which could not be released but nevertheless gave them a sense of understanding of the Navy's wartime problems. Rules for the seminar were rigid: no notes were to be taken; all information was to be treated as confidential and not to be relayed to a second person; and there was to be no continuation of the discussion following each meeting. In other words, any question could be asked but not one answer was to be printed or repeated. Naval speakers were scheduled to talk on specific aspects of the war and naval operations in general. The sessions also were used to further explain and clarify security and other information policies.[128]

Another public relations tool instituted in 1942 was an internal one. Beginning on November 1, the Naval Districts Section published a monthly Public Relations Bulletin "to aid Public Relations Officers of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in carrying out their duties in coordination with each other, and in conformity with the general policy of the Office of Public Relations, Navy Department."[129]

During 1942, media and public interest in anyone or anything directly connected with combat was at a peak. Navy men returning from battle areas, for instance, were much in demand for radio and press interviews. The field

public relations officers were kept quite busy with arrangements for such participation by naval personnel, since all interviews for both officers and enlisted men had to be channeled through the nearest public relations office. In addition, if a radio appearance--as most of them did--concerned a man's experience at sea, military actions, or Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard operations since the war started, a written script had to be reviewed for security and policy in advance of broadcast.[130]

Numerous requests for exhibition of war materials, both ours and the enemy's, sent back from the combat zones also were received by the summer of 1942. To fill these requests, Admiral Hepburn asked the Navy bureaus to make available to OPR such items as Japanese two-man submarines, life rafts used by naval aviators, and enemy war planes.[131]

In late September, another naval district public relations officers conference was held in Washington--this time, however, for only the first through ninth naval districts. The western districts were not included due to the wartime travel restrictions. Representatives from each section of OPR, the Office of Censorship, the Army Bureau of Public Relations, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Public Relations Divisions, and OWI addressed the group.[132]

Publicity on New Ship Construction

One subject to which partial publicity was given by

the Navy during 1942 despite the fact that it might have been of some value to the enemy was the launching of new ships. Whether or not to release information on new construction was discussed immediately after Pearl Harbor along with the other security measures. Secretary Knox admitted at that time that the enemy would benefit from such publicity; but his view, which prevailed, was that it would be more valuable for morale purposes to have the American public know that we were striking back from the war production standpoint.

Security precautions on many aspects of the new construction program remained quite rigid, however. A directive by the Secretary of the Navy issued on March 30, 1942, retained the prewar ban on visiting by the general public to ships either in the building or conversion process. Further, all information and photographs regarding new construction or conversion of submarines, destroyers, cruisers, aircraft carriers and battleships was to be classified as confidential and not released unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.[133] In a clarification of this directive issued to public relations officers a month later, the policy was not quite so restrictive. All publicity about ship commissionings was prohibited and that concerning conversions had to be referred to Washington. Launchings, however, could be publicized during a period of six days prior

to the actual day of launching, provided such publicity was strictly limited to the ceremonial aspects of the occasion and only general information about the ship was released.[134]

The security issue about ship launchings came to the fore again in early April, however, when Canadian naval intelligence sources made available to the Commandant Thirteenth Naval District in Seattle a list of U.S. naval vessels recently launched, which had been compiled from American press reports. The district commandant relayed this list to Admiral Hepburn with the somewhat caustic comment: "Inasmuch as Canada allows no publicity concerning its launchings, it is a matter of some interest to observe the amount of detail . . . it is still possible to obtain from the public press regarding naval launchings in the United States."[135]

Admiral Hepburn's reply to this letter was significant in that it represents one of the few cases found by the author of definite evidence that public relations considerations were a major factor in determining Navy release of information policies early in the war. The Admiral stated that when the directive on publicity for new ship construction was in the process of being prepared, it had been proposed to flatly prohibit launching publicity of any nature. The Office of Public Relations argued against this restriction on the following basis:

> Having in mind the state of public morale and naval public relations, this Office advised against such a step at this time, pointing out that all launchings for a considerable period would involve only ships publicly authorized by Congress, the laying of whose keels had been publicized, and the rates of construction rather accurately announced before the sudden outbreak of war.[136]

In the same letter, it was mentioned that OPR did advise certain specific restrictions on launching publicity along with the complete ban on commissioning publicity previously cited. It also was stated that further restrictions on launching publicity could be expected when ships not publicly authorized by Congress were built, eventually leading to a future total ban on publicity for launchings as well as commissionings.

In late summer of 1942, plans were made by various government agencies and representatives of labor and management throughout the country to give war industry workers special recognition for their contributions to the war effort on the forthcoming Labor Day, September 7. The occasion was tailor-made for ship launchings and other ceremonies connected with the Navy's shipbuilding program. Accordingly, Secretary Knox authorized and encouraged as many launching and keel-laying observances as could possibly be scheduled for the Labor Day celebrations. The ban on public visiting was even to be lifted so that families of shipyard workers could be invited to attend the events.[137]

Naval district public relations officers were directed to extend full cooperation to the business and labor representatives in making arrangements for the Labor Day ceremonies and to assist the news media in gaining full coverage of them compatible with security. A general press release announcing the mass launchings and keel layings was issued by OPR on August 30. No complete list of names of ships was given out, but the districts could publish ship names involved in their own ceremonies.

In late September, an extensive public relations campaign was conducted by the Navy surrounding the launching in Boston of the new Lexington, which replaced the carrier of the same name that was lost in the Battle of the Coral Sea. The campaign was tied in with a massive recruiting drive for aviation cadets and enlisted air personnel. The theme, "Be a 1942 Minute Man--Join the Lexington Volunteers," was emphasized. Congratulatory messages were solicited from the mayors of twenty-eight communities named Lexington, along with gubernatorial proclamations and similar endorsements from community leaders. Naval speakers were scheduled, window display contests arranged, and radio interviews with personnel from the former Lexington set up.[138] The effort represented the first truly coordinated and creative public relations initiative by the Navy since the start of the war.

A New Direction to the War

The first year of hostilities for the United States was primarily a naval war. Except for the delaying action in the Philippines and the ground combat in the Solomon Islands late in the summer of 1942, most of the fighting either took place on the high seas or originated from there as did the Doolittle Tokyo raids.

Crippled by the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy operated on a shoestring capability in the first months of the war and concentrated on keeping the enemy in the dark on any information which might conceivably help him. It was inevitable that this emphasis on security was to run at cross purposes with the public's eagerness to know and the press' aggressiveness to tell what was happening. As a result, the sea service absorbed the brunt of public and press criticism of war news policies during the first year of the conflict, primarily for its delays in announcing ship losses.

By year's end, however, there were faint stirrings of a more positive public relations stance by the Navy. Elmer Davis--the Devil's advocate, so to speak--forced speedier revelations of ship losses and damage; and the status of aviators in the naval hierarchy was upgraded by the policy decision in June to build aircraft carriers rather than battleships. Whether by nature or by long experience at fighting for a proper niche in the Navy, the

airmen seemed to be more public relations conscious than their surface and submarine colleagues. This was also true of their counterparts in the Army.

But the evolutionary process is a slow one. The Navy public relations ship still had "shoal waters" to navigate. However, the war began to take a new turn with the invasion of North Africa on November 8, 1942. With the ensuing land battles taking away much of the news spotlight from sea engagements, the Navy was able to focus on improving its public relations program minus certain of the severe pressures it encountered during the first twelve months of the war.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

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[2]Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1950), 10:519, quoted in Lemar S. Mackay, "Domestic Operations of the Office of War Information in World War II," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966, p. 187. Hereafter cited as Mackay, "OWI."

[3]Washington Times-Herald, December 11, 1941.

[4]Mackay, "OWI," 187-88.

[5]U.S. Office of Facts and Figures, "Report on Poll Taken to Determine Public Demand for Additional Information About Pearl Harbor," January 16, 1942, contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, "Historical Records of the Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, Box 156, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "Philibert Collection."

[6]Rosenman, op. cit., cited in Mackay, "OWI," 185.

[7]Robert Humphreys, "How Your News is Censored," Saturday Evening Post, September 26, 1942, p. 114. Hereafter cited as "News is Censored."

[8]Ibid.

[9]Navy Department press releases, December 18 and 27, 1941, Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[10]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to Naval District Commandants, December 17, 1941 (Serial 411217), U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, General File (SN-117), Record Group 80, War Records Branch, Naval Records Section, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as "Record Group 80."

[11]Washington Evening Star, December 11, 1941.

[12]"Censorship, 1919-1941," a chronological log on censorship, Philibert Collection, Box 155.

Notes to Chapter III

[13]Chicago Sun, December 10, 1941.

[14]"Establishing the Office of Censorship and Prescribing its Functions and Duties," Executive Order 8985, December 19, 1941, contained in file "Directives, October-December, 1941," Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[15]"News is Censored," 17ff.

[16]U.S. Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press (Washington, January 15, 1942), 2. Hereafter cited as Censorship Code.

[17]"Instructions Governing Release of Information on Merchant Ships," undated directive issued by the Navy Office of Public Relations to All District Commandants (Less Nine), contained in file "January-March, 1942," Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[18]Censorship Code, 2.

[19]U.S. Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War (Washington, 1946), 206-08. See also, Mackay, "OWI," 50-51, and "News is Censored," 113.

[20]Capt. Harold B. Say, USNR (Ret.), personal interview, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1968. Hereafter cited as "Say Interview." As a lieutenant, Captain Say was a security review officer in the Press Section of OPR and later headed a separate Security Review Section in that office.

[21]Michael Darrock and Joseph P. Dorn, "Davis and Goliath: The OWI and Its Gigantic Assignment," Harper's Magazine, 186:227-28 (February 1943). The primary information agencies to be coordinated by OFF were the Office of Government Reports, Division of Information of the Office of Emergency Management, Office of the Coordinator of Information, Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of Civilian Defense.

[22]Memo., Adlai E. Stevenson to "Colonel Knox," January 8, 1942 (Serial 420108), Record Group 80, Box 423.

[23]Memo., Lt. Cmdr. Wallace S. Wharton, USNR, to Cmdr. Robert W. Berry, USN, December 31, 1941, Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[24]Memo., Lt. Cmdr. Wallace S. Wharton, USNR, to Director of Public Relations, January 3, 1942, ibid., Box 156.

[25]T. I. Mertz, personal interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1968. Hereafter cited as "Mertz Interview."

[26]The first Navy Communique of the war actually was issued on December 10, 1941 (Helene Philibert, "History of Navy Public Relations," 4, Philibert Collection, Box 157 /see n. 7, Chapter I/).

[27]An undated "Communique Follow-up Sheet," contained in file "January-March, 1942," ibid., Box 156.

[28]U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, "United States Naval Administration in World War II," unpublished narrative history of Headquarters, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Vol. 1, Book 2, pp. 158-59. This series of naval command histories, contained in the Navy Department Library, Washington, D.C., is hereafter cited as "Administrative Histories," followed by the pertinent command title.

[29]Memo., Secretary of the Navy to All Chiefs of Bureaus and Offices, December 17, 1941, U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, Operational Archives Branch, Classified Files of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Files of the General Board, Series 441.

[30]Ltr., Director of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy, January 10, 1942 (Serial 420108), Record Group 80, Box 422.

[31]Memo., Frank Knox to All Chiefs of Bureaus and Offices, January 10, 1942, ibid.

[32]Ltr., Frank Knox to Theodore G. Joshin, February 14, 1942, Frank Knox Papers, Manuscript Section, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as "Knox Papers."

[33]"Press vs. the Navy," Newsweek, February 23, 1942, p. 56.

[34]Navy Department memorandum for the press, February 13, 1942, contained in file "January-March, 1942," Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[35]Memo., Frank Knox to RAdm. Arthur J. Hepburn, USN, February 5, 1942, ibid.

[36]Various Office of Public Relations and Secretary of the Navy letters and memoranda, ibid.

[37]Memo., Frank E. Mason to Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, September 5, 1942, ibid.

[38]Ltr., Lt. Cmdr. Paul C. Smith, USNR, to "Colonel Frank Knox," September 26, 1942, ibid. Smith's objections centered around his considered need for Navy public relations officers to identify psychologically with young officers and men who were fighting the war.

[39]George H. Manning, "Lovette Says Navy Press Releases Must Be Factual," Editor & Publisher, August 1, 1942, p. 5.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Memo., J. Harrison Hartley to Director, Office of Public Relations, OOR-3 (299), March 6, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[42]Memo., J. Harrison Hartley to Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, OOR-3 (506), April 6, 1942, ibid.

[43]U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, article prepared for publication in Radio Annual, 1943, ibid.

[44]Lt. Cmdr., Victor F. Blakeslee, USN (Ret.), "Magazines and Navy Public Relations," remarks made before a conference of naval district public relations officers (First through Ninth Naval Districts), Washington, D.C., September 29, 1942, recorded in mimeographed minutes of conference, p. 129, ibid. Hereafter cited as "1942 PRO Conference."

[45]In addition to the references cited in notes 36-44 above, various other letters, memoranda, news releases, information sheets and personnel directories contained in ibid., Boxes 155 and 156, were consulted in compiling the above data on personnel changes and new functions in OPR in early 1942.

[46]The naval abbreviation for Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, at the time of Admiral King's appointment to the post was "CINCUS." Not liking the phonetic connotation of this short title, King immediately changed the abbreviation to "COMINCH" ("The Navy and the Navy," Fortune, 26:176, August 1942).

[47]Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), 159.

[48]RAdm. Julius A. Furer, USN (Ret.), Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, 1959), 77.

[49]Mertz Interview.

[50]Furer, op. cit.

[51]Cmdr. Harold Bradley Say, USNR, "Censorship and Security," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 79:136 (1953).

[52]Furer, op. cit.

[53]Ltr., Raleigh Warner to Mrs. Frank Knox, March 29, 1949, Knox Papers, Box 1.

[54]RAdm. Robert W. Berry, USN (Ret.), telephone interview, March 17, 1970.

[55]Say Interview.

[56]Ltr., Frank Knox to Will H. Hays, November 24, 1942, Knox Papers, Box 1.

[57]"News is Censored," 17. See also, Byron Price, "Censorship and Common Sense," an address before the annual meeting of the Southern Newspaper Publishers Association, Hot Springs, Ark., September 28, 1942 (a mimeographed copy is contained in Philibert Collection, Box 156); and Roger Kafka, "Publication Not Recommended," Seapower, 3:13 (September 1943).

[58]Say Interview.

[59]Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record, 1st ed. (New York, 1952), 652.

[60]"News is Censored," 114.

[61]Memo., J. W. Thomas, Jr., Office of Naval Intelligence (Op-16-F-7), to Director of Public Relations, January 15, 1942, U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, Administrative Files, Job Order 63-A-2506, Item 1, Box 76, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "OI Administrative Files."

[62]Naval message, Director of Public Relations to All District Commandants (Less Nine), January 16, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[63]Lt. Cmdr. Paul C. Smith, USNR, "Navy Department Memorandum to the Press," January 17, 1942, contained in file "January-March, 1942," Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[64]Mr. Price was quoted in a special "Navy Department Note to Managing Editors," February 4, 1942, ibid.

[65]Byron Price, "Censorship and Common Sense" (see n. 57).

[66]Kafka, "Publication Not Recommended," 15.

[67]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to Commandants All Continental Naval Districts, OOR-6(1733), February 23, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[68]Ltr., Director of Public Relations to Commandants All Naval Districts, Less Sixteen, OOR-6(1873), March 10, 1942, ibid.

[69]Memo., Director of Public Relations to All District Public Relations Officers, OOR-2(2738), March 30, 1942, ibid.

[70]"News is Censored," 114.

[71]"The Navy and the Navy," Fortune, 26:69-70 (August 1942).

[72]Various letters from Director of Public Relations to Commandants of the Naval Districts, May 2 to December 31, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[73]Naval message, Secretary of the Navy to All Ships and Stations (ALNAV 114, 042054), June 3, 1942, ibid.

[74]Memo., Director, Office of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy, OOR-A(2176), July 17, 1942, ibid.

[75]Memo., Lt. Cmdr. James G. Stahlman, USNR, to All District Public Relations Officers, OOR-6(1853), March 7, 1942, ibid.

[76]Memo., Cmdr. Wallace S. Wharton, USNR, to Adlai E. Stevenson, January 29, 1942, ibid.

[77]Ltr., Director of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy, OOR-A (362), March 13, 1942, ibid.

[78]Ibid.

[79]New York Times, March 12, 1942.

[80]U.S. Office of Facts and Figures press release (Off-9), March 18, 1942. Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[81]"Navy Releases Casualty Lists," Navy Department press release, May 2, 1942, contained in file "Casualties," ibid.

[82]Administrative Histories, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, 396-408, passim.

[83]Ltr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to Secretary of the Navy (Director, Office of Public Relations), February 25, 1942 (Serial 0695), OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 2, Box 1.

[84]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to multiple addressees, April 28, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[85]Various letters and memoranda, ibid.

[86]Albert Harling, a review of Stanley Johnston's Queen of the Flat-Tops (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1942), Journalism Quarterly, 19:395 (1942).

[87]Ltr., Cmdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr., USN, to Lt. Cmdr. Waldo Drake, USNR, OOR-1 (8500), October 31, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156. See also, F. A. Reech, "Photo Coverage of the War by the Still Picture Pool," Journalism Quarterly, 20:311 (1943).

[88]New York Times, January 12, 1942.

[89]Elmer Davis, "Flow of War Information," Army and Navy Journal, special edition entitled "United States at War: December 7, 1942 - December 7, 1943" (December 1943), 222.

[90]"Consolidating Certain War Information Functions into an Office of War Information," Executive Order 9182, June 13, 1942. A copy is contained in file "May-August 1942," Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[91]OWI Regulation No. 1, July 19, 1942, ibid.

[92]Charles A. H. Thomson, Overseas Information Service of the United States Government (Washington, 1948), 21, quoted in Mackay, "OWI," 183.

[93]Elmer Davis, "Report to the President," House Subcommittee on Government Operations, Hearings, Government Information Plans and Policies, Part 2, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963), 231, quoted in ibid., 178. Hereafter cited as Davis, "Report."

[94]Mackay, "OWI," 189-191.

[95]OWI Regulation No. 2, September 9, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[96]Memo., George Marvin to Director of Naval History, undated, ibid., Box 157.

[97]Say Interview.

[98]Kafka, "Publication Not Recommended," 13.

[99]Memo., Cmdr. William M. Galvin, USNR, to Director of Public Relations, March 11, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156. The OFF official was Allan Barth, who registered the complaint at one of the daily meetings of the Radio-Press Section of the Coordinator of Information.

[100]Kafka, op. cit.

[101]Excerpt from U.S. Office of Facts and Figures report, "Media of Public Opinion," July 3, 1942, contained in undated and unsigned "Memorandum for the Director of Public Relations," Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[102]U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Field Press Censorship (OPNAVINST 5530.5A), June 1967, p. 19.

[103]Frank Thayer, Legal Control of the Press (Chicago, 1944), 60, quoted in Mackay, "OWI," 196.

[104]"The Truth, 100 Days Late," an editorial in the Tulsa Tribune, September 18, 1942, quoted in memo., Lt. Hugh R. Awtrey, USNR, to Director of Public Relations, October 1, 1942, Philibert Collection, Box 156. Hereafter cited as "Awtrey Memorandum." The subject of this lengthy memorandum was an analysis of newspaper comment about the Yorktown communique.

[105]New York Times, September 17, 1942, quoted in Awtrey Memorandum.

[106]Omaha World Herald, September 17, 1942, ibid.

[107]Awtrey Memorandum.

[108]"Censorship Justified," Long Beach (Calif.) Press-Telegram, September 17, 1942, ibid.

[109]Kafka, "Publication Not Recommended," 15.

[110]"Davis and the Navy," Newsweek, November 9, 1942, p. 30.

[111]Ltr., Elmer Davis to Mrs. Elmer Davis, October 9, 1942, quoted in Roger Burlingame, Don't Let Them Scare You: The Life and Times of Elmer Davis (Philadelphia and New York, 1961), 201-02.

[112]Mackay, "OWI," 192.

[113]Davis, "Report," 226, quoted in ibid., 192.

[114]"Davis and the Navy," op. cit., 29.

[115]Davis, "Report," 227, quoted in Mackay, "OWI," 193-94.

[116]Jerome S. Bruner, "OWI and the American Public," Public Opinion Quarterly, 7:126 (1943).

[117]Kafka, "Publication Not Recommended," 15.

[118]Washington Evening Star, August 12, 1942.

[119]U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, Naval Districts Section, Public Relations Bulletin, No. 1, November 1, 1942, p. 2, Philibert Collection, Box 156. Hereafter cited as PR Bulletin.

[120]PR Bulletin, No. 2, December 1, 1942, p. 3, ibid.

[121]Lt. Cmdr. Samuel J. Singer, USN, "Navy's Industrial Incentive Program and Its Relations to Public Relations Officers," 1942 PRO Conference, 94-96 (see n. 44).

[122]"History of the Office of the Special Assistant and Director of Public Information, Bureau of Naval Personnel," Administrative Histories, Bureau of Naval

Personnel, 155.

[123]Ibid., 159.

[124]Capt. Ellis Reed-Hill, USCG, "The Navy and Coast Guard Public Relations," 1942 PRO Conference, 9-14.

[125]Maj. George T. Van der Hoef, USMC, "Marine Corps Public Relations," ibid., 138.

[126]Ibid., 141-42. All of the information provided in this section was taken from Major Van der Hoef's remarks at the 1942 PRO Conference, pp. 136-142.

[127]The foregoing data on public relations personnel and organizational changes in the summer and fall of 1942--with the exception of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Public Relations Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the information about Coast Guard and Marine Corps public relations--was compiled from various letters, memoranda, personnel directories, and PR Bulletins, Nos. 1 and 2, November 1 and December 1, 1942, contained in Philibert Collection, Boxes 156 and 157.

[128]A comprehensive file on the OPR Press Seminars, including biographical data on each Navy speaker, is contained in Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[129]PR Bulletin, No. 1, November 1, 1942, p. 1, ibid.

[130]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy (Director, Office of Public Relations) to multiple addressees, OOR-3 (7511), October 31, 1942, ibid.

[131]Memo., Director, Office of Public Relations, to Chiefs of All Bureaus, OOR-A (2207), July 27, 1942, ibid.

[132]1942 PRO Conference.

[133]"Security Letter 1-42," Secretary of the Navy to All Ships and Stations," March 30, 1942 (Serial 39216), Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[134]Ltr., Director of the Office of Public Relations to Commandants of All Naval Districts, Less Sixteen (Public Relations Officers), OOR-6 (2411), April 25, 1942, ibid.

[135]Ltr., Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District to Public Relations Officer, Navy Department, April 6, 1942 (Serial 102006), ibid.

[136]Ltr., Director, Office of Public Relations, to Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, OOR-C (623), April 25, 1942, ibid.

[137]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to multiple addressees, August 12, 1942, ibid.

[138]Various letters from Director, Office of Public Relations to All Naval District Public Relations Officers, August 28 to September 16, 1942, ibid.

CHAPTER IV

FROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE

By December 7, 1942, the first anniversary of U.S. entry into the war, the military situation for the Allies had begun to change from a defensive to an offensive posture. American troops were advancing on Tunis, following the successful landings in North Africa in early November. Soviet armies had launched a powerful counter-offensive after halting the Germans at Stalingrad. And in the Pacific, where the offensive phase actually commenced in August with the landing of U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal, desperate Japanese attempts to reinforce their garrisons on the island were being repeatedly repulsed.[1]

On Pearl Harbor Day, 1942, the Navy announced for the first time the complete losses sustained in the attack on Hawaii a year earlier. The anniversary statement admitted that eight battleships had been "knocked out," five of which were either sunk or damaged "so severely that they would serve no useful purpose for some time."[2] Five other ships were listed as damaged in addition to those reported as sunk or damaged a year earlier. Total casualty figures and plane losses also were revealed.

CHAPTER IX

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By December 7, 1943, the first President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Edvard Beneš, had returned to Prague. Shortly after the Communist coup in February 1948, Beneš died. Jan Masaryk, the son of the founder of Czechoslovakia, was found dead in the courtyard of the Foreign Ministry. Masaryk had been the only non-Communist minister in the Government. Soon after the Communist coup, Czechoslovakia withdrew from the Marshall Plan. Czechoslovakia was the first country behind the Iron Curtain to withdraw from the Marshall Plan.

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Press and Public Reaction Assessed

The Analysis Section of the Office of Public Relations carefully screened newspaper editorials and radio commentaries for reaction to the Pearl Harbor anniversary announcement. An initial flurry of critical press and radio comment about censorship and the flow of war information was observed, but after two weeks the issue subsided. Reflecting the fact that public and press attention had been diverted somewhat from naval actions in the war, the analysis report stated: "Criticism of the Navy continues to decrease on about the same scale that dissatisfaction mounts over certain aspects of the North African news situation."[3]

Despite an improvement in the flow of war news following the North African landings, the news media continued to criticize military control of the release of information.[4] Concerned about the persistent press dissatisfaction, OWI conducted a series of nationwide surveys to measure public attitudes toward the handling of war news. These opinion polls showed that the public, in contrast with the news media, was generally satisfied with military disclosures. In a February 1943 survey, 71 per cent of those queried gave the Army a "very well" rating on its news release policies, while 63 per cent thought the Navy also was doing well in this regard. However, there was a certain carry-over of adverse public opinion

surrounding the Navy's earlier delays in announcing ship losses. Thirty-eight per cent of the public believed the Navy was remiss in not making more prompt announcements, whereas only 11 per cent accused the Army of tardiness in its releases. On the other hand, the Army was blamed for not giving enough details about land battles.[5]

Captain Lovette, in a Pearl Harbor anniversary article written for Army and Navy Journal, attempted to explain the Navy's dilemma over the timing of ship-loss releases:

> The lapse of time [in announcing ship losses] is not, as some would have you think, based on a desire on our part to withhold news from the public. On the contrary we realize as well as anyone how vital complete coverage regarding the scope of battles won and lost is to the morale of those on the home front. But it must be remembered that when the enemy attacks our ships in the heat of battle the issue is often unknown to him. He cannot always tell whether his bombs or torpedoes have struck home, or just how badly damaged our units may be. If we were to issue communiques regarding the immediate fate of our ships it would indeed constitute aid and comfort to the enemy.[6]

In the article, the Navy's chief information officer also summed up the role of Navy public relations as he saw it after one year of wartime experience. He divided the job into four specific functions:

(1) To inform the public of the progress of the war at sea through official communiques.

(2) To assist the news media in covering naval activities and using Navy material.

(3) To act as "appropriate authority" in assisting the media to release news and photographs on subjects restricted under the censorship code.

(4) To answer inquiries from the general public on naval personnel and activities.

Lid of Security Lifts Slightly

On December 29, 1942, restrictions on the use of complete casualty lists by the news media were removed. Shortly thereafter, the Office of Public Relations began sending full casualty lists daily to the naval district public relations officers and authorized their release in answer to queries.[7]

On January 11, 1943, the previous rigid restrictions on the release of information about U.S. submarine activities were modified to allow news items on the undersea craft to be issued by individual submarine commands. However, in the Navy-wide directive authorizing this modification, Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal warned commanders to exercise caution "to insure that no information is released which might endanger the success of future operations."[8]

The relaxation of security about submarine operations came in the wake of a sharp revival of public interest in the German submarine campaign in the Atlantic. George Fielding Eliot, desiring to change this interest to concern,

wrote to Secretary Knox in March 1943:

> I wish it were possible to release more material on the U-Boat war, specifically human interest stories of a dramatic and appealing nature. . . . In other words, what I am anxious for is that there should be behind the Navy . . . the full pressure of an aroused and vigilant public opinion. I know that what I am suggesting is in many ways a departure from precedent--the Navy has always been here as in Britain the "silent service" . . . but . . . there is need for public pressure to keep the U-Boat war at the top of the priority list.[9]

Knox replied to Eliot that the Navy had at last adopted a more liberal policy on releasing information about the U-Boat war. He added: "I certainly intend to keep this situation very much in the public mind both to prepare them for the very probable losses and to secure their support in taking remedial measures."[10]

In addition to partially lifting the lid of security on U.S. submarine operations, the Navy for the first time began permitting normal publicity about the anti-submarine role of the new escort carriers.[11] Previously, these ships had been in a strictly classified status.

Admiral King was worried that the relaxation of security restrictions on anti-submarine warfare might go too far. In June 1943, he sent a letter to all ships and stations directing that strict secrecy be maintained as to tactics, methods and new weapons being used against the U-Boats.[12] He particularly warned against any disclosure concerning the use of radar, a subject closely safeguarded

throughout the war. In a significant departure from his previous admonitions to the fleet on security matters, however, King reminded commanding officers that many facets of anti-submarine warfare were unclassified and invited them to submit news releases on these subjects.

It is interesting to note that during a period when certain restrictions on publicity were being removed by the U.S. Navy, specific requests to ensure secrecy were received from the British and French navies. In December 1942, the British Admiralty sent a message to Admiral King complaining that a U.S. Navy photograph violated British security about a new type of corvette.[13] The message also objected to a photograph of a British ship published by Henry Kaiser's Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation and reiterated British censorship rules on new merchant ship construction. In February 1943, the French Naval Mission in Washington asked that no mention be made of the movements of French naval vessels currently in American harbors or waters.[14]

Improvement in Navy Releasing Procedures Noted

By the end of May 1943, Captain Lovette, speaking on a network radio program, commented that "because of a speed-up of communications and improved techniques in getting communiques cleared, the Navy is now releasing news faster than at the beginning of the war."[15] He cautioned,

however, that delays in releasing news of value to the enemy would at times be necessary in the future as they have been in the past. One such delay occurred prior to his statement. The occupation of the Aleutian island of Amchitka by American troops, which took place in January 1943, was not officially announced until May 7, almost four months after the event.[16]

Despite the delay in the Amchitka announcement, Elmer Davis also reported in the spring of 1943 that military news, especially naval news, was being released more promptly and in greater detail than before.[17] The OWI director at this time was meeting frequently with Army and Navy representatives to discuss the content and form of military news releases. Moreover, a system had been set up whereby OWI cleared in advance the communiques to be issued by the services in Washington. This gave Davis and his staff an opportunity to rebut if they felt more information could be given without impairing security. Davis credited the services with keeping his agency more fully informed about military operations than they had in the past. One reason for the better exchange of information was the establishment in May 1943 of a security advisory board within OWI. This board was made up of Army and Navy officers under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral Richard P. McCullough, USN (Retired).[18]

The OWI director told a group of Navy public relations officers in late April 1943:

> We have always had the utmost friendly relations and the best possible cooperation with the Office of Public Relations. And when we disagree, as we do only occasionally, as to whether a certain item is a matter of security or not, we do not question that the Naval authorities have the last word. . . . Since I have come over to this side of the fence, I realize a great many things that I was not aware of as a reporter. The question of security . . . has a good many angles, many of which an outsider might not see at all but which actually exist, and may not be revealed until perhaps three months later.[19]

As we shall see, Davis' magnanimous attitude toward the problems of Navy security was to change later in the year as the press and OWI launched a new attack on military information policies.

Speaking at the same conference as Elmer Davis, Secretary Knox also keynoted the improvement in Navy public relations. "There has come about a considerable [sic] greater degree of enlightenment among high officers of the Navy about the proper place and . . . importance of information to the public."[20] Knox noted that there was currently in progress a reorganization of Navy intelligence, which "will result in a better understanding of exactly what kind of information is desired and what kind of information must be kept secret." He added that the Navy in Washington did not receive nearly as many complaints about news handling as it did earlier in the war. "Today the news is dished out as fast as it comes in. We don't hold up

anything for a press conference. The communiques are read as rapidly as possible and handed out."

In his speech, however, the secretary leveled a charge of irresponsibility in protecting security at his former newspaper colleagues:

> Captain Lovette and his staff are dealing with a lot of prima donnas, who unfortunately . . . think the story is more important than security. I have been frankly disappointed in the lack of imagination and understanding on the part of a good many newspaper men. . . . They seem to think that it's smart and clever to get something into the newspapers that they themselves know ought, for the sake of security, not to be printed.

In a letter to a newspaper friend about three months earlier, Knox criticized the editorial judgment of Washington's two morning newspapers:

> I am in the middle of an amusing controversy here right now. The Japs have been making some extravagant and fanatical claims of damage done our ships, and then when a communique was published of a very indefinite character explaining that the brushes now occurring may be the preliminary to a heavy engagement later, both morning papers here . . . assumed that this meant an engagement was actually in progress and added that on the outcome of this battle now in progress rested the control of the South Pacific. I had a press conference the next day and corrected the misinterpretation of both newspapers and now they are zealously trying to prove that the Secretary of the Navy and the Press Relations department of the Navy have a difference of opinion--kind of a silly performance which shows beautifully the irresponsible character of the editorial management of both papers.[21]

An analysis of media items during the four weeks ending June 14, 1943, showed that the volume of comment on the Navy's information policy was declining, "although such comment is still preponderantly adverse."[22] Of thirty-five

items, twenty-two were uncomplimentary, five favorable and eight "balanced," reported the Analysis Section of OPR.

A More Creative Public Relations Approach

In conjunction with the gradual relaxation of security restrictions and the speedup in releasing procedures, steps were being taken by the Navy to actively interest the press and public in specific naval activities. As discussed in Chapter III, this more "creative" approach to public relations began in September 1942 with the extensive publicity effort surrounding the launching of the new Lexington.

In December 1942, the Director of Public Relations forwarded to the Commandants of the First, Eighth and Ninth Naval Districts a detailed plan for publicising the transit of a new submarine, the USS Pato, along inland waterways from Manitowoc, Wisconsin, to New Orleans.[23] The trip was considered an excellent opportunity to dramatize for the people residing in Mid-America, who seldom saw a Navy ship, the role played by submarines in the war. Media representatives were encouraged to accompany the Pato from St. Louis to New Orleans, and unrestricted photographs by the press and public were allowed at any point during the transit.

Also in December 1942, arrangements were made by Captain Lovette to embark a selected group of media representatives in the new battleship Alabama to observe gunnery

exercises during the ship's "shakedown" cruise.[24] As in the case of the Reno campaign, these plans had the full support of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. During the Alabama field trials, color photographs were taken for the first time by Navy photographers.

By February 1943, the Navy's combat photography units were in full operation in the fleets. There were five teams in the field at this time--one each assigned to the Pacific Fleet, Atlantic Fleet, South Pacific Force, Southwest Pacific Force and the U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. By June, the number of units had grown to eleven.

As a result of the combat photography unit system, the recapture of Attu Island in the Aleutians in late May 1943 became one of the most photographed American military operations in the war up to that time. Navy Lieutenant Dewey Wrigley, USNR, a former Paramount Films motion picture photographer, and his combat film team went with the convoy to Attu and accompanied the troops ashore. They spent four days and nights on the front line, photographing all phases of the battle.

To effect additional and more efficient distribution of the increasing number of still photographs that were being forwarded to Washington daily by field commands, a photographic reference library was established in January 1943 as a sub-section of the Pictorial Section in the

Office of Public Relations. Initially, more than 17,000 different photographs of Navy subjects were placed in this library. All of these pictures were cleared for release, and writers and editors were encouraged to "browse" through the library and make their own selections.[25]

Also in January 1943, the Radio Section of OPR took steps to improve broadcast coverage of Navy activities. Field and fleet public relations officers were urged to be on the lookout for creative ideas for radio programs:

> Producers, writers and sponsors will welcome guidance in making radio programs dealing with the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard affirmative in their effect upon the listener. By affirmative is meant the presentation of facts--in dramatic interviews or any other form suitable to the particular program--on problems of the Navy in this war. Every script, whether for network, regional or local broadcast, is important enough to contribute something of the tremendous job the Navy is doing.[26]

At least one result of the increased effort in the area of broadcasting occurred in August 1943, when NBC turned over four hours of network time to the Navy for a special broadcast entitled "Battle Stations." The first two hours covered the Battle of the Atlantic, while the second half of the program dealt with naval aviation.[27]

The medium of radio was the primary vehicle in the first years of the war for dispensing internal information to military personnel. In early 1943, the Overseas Division of OWI, in cooperation with the Navy and Marine Corps public relations offices, was short-waving two programs to men afloat and at advanced bases. The shows were made up

of service news and personal messages from next of kin, as well as musical and other entertainment. The Navy program, "Calling the Navy," was broadcast six days a week three times a day all over the world. Direct contact with the OWI Overseas Division was maintained by OFR's radio branch in New York in connection with this program.[28]

Arrangements were also made with the OWI Radio Bureau in February 1943 for a network and local radio campaign to assist a recruiting drive for the Women's Reserve of both the Navy and Coast Guard. The campaign began with daily spot announcements on network-affiliated and non-affiliated stations throughout the nation. It continued in the second week with appeals being broadcast on leading network programs, including the appearance of five admirals on five different shows. In the third week, a fifteen-minute recorded program was aired on 800 stations, featuring Lieutenant Commander Mildred H. McAfee, USNR, director of the WAVES and former president of Wellesley College.

This radio publicity was the beginning of an extensive effort in 1943 to recruit women for all the sea services. A decline in the enlistment of women reservists occurred at a time when they were critically needed to release men for combat duty.

The public relations aspects of the campaign centered around the first anniversary of the WAVES on

July 30. The Office of Public Relations and the Director of the Women's Reserve of the Navy cooperated in a nation-wide publicity effort to observe this event. The Press Section of OPR issued an advance release, containing statistical information and a summary of the first year's history of the WAVES. Feature stories, including photographic features, were prepared for newspapers and magazines. Radio programs and interviews were conducted, with a second intensive national radio drive staged in the latter part of July. Arrangements also were made for newsreel coverage of anniversary ceremonies.[29]

The assistance rendered by the Office of Public Relations was praised by Lieutenant Commander McAfee, who wrote to Captain Lovette:

> I suppose that the Public Relations Office considers that its recent activity on behalf of the Women's Reserve is in its normal line of duty. May I assure you, however, that those of us who have watched the efforts to celebrate the first anniversary of the Women's Reserve are impressed by the remarkable achievement which resulted from efforts far in excess of what we would normally expect in the line of anybody's duty. Every branch of your organization was untiring in its effort to present the Women's Reserve to the public.[30]

Recruiting Drives and Other Promotional Activities

Throughout 1943, naval district and branch public relations officers were asked to provide publicity assistance for various other recruiting programs, such as the drives for aviation cadets and the new V-12 officer trainee

classes. In the latter case, each college at which a Class V-12 unit was located handled publicity about the unit as a whole. However, Navy public relations officers released stories about individual class members to media in the enrollee's home area.

In August 1943, the Bureau of Aeronautics requested the Office of Public Relations to coordinate publicity for the Navy's pre-flight training program. Because of the strong athletic emphasis at the pre-flight schools, OPR recommended that leading sports writers be invited to spend a week at the various schools during the opening of football season. The plan called for twenty writers to visit each school.[31]

A month earlier, a selected group of newspaper writers from around the country were given a flying tour of naval air facilities. Commands visited included the Naval Air Stations at Glenview, Ill., Norman, Okla., and Corpus Christi, Tex., and the Naval Air Gunners School at Purcell, Okla. In early December 1943, a special tour was conducted of naval activities in Charleston, S.C., by the Sixth Naval District Public Relations Office for newspapermen from Georgia and South Carolina. The highlight of this tour was a one-day cruise at sea aboard a new destroyer, in which the newsmen were given gunfire and smoke-screen-laying demonstrations and were "subjected" to dive bombing and strafing attacks simulated by planes from the Naval Air

Station, Beaufort, Ga.[32]

By 1943, public relations assistance in recruiting was much more coordinated than it had been earlier in the war. One previous problem was the lack of centralized control over requests for recruiting publicity. For instance, in the summer of 1942, the Bureau of Yards and Docks asked the Radio Section of OPR to enlist the cooperation of the broadcasting industry in a "crash" program to recruit 60,000 Seabees in ninety days. The goal not only was met but exceeded. However, due to the lack of training facilities for Seabees, many plumbers, electricians and others who had given up their jobs or private businesses to enlist "cooled their heels" at home waiting for the Navy to process them. OPR shortly thereafter arranged to clear all such requests in the future with the Director of Recruiting.[33]

A series of "Battle Reports," authored by the head of the Magazine Section of OPR, Lieutenant Commander Walter Karig, began in the fall of 1943, supplementing for the news media the official communiques and Navy press releases.[34] The first full volume was published in 1944. Four additional volumes were prepared as the war progressed.

In 1943, as in the previous year, naval district and branch office public relations officers also were involved in publicizing the national war bond program.

Much of their effort in this regard was directed toward an internal audience--naval personnel and civilians working for the Navy. In 1942, the internal informational campaign to encourage war bond purchases resulted in a $100 million investment in bonds by Navy Department personnel. Purchases in 1943 amounted to $300 million, and the Secretary of the Navy assigned a quota in 1944 of $600 million.[35]

Not all of the Navy's promotional activities on behalf of war bonds were internal, however. Early in 1943, there were several notable efforts to raise money for the construction of naval vessels to be named after specific cities. The popularity and success of these promotions led to an increasing number of requests by cities to have ships named in their honor. Consequently, the Navy appealed to the Treasury Department to discourage this type of bond campaign, since ship names ordinarily were approved far in advance or reserved for other subject areas. The "Sponsor a Fighting Ship" program, however, in which local communities received credit for defraying the cost of a ship through bond purchases by having a plaque displayed on the ship's quarterdeck, continued.[36]

Another fund-raising drive in which Navy public relations was asked to assist in early 1943 was the Red Cross War Fund Campaign. President Roosevelt designated March of that year as Red Cross Month. In preparation for the campaign, Norman Davis, director of the American Red

Cross, asked the Secretary of the Navy in January to provide photographs showing Red Cross activities in connection with the Navy at war.[37] Pictures of blood plasma being loaded aboard ships or first aid being applied to survivors of ship sinkings were the type desired. Secretary Knox took a personal interest in the Red Cross drive and urged Navy public relations officers to cooperate to the maximum extent with Red Cross officials to "help promote public understanding of Red Cross work with the armed forces."[38]

A unique public relations program, begun in 1942 and continued in 1943, was the Model Aircraft Project, co-sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education and the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. For 1943, a quota of 300,000 solid model planes was assigned to the nation's school students for the study of aircraft recognition by military personnel and civilian plane spotters. The models were built to scale, so that at a distance of thirty-five feet each plane model appeared the size of a real plane at a distance of half a mile. Models of enemy planes and those of Allied nations were built by boys and girls under school supervision and then shipped to Navy receiving depots for distribution to naval schools, ships at sea, Army commands and other centers where accurate models were needed to teach aircraft recognition. About 35 per cent of the models were used by the Navy itself in training aviators and gunners. Navy certificates of rank, ranging

from "Cadet Aircraftsman" to "Admiral Aircraftsman" were awarded to the students on the basis of the number of acceptable models built.[39]

Industrial Incentive Program

During the war, the United States Navy was the nation's largest single employer of labor.[40] Labor relations not only was of vast importance to the Navy's effort; it also required extensive public relations activity, particularly on the part of naval district and branch public relations offices.

In December 1942, Rear Admiral Clark Woodward, who headed the Navy's Incentive Division, wrote to Captain Lovette expressing his appreciation for the assistance provided by public relations personnel:

> Since its creation in July of this year, the Incentive Division has had occasion to lean heavily on the various Public Relations offices throughout the country for assistance in Army-Navy "E" awards, staging rallies, visits of combat personnel to industrial plants and other similar activities.
>
> The splendid cooperation which has been afforded this Division by /these offices/ . . . has enabled us to extend greatly our response to the need for incentive work in industry supplying the Navy with war materials.[41]

Admiral Woodward stressed that the need for incentive work in the nation's war industry was increasing. "New methods must continually be devised to meet the changing psychology of management and labor, and an even larger number of Navy contractors is requesting assistance

on both old and new type of Incentive problems." He renewed an earlier request to Captain Lovette for all possible public relations assistance to his division in the future.

In June 1943, Admiral Woodward specifically asked that branch public relations officers contact local radio stations in their areas to arrange for the inclusion of incentive messages in public service programming. It was particularly desired that these messages be broadcast during the morning hours when workers were enroute to their plants. The announcements were definitely "hard sell," as evidenced by the following example:

> "Pick out the biggest ships and let 'em have it."
>
> That's what Captain Jack Moran told his crew before going into battle with the Japs. His ship--the USS BOISE--sent six Jap warships to the bottom. Build more ships for your Navy, and help send more Jap ships to the bottom![42]

As discussed in the last chapter, the Incentive Division provided many other services in addition to radio messages to help public relations and incentive officers in their liaison with industry. Photographs showing Navy products in action, communiques reporting on the performance of certain equipment under combat conditions, material for employee publications, exhibits of finished Navy products in settings approximating their use in combat, posters, motion pictures, speakers and special recordings--all were made available.

In September 1943, at the urging of Under Secretary Forrestal, a plan was initiated whereby two newscasts per employee shift would be broadcast directly to public address systems at war plants on leased lines from local radio stations.[43] The newscasts would consist primarily of war news, especially about naval actions. Local items of Navy interest would be provided by the nearest Navy public relations office, and incentive messages would be incorporated into the opening and close of each newscast. District public relations officers had the responsibility of arranging with local radio stations to originate the newscasts. Charges for telephone lines and fees for the stations were treated as regular production costs.

In July 1942, the separate awards previously presented by the services to individual plants for outstanding performance in war production--the Navy "E," Army "A," and the Army-Navy Star--were combined into one joint Army-Navy Production Award. Six months later, Rear Admiral Henry A. Wiley, Chairman of the Navy Board for Production Awards, complained that the new award was being presented too often and to too many plants.[44] He felt that the number of firms receiving the award should be reduced in order to "accentuate" its value. Accordingly, all agencies recommending the Army-Navy Production Award were requested to exercise more stringent supervision of their recommendations in the future, so that the awards would go

only to "those contractors whose production performance has been outstanding and who are really deserving of the award."

Physically, the award consisted of a special flag to be flown above the industrial plant and a pin to be worn by every employee of the plant as a symbol of outstanding contributions to the war effort. As mentioned previously, the cognizant naval district public relations officer or his branch representative handled all arrangements in connection with the presentation of awards. To demonstrate the joint character of the award, an Army officer, if available, presented the pins to individual employees at Navy-sponsored ceremonies, while a Navy officer made the presentations at the Army-sponsored events.

Under Secretary Forrestal, who had the over-all responsibility for the industrial incentive program, arranged in May 1944 a tour for selected newspapermen and radio commentators to Navy establishments "where they could see the results of the Navy production program."[45] The tour consisted of two trips: a one-day visit to Philadelphia and Camden, New Jersey, on May 20; and a three-day visit to New York City, Kearny, New Jersey, Dahlgren, Virginia, and Patuxent, Maryland, on May 29-31. The purpose was to acquaint the newsmen with improvements made during the past year in Navy ships, aircraft and ordnance. Many of the weapons systems shown could not be written about because of

secret classification; however, Forrestal was anxious that the newsmen see them, so that they would be "better able to write about future war developments."

Public Relations Manual Promulgated

On March 1, 1943, the U.S. Navy Public Relations Manual was issued by the Office of Public Relations (see note 40). It was the first compilation of directives, instructions and guidance for sea service public relations personnel since the Office of Naval Intelligence published Training Instructions for Public Relations Personnel in 1939.

The new manual contained the federal statutes, Navy Regulations and General Orders, sections of the Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, directives, letters, memoranda and excerpts from the Public Relations Bulletin which related to the subject of public relations on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. It also included, where pertinent, letters of the Office of Civilian Defense, the codes published by the Office of Censorship and the regulations of the Office of War Information. It was divided into seven sections: administration, media--general, media--press, media--radio, media--pictures, special events and security. Purposefully issued in looseleaf notebook form so that supplemental and correctional pages could be easily inserted, the manual also had a simplified numbering system and an index whereby the user could quickly locate the

subject for which he was looking. It was fully intended to be an up-to-date reference book and a text for indoctrinating personnel new to the field, and it served that purpose throughout the remainder of the war.

Cutback in Public Relations Personnel

Paradoxically, at a time when Navy public relations was gradually coming out from under the "heavy hand of security" and beginning to pursue a more aggressive course in informing the public, steps were being taken to reduce the number of personnel engaged in the function. The reasons for this action were: (1) an urgent need for additional personnel to man the rapidly expanding naval forces, and (2) concomitant criticism from various sources over the utilization of combat-eligible males in non-combat assignments.

A Navy that had been "starved for funds" in the past was now being permitted, even encouraged, by Congress to "spend like a drunken sailor."[46] In May 1943, with less than thirty members on the floor, the House appropriated $30 billion for the Navy in Fiscal Year 1944 in just twenty minutes. This prompted one representative to remark sarcastically that he thought there should be at least one member present for each billion dollars voted.[47]

In January 1943, Captain Lovette wrote to public relations officers in the continental United States that a

congressional investigation of the Office of Public Relations, as well as other offices and bureaus of the Navy Department, probably was forthcoming.[48] He added that the Secretary of the Navy wanted to ensure in advance of any investigation that all male personnel qualified for duty afloat were being made available for such duty. Accordingly, the field public relations officers were requested to furnish as soon as possible the names of their officer and enlisted personnel up to thirty-five years of age who were physically qualified for sea assignments. Despite Lovette's warning, the congressional investigation of military public relations did not materialize; however, the Navy continued to assume that it might take place.

The Chief of Naval Personnel, in late April 1943, stressed the need for qualified officer personnel in the fleets by citing figures showing the tremendous increase in officers in the Navy since the war began. "The Navy had 35,000 officers before Pearl Harbor. Today, we have 147,000 . . . and by January 1, 1944, we shall need an additional 60,000 for a total officer strength of 207,000."[49] In February 1943, it was estimated that in the near future there also would exist a shortage of 100,000 enlisted men in the Navy.[50]

The acute manpower shortage caused Admiral King to write to Secretary Knox in March 1943 recommending that further expansion of personnel in the fields of naval

intelligence, photography and public relations be stopped. The admiral observed, "I have come to the conclusion that certain military activities are now adequately manned to meet all essential requirements."[51]

There seemed to be a certain amount of justification for Admiral King's assessment. A postwar history of the Public Relations Office, Fourth Naval District, Philadelphia, noted with considerable candor:

> . . . the war-time strength estimated to have been necessary in July, 1941, has never been required. This early set-up called for 29 officers, 8 enlisted personnel and 15 civil service clerical employees--a total of 52. The fact is that the total complement /of the public relations office/ has never exceeded 24.[52]

Secretary Knox immediately approved Admiral King's recommendations and further directed a reduction in public relations personnel wherever possible. In response, Captain Lovette informed the naval district commandants, the chiefs of naval air functional training commands, and the commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard that revised complements for their public relations offices would be forthcoming.[53]

By September 1943, the entire public relations manning level for the Navy had been reduced by 20 per cent. Priority was given to fulfilling requests for additional public relations officers for fleet commanders, but officers so ordered had to be taken away from public relations offices in the United States. Even with this

procedure, a request from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, for four additional public relations officers was filled with only two.[54]

The public relations personnel "squeeze" became even more acute in November 1943, when the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Personnel in joint conference ordered the Director of Public Relations to "reduce to a minimum" the officer and enlisted personnel attached to the various public relations offices. Complying with this directive, Captain Lovette recommended to district commandants that an immediate survey be made of public relations personnel in their areas and that "only those officers and enlisted personnel who can be certified as being absolutely necessary for Public Relations duties be retained."[55]

Despite the emphasis on cutting personnel in the first half of 1943, the total strength of the Office of Public Relations increased from 135 in October 1942 to 158 on June 30, 1943. The additional personnel, however, were civilians and WAVES, both officer and enlisted. There was a decrease of eight male officers and four male enlisted men in the office during this period. Throughout the remainder of 1943 and during the first four months of 1944, the officer strength in OPR remained constant, fluctuating between sixty-two and sixty-four.

There was a drastic reduction in the number of

officers in the field and fleet public relations offices during 1943, however. A January directory in that year listed the names of 274 officers attached to thirteen naval district, fifty-nine branch, thirty-eight air command and two fleet public relations offices. By August 15, 1943, the number had decreased to 218 and to 185 by May 1, 1944.[56] The reduction was achieved primarily by the closing of twelve naval district branch offices in metropolitan centers.

Compared to the War Department Bureau of Public Relations in mid-1943, the Navy's office in Washington did not seem to be over-staffed. An August 15th Army directory listed 129 officers in its Bureau of Public Relations, twice as many as in OPR--and over three times as many civilians, 306 to 76.[57]

Scope of Office of Public Relations Activities

The variety and magnitude of Office of Public Relations activities were keynoted in an annual report submitted by Captain Lovette to Secretary Knox, covering the fiscal year period from July 1, 1942-June 30, 1943.[58] Some of the statistical highlights were:

(1) Issuance of 335 communiques and 2,448 press releases.

(2) Distribution of 178,620 still photographs.

(3) Release of 40,500 feet of motion picture film.

(4) Security review of 4,500 articles submitted by newspaper and magazine correspondents; 2,012 radio scripts; 1,684 advertisements; 276 speeches; and 102 books.

(5) Supply of material and/or personnel for 1,571 radio programs.

(6) Preparation of 704 speeches for Navy officials and 409 articles for magazine and other periodicals.

(7) Answering of 18,482 queries submitted by the news media and general public.

There were twelve sections in OPR in January 1943: administrative, press, radio, pictorial, motion pictures, naval districts, analysis, magazine, combat photography, special events, review and aviation. The last four had been added since June 1942 and represented additional wartime services provided by the office.

A new post of Credentials Officer for war correspondents was created in January 1943 under the Executive Assistant to the Director, Commander Beecher. Initially, Lieutenant D. C. Blythe, USNR, who had relieved Lieutenant Gordon as head of the Administrative Section in the fall of 1942, assumed this position, while Lieutenant P. G. Parker, USNR, became the new administrative head. Blythe was relieved as Credentials Officer in April 1943 by Lieutenant Thomas Pinckney, USNR.

During Fiscal Year 1943, 113 war correspondents were accredited to the various fleets and sea frontier

commands, and new correspondents were being accredited at the rate of seventeen per month. Approximately 140 authorizations per month were being issued to correspondents for visiting naval shore activities in the continental United States. These authorizations did not require the full security investigations necessary for war correspondent accreditation.

Four personnel changes occurred in the Office of Public Relations in March 1943. Lieutenant Commander Edward M. Seay, USNR, replaced Lieutenant Commander Huggins as head of the Naval Districts Section, with Huggins reporting to the U.S. Naval Operating Base, Bermuda, to head up a new public relations office there; Lieutenant Commander Harold B. Say, USNR, moved up as head of the Review Section, relieving Lieutenant Commander Blakeslee; Lieutenant Commander Walter H. Neff, USNR, became the new head of the Aviation Section in place of Lieutenant Commander Winston; and Commander George W. Campbell, USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander Hill as the Assistant to the Director for Communiques. A month later, Commander Campbell's title was changed from "Communiques Officer" to "Security Officer" with his main function still being the preparation of communiques.

Except for rotation of junior officers, there were no additional personnel changes in OPR until October 1943, when Commander Beecher replaced Captain Berry as Deputy

Director. Berry had been promoted to the rank of captain in May and was anxious to return to sea duty. He became commanding officer of the USS Proteus after leaving OPR. Relieving Commander Beecher as Executive Assistant to the Director was Commander J. L. Collis, USN, who recently had been awarded the Legion of Merit for services as commander of a minesweeping division in the Pacific.

The Naval Districts Section of OPR was absorbed into the Administrative Section in December 1943. Lieutenant Commander Seay, who had headed the section, was now in charge of a branch of the Special Events Section called "Organizational Contacts."[59]

There were changes in the Bureau of Naval Personnel's Public Relations Division in 1943 also. On April 16, at the request of Captain Lovette, its name was changed to "Special Services Division" to avoid possible confusion with the Office of Public Relations. Two weeks later, the first director of the division was transferred to other duty; and his executive officer, a reserve lieutenant commander who had been a public relations counselor in civilian life, was appointed acting director. On June 12, the division as such was dissolved, with the acting director being named as Special Assistant for Public Relations to the Assistant Chief of the bureau. This move was significant in that it represented an awareness on the part of the bureau that its public relations advisor should have

direct access to the top level of command. So that he could concentrate full-time on the job of advising and counseling, the Special Assistant for Public Relations also was relieved of many of the borderline public relations tasks previously performed by the Public Relations Division --including the preparation and release of All Hands, which was transferred to the bureau's Welfare Division.[60]

A West Coast Director Named

Poor handling by local public relations officers of an inspection trip by the Secretary of the Navy to the Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts in July 1943 led to a recommendation for and subsequent establishment of a West Coast branch of the Office of Public Relations.

Jack Hartley, head of the Radio Section of OPR, who accompanied Secretary Knox on the trip, reported to Captain Lovette that no contact was made by local public relations officers in San Francisco with the secretary's party until twenty-two hours after their arrival. He added that contact then was made only after Frank Mason telephoned the Chief of Staff of the Twelfth Naval District and pointed out that it was usual for the district public relations officer to meet the secretary on arrival, discuss with his aide what was desired, prime him on questions that might arise at a press conference, and suggest to members of the press questions which might bring forth quotable comment.

Hartley continued in a caustic vein by saying that the press conference finally held was one of the poorest he had ever attended. "The Secretary had to ask each representative of the press his or her name instead of being introduced."[61]

In Seattle, Secretary Knox attended a launching ceremony for a new destroyer. The district public relations officer, said Hartley, "did not appear at the launching and the Assistant PRO that did appear wasn't even able to supply the name of the vessel being launched!"

Other factors contributed to the decision to set up a supervisory West Coast public relations office. One was the need which had existed for some time to expedite the clearance and release in that area of information which bordered on being classified. Previously, such news items had to be sent to Washington for approval, causing considerable delay. In general, there also was an increase in public relations activities on the West Coast at this time.[62]

On September 28, 1943, Commander Alfred J. Bolton, USN (Retired), was named as the Assistant Director of Public Relations, West Coast, with additional duty as Motion Picture and Radio Liaison Officer. His office was in Los Angeles, where he had been serving as liaison officer with the motion picture industry for the Eleventh Naval District since June 1, 1943, and prior to that as

assistant district public relations officer.

A directive spelling out his supervisory responsibilities was issued by Commander Bolton to all public relations officers on the West Coast in October 1943.[63] All press material, including photographs, previously sent to Washington for security review, would now be submitted to him. Arrangements for radio programs over national and coastal networks, and all contact with the motion picture industry would be made through his office. And, whenever possible, his office would assist public relations officers with the handling of local visits by high Navy officials.

Liaison With Motion Picture Industry and Newsreel Releases

Shortly before the West Coast office was created, Lieutenant Alan Brown, head of the Motion Picture Section of OPR, made a liaison trip to Hollywood. He reported that a majority of the motion picture studios "seemed to understand the Navy's problems and were anxious to be of assistance."[64] He was disturbed to find, however, that the Bureau of Yards and Docks had arranged with Warner Brothers to release a Seabees short subject motion picture without consulting the Office of Public Relations. The Seabees also had cooperated independently with Republic Pictures on the production, "The Fighting Seabees," authorizing camera crews to visit Seabee Training Centers without proper security clearances. In Lieutenant Brown's opinion, the

Bureau of Yards and Docks had replaced the Bureau of Aeronautics as the "number one problem child" in the area of independent arrangements and releases.

In September 1943, Warner Brothers was filming a technicolor short subject about PT boats entitled "Devil Boats." MGM also was shooting a short subject to be narrated by Pete Smith, concerning naval aviation and the safeguards the Navy employed. During the same month, two combat photography unit films covering the landing on Kiska and the landings at Salerno were released to newsreel companies, as was a special 16mm. film of the surrender of the Italian Fleet.

The Motion Picture Section of OPR also made available to the newsreels an official Navy film of the September 1943 Norfolk Naval Air Station fire, in which twenty-eight persons were killed and 250 injured. The handling of the disaster by the Fifth Naval District Public Relations Office received praise from members of the news media in the area. Information personnel were on the scene within three minutes after the fire broke out, supplying eyewitness accounts and photographs and compiling the first casualty lists. The public relations office itself was transformed into a workshop for press and radio representatives, and special telephone lines were installed to facilitate clearance and transmission of reports.[65]

Eleven film releases were made by the Motion Picture Section in the early months of 1944. The most widely used of these covered the seizure of the Marshall Islands and the first raids on Saipan and Truk. The latter footage was taken with 16mm. gun cameras mounted in the wings of the striking carrier planes.

Army subjects appearing in the newsreels during the same period outnumbered Navy subjects about two to one. The continuing Italian campaign, Army Air Force bombing of Germany, the bombing of the Casino Abbey and General MacArthur's personal occupation of the Admiralty Islands kept the Army films in the spotlight. The Navy obtained excellent footage of the Kwajalein and Makin Island landings, but delays in transporting the films back to the United States detracted from their timeliness and eventual use.

At the request of the Commander, Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander Bolton approached MGM in early 1944 to encourage that studio to produce a feature motion picture about the amphibious forces. MGM seemed receptive and indicated they would probably make the film.

The Navy's amphibious arm was not alone in seeking publicity for its activities at this stage of the war. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air asked the Director of Public Relations for assistance in furthering public understanding

of the wartime role of naval aviation. In response to these requests, the Motion Picture Section arranged for Pathé photographers to shoot a carrier "shakedown" cruise film for public release. The film was made aboard the new Wasp and released in April 1944 as part of the Pathé series entitled "This is America."

In further cooperation with the Assistant Secretary for Air, Mr. Artemis Gates, plans were formulated in the spring of 1944 to interest a Hollywood motion picture studio to release a color film made by Navy cameramen aboard the new Yorktown.[66]

In March 1944, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), in coordination with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), developed plans to make a documentary motion picture covering Navy participation in the forthcoming landings in France. OSS effected a transfer of one of its officers in London, Lieutenant Commander John McClain, USNR, to the staff of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, for the purpose of supervising the use of Navy combat photography units in the project.[67] When OSS director, General William Donovan, informed Captain Lovette that he intended to substitute Commander John Ford for McClain, the Navy Director of Public Relations immediately became concerned. Ford, the Hollywood movie director, had affronted the Navy in the past by "pirating" some of its photographers for other governmental uses. Lovette's

assistant, Commander Collis, wrote to Lieutenant Commander Harry Bingham, USNR, the public relations officer for the Navy European command, cautioning him to retain complete control over the Navy photographers in the OSS project. "We frankly doubt," Collis said, "that /Commander Ford/ would be content to remain in an 'advisory' capacity."[68]

"Visiting" Correspondents Accredited to Pacific Fleet

Early in 1943, the Office of Public Relations initiated a plan whereby correspondents could accompany Pacific Fleet ships during operations on a rotating or "visiting" basis. Prior to this, only those permanently accredited to the fleet were permitted to embark during operations. Commander Beecher wrote to Commander Waldo Drake in early January, "The favorable reaction of Admiral Nimitz . . . and yourself to the proposal to assign six billets to visiting War Correspondents was indeed gratifying."[69]

The first of the billets were made available to Saturday Evening Post, Colliers and other leading magazines. Commander Beecher estimated that about fifteen magazine writers had indicated they wished to take advantage of the new "visiting correspondents" plan.

Meanwhile, Commander Drake decreased the number of seagoing billets for the wire services to six apiece, reducing the other Associated Press and United Press

correspondents in the Central Pacific to the status of base correspondents. Strategic placement of the six seemed to defer any immediate protests from the wire services over this limitation.

Because of the visiting correspondents plan, there was less room also to accommodate representatives of the foreign media. A request from Walter Farr of the London Daily Mail to return to the Pacific Fleet as a permanent correspondent was held in abeyance because "if Farr is sent back out there it would be increasingly difficult to hold off the London Times."[70] A plan to set definite limits on the numbers of British, Australian and New Zealand correspondents and to rotate them was considered.

Admiral Nimitz hosted about thirty correspondents for a luncheon at his quarters in January 1943 during a visit by Secretary Knox to Pearl Harbor. The admiral also took time out from his busy schedule at this time to give a long "backgrounder" interview to Carleton Kent of the Chicago Times, who was returning home from Australia.[71]

While the effort was being made in 1943 to expand war correspondents' coverage of the Pacific war, difficulties in transportation for the newsmen were being encountered. Commander Drake wrote to Commander Beecher in September, complaining that three correspondents had to arrange their own transportation from the West Coast, "arriving here yesterday in a slow boat . . . for which

passage they each had to pay $110."[72] Drake requested that the Office of Public Relations write a letter to the Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, reminding him that accredited correspondents traveling under orders rated the same transportation facilities as naval officers.

Drake also referred in his letter to an incident in which a correspondent had his accreditation rescinded because of "vitriolic criticism of the high command . . . together with tone of his copy." The commanding officer of the ship in which the newsman was embarked made a special trip to Pearl Harbor to urge that he not be given further Navy credentials. According to Drake, the commander involved was an officer "of excellent judgment and in full sympathy with the press."

President Directs Closer Cooperation With OWI

During 1943, the tide of battle continued to turn dramatically in favor of the Allies. On February 9, organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal ended, bringing to a successful conclusion the initial U.S. offensive move in the war. On May 13, enemy resistance in North Africa came to a close; and on June 30, Marine and Army troops were landed on Rendova and other islands in the New Georgia area, Solomon Islands. On July 10, Sicily was invaded, followed by landings on the Italian mainland in early September. The Japanese had completely evacuated the

Aleutians by July 28; and on November 20, naval, Marine and Army forces landed on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands.[73]

Media interest in the 1943 offensive operations was extremely high, resulting in a continuation by the press of the earlier complaints about military handling of war news.

In May 1943, E. Palmer Hoyt, former editor of the Portland Oregonian, replaced Gardner Cowles as head of OWI's Domestic Branch. Hoyt was a firm believer in the right and capability of the press to inform the public about the war; and from the moment of his appointment, OWI began to take a stronger stand in supporting the accusations leveled against the military by the news media.[74]

In August 1943, Nicholas Roosevelt resigned from his post as OWI's liaison officer with the Army and Navy. With a note of bitterness, he wrote in his letter of resignation to Elmer Davis that "so long as the relations of the OWI with the War and Navy Departments rest solely on the basis of petition and suggestion . . . only you . . . can do anything further to improve the public relations policies of the Army and Navy."[75]

Davis accepted the challenge from his former liaison officer. He once again approached President Roosevelt concerning OWI's problems with the armed services. As a result, the President, on September 1, 1943, sent letters to both service secretaries, directing them to

coordinate more closely the release of military war information with OWI. The President's letter to the Secretary of the Navy is quoted in part:

> The intensification of the war has increased the necessity of a fuller public understanding of the progress of military affairs. Closer relationships between the Navy Department and the Office of War Information are therefore highly desirable. . . . I should like to request you to put the following instructions into effect in your Department:
>
> 1. Whenever the Director of War Information determines that the public interest will be served by the release of information (including motion pictures and photographs) in the possession of the Navy Department, such information shall be released by the Navy Department at such time and in such form as the Director shall determine.
>
> 2. Where objection is made by the Navy Department to the release of information on the ground that such release may prejudice the security of naval operations, the Director and the Secretary of the Navy shall attempt to arrive at a satisfactory solution, giving due consideration to the interests of public disclosure on the one hand and of military security on the other. If an agreement cannot be reached by discussion, the matter shall be laid before me at once.
>
> 3. All news releases and statements concerned with material other than naval action, prepared for issuance in Washington by the Navy Department, shall be cleared before issuance with the News Bureau of the Office of War Information. News releases, communiques and statements concerned with naval action, prepared for issuance in Washington, shall be cleared before issuance with the Director.
>
> 4. In the event of disagreement as to the form or phraseology of a news release, communique or statement prepared for issuance by the Navy Department, the decision of the Director shall be binding on the Department.
>
> 5. The Director shall have access to all restricted and confidential (but not secret) motion pictures, photographs, and information in the Navy Department whenever such access is necessary in connection with any study being conducted by the Office of War Information.[76]

Secretary Knox immediately sent a letter to Captain Lovette, with copies to Admirals King and Horne and the Commandants of the Coast Guard and Marine Corps, quoting almost verbatim the contents of the President's letter.

In early October 1943, President Roosevelt stated at a press conference that more war news would be given out in Washington. At about the same time, the Navy announced that an attack was underway against the Marcus Islands. This represented an important departure from previous Navy news policy of disclosing an action only after it was completed. Another change in military information policy was the release for the first time in the war of official photographs showing American casualties.

While Davis did not have to refer any decisions to the President, he reported that the services were still slow in cooperating with OWI, and in many cases failed to observe the directive to clear through him materials other than military operations.[77]

Churchill "Scoop" Triggers New Attacks on U.S. Military

On September 18, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill made a speech before the British House of Commons, in which he revealed some good news about the war which had been withheld from publication in the American press on the grounds of security. He announced the following information which, from the Navy standpoint, Admiral King in particular

had been highly desirous of keeping secret:

> No merchant vessel had been sunk by enemy action in the North Atlantic in four months; fewer ships were lost by the Allies in August than in any month since the U.S. entered the war, and in the first two weeks of September not one United Nations ship was sunk by Axis submarines anywhere.[78]

Churchill further revealed that the "massive ship-building program of the U.S. had fulfilled all that had been hoped for and more, and the net gain of new building over losses since the beginning of the year exceeded 6 million tons."

The American press reacted strongly and immediately to the revelations of the British Prime Minister. Criticism was directed at the President, OWI, and the public relations offices of the Army and Navy.[79] Raymond P. Brandt of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch suggested that the President appoint "aggressive civilians, preferably newspapermen, as assistant secretaries of War and Navy, to handle public relations, . . . " Roscoe Drummond of the Christian Science Monitor stated that Elmer Davis was "too frequently vetoed by the Army and Navy on thin grounds of military security." He recommended the application of strong pressure on Washington "to make sure that over-cautious arguments of military security shall not perpetually defeat the cause of adequately informed public opinion."

One immediate result of the Churchill disclosures

was a planned joint monthly communique by the President and the Prime Minister on submarine operations.[80] The texts of these announcements were to be discussed in advance with American and British naval officials, as well as with OWI and the British Ministry of Information. However, Davis reported that "these communiques were seldom very communicative," because the President and Prime Minister too often supported the security decisions of their respective naval officials.[81]

Meanwhile, the attacks by the press on military public relations policies continued. Drew Pearson even charged that naval intelligence officers "shadowed" his home after he revealed in a story certain naval losses sustained in a Guadalcanal sea engagement.[82] Pearson obtained the information from the testimony of a vice admiral before the House Naval Affairs Committee.

The Newspaper Advisory Committee to OWI issued a statement on September 30, 1943, to the effect that the American people were not being fully informed about the war. The Committee stated:

> The responsibility for this cannot be attributed altogether to the OWI nor to public relations officers of the armed services, nor to the established media of communication. It stems from the disinclination on the part of some high naval and military authorities to evaluate what is information to which the public is entitled.[83]

Elmer Davis himself at this time joined in the attack on the military. In a speech in New York City in

late October 1943, he said that official reporting of events "had been worst" in the Solomons and the Aleutians, both of which were "under the control of the Navy, not only as to giving out news to correspondents but also as to censoring dispatches."[84]

As criticism of military information policies reached its pinnacle in October 1943, Editor & Publisher reported that the Navy was relaxing "its tight grip on the news."[85] The publication cited as evidence an announcement identifying the USS South Dakota as the "famous battleship" which shot down a great number of enemy planes during a Japanese air raid in 1942. The name of the battleship had been withheld for more than a year. The Navy also released for the first time details surrounding the sinking of the Hornet.

In December 1943, Admiral Nimitz announced a change in Navy censorship policy concerning the use of names in press copy and news releases about the Pacific war. In the past the names of naval personnel included in correspondents' stories were deleted by censors "unless they had been previously mentioned in a Washington communique reporting the action."[86] As a result, many stories of personal bravery were related anonymously, leading to poor morale on the part of Navy men who noticed that men in the other services were "getting high praises, while their work received very little public notice." This viewpoint was

reported by Foster Hailey, a New York Times correspondent in the Pacific, who claimed that many of his stories were delayed up to eight months in some cases because the Navy "saw no reason for expediting them." Hailey added, "It's the fightingest Navy in the world. But it doesn't know public relations."

Tarawa, a Turning Point

As the Central Pacific Force, under Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, poised to begin the massive amphibious thrusts designed to place U.S. troops on Japan's doorstep, there was evidence of a significant change in Navy public relations policy in the Pacific. On the eve of the Tarawa invasion, Admiral Nimitz released to the media at Pearl Harbor the text of a directive he sent to all Pacific Fleet and Naval Shore Activities in the Pacific:

> Projective offensive operations in the Pacific provide opportunity to present to the American people and to our allies throughout the world the accomplishments and needs of our fighting forces. It is to the benefit of the Army, the Navy and our Country that we develop this opportunity to the utmost.
>
> Fleet, force and unit commanders are directed to provide all practicable cooperation, including information and physical facilities, consistent with security and operations, to accredited representatives of the press and of the naval and military forces assigned to coverage of the Pacific campaign.[57]

At Tarawa, a new amphibious flagship, the AGC, equipped to handle the myriad communications needs of a landing operation, was introduced into the fleet. The AGC permitted a major step forward in reporting the news.

Previously, press copy had to be sent by mail to Pacific Fleet headquarters or other authorized commands for censorship and onward transmission. Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, the amphibious commander at Tarawa and Makin, was the first Navy commander in the war to allow press copy to be filed "literally from the beach-head" through the radio facilities of his flagship.[88]

This "play-by-play" report of the Tarawa invasion received high praise from Palmer Hoyt, who resigned from his post as OWI domestic director at the end of 1943. In a farewell speech, Hoyt complimented Admiral Nimitz and the Navy, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard for arranging the fast accounts of the battle, which in his view was "the greatest job of coverage in the history of warfare."[89] Despite the great distances involved--Tarawa was 5,000 miles from the U.S. West Coast and over 2,000 miles from the nearest telegraph--news stories of the battle were on editors' desks in twenty-four hours and still photographs within forty-eight.

Although Tarawa marked a breakthrough in Navy radio transmission of news copy, the practice was not to become standard for many months. As late as June 1944, Admiral Spruance imposed complete radio silence during the Battle of the Philippine Sea (see note 88).

Full publicity for the amphibious forces also was slow in coming. The Office of Public Relations issued a

national news release concerning the training of these forces in June 1943. However, throughout the summer and fall, restrictions were placed on release of information about amphibious activities. No local publicity of any kind was authorized, and all material and photographs had to be cleared through the Director of Public Relations.

In December 1943, it was concluded that a publicity campaign was necessary for speeding the production of landing craft, so vitally needed for both the continuing Pacific amphibious operations and the forthcoming invasion of France. Accordingly, a statement by Under Secretary Forrestal, directed primarily at shipyard workers, was given wide dissemination throughout the naval districts.[90]

On January 31, 1944, Marine and Army troops were landed on Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls in the Marshall Islands. This was followed by the seizure of Eniwetok Island a few weeks later.

While the "island-hopping" in the Pacific continued, an attempt was made by Admiral Harold C. Stark, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, to enhance the coverage in the British press of the Navy's Pacific war role. He wrote to Secretary Knox in March 1944, requesting that a naval expert on the Pacific war be assigned to his staff. Specifically, he asked for Captain K. M. McManes, who handled U.S. Navy news at the weekly Ministry of Information press conferences in 1942.

The need to improve coverage of the Pacific conflict was recognized on a very high policy level in London. It was felt that more complete coverage prior to the Normandy invasion would seem normal to the British public, whereas an effort in that direction later might appear too obvious a device to stimulate Anglo enthusiasm for fuller participation in the Pacific war. OWI had been working for some time on a proposal for a special Pacific press conference to be held weekly in London, and U.S. Army and Australian officers already had been nominated as spokesmen. In urging Captain Lovette to push for quick action on Admiral Stark's request, Lieutenant Commander Bingham wrote, "A Pacific conference without the U.S. Navy would be like 'Hamlet' without the Prince of Denmark."[91]

Knox Scolds King About Submarine Security

Although Admiral King had approved the relaxation of news restrictions in the Pacific, as late as October 1943 he was still holding to his previously rigid position with regard to submarine publicity. He wrote to Secretary Knox:

> . . . because of the far-reaching and harmful results of any incorrect decision we might make as to the publication of information having to do with the operations of our submarines, the matter has been under careful scrutiny for some time.
>
> While I am adverse to any step that might result in deprivation to the public of any information we might properly give them, I feel that in this instance none of us is able to state categorically the amount of "aid and comfort" to the enemy that might result from some

> small piece of apparently innocuous information. I am reluctantly constrained, therefore, to recommend to you that until Japan has capitulated, no book or article dealing with our submarine combat operations be published.[92]

Knox's reply was emphatic and sarcastic in tone. It expressed vividly his bitter frustration through two years of war over what he considered to be an over-zealous application by King of the security argument in the release of information. "I have just read your memorandum dealing with the publication of books on submarine operations . . . and must say that I am not at all impressed,"[93] he told the admiral. "The effect . . . is to argue that nothing at all be printed about submarine activities until the war is over, and the justification of this position is 'security.'" The secretary claimed that the same position could be taken about aircraft carriers, since "the tactics of the operation from air is /sic/ exactly as difficult as attack under the water." He continued:

> From the point of view of a man who only sees security involved, it would be infinitely wiser to not print any news at all until the war is over, and this type of man constitutes the majority in the Navy, but this simply cannot be done.
>
> Unfortunately the war is not being fought by the Navy alone and the Navy is utterly dependent for both personnel and material upon the public. The public, properly and naturally, want to know everything that can be told them about the progress of the war. To say that nothing can be told them about submarine operations because that would be giving away secrets to the enemy is tantamount to say that we can tell them nothing about destroyers, or cruisers, or battleships. . . . That is preposterous on its face.

Knox accused King of returning to the same type of opposition to publicity that the admiral evinced early in the war. The secretary reiterated that he, personally, had taken over the conduct of Navy public relations in October 1942 to "prevent a rapidly growing public resentment." He added that there had been a definite improvement in both the speed and comprehensiveness of Navy news in the past year, and pointedly stated, "I propose to maintain complete control of this particular part of Navy activities."

Knox ended his memorandum with the following caustic admonition to King to keep out of the publicity business and confine himself to matters of legitimate security review:

> I observed in a memorandum I received from you a disposition to put someone in the Combat Intelligence into some position of authority over publicity. I wish this order to be promptly cancelled. I want no further interference with Public Relations save only that defined in a recent memorandum to you which provided that a member of the Public Relations staff would be named by you to represent the Commander in Chief's office. He was to pass upon all questions of security involved. In case the decision involved questions which he did not feel competent to pass upon, he was to refer these questions either to you or your Chief of Staff. I want this condition continued without elaboration, and certainly I want no changes made, in the way of creation of new authority over publicity, without my approval. To put the matter bluntly and briefly--I know I have the authority and I know I have the experience to handle, without assistance, the question of Public Relations of the Navy. I propose to assume that responsibility and exercise that authority with the sole provision that questions of security will be dealt with by your representative in the manner I have described.

Despite the authoritarian tone of the secretary's memorandum, Admiral King still was able to place an almost complete embargo on submarine stories that remained in effect until a few months before the end of the war. His edict resulted from the publication of several stories which he considered harmful to our submarine operations. Prior to his action, there had been a trickle of submarine publicity, particularly in the Pacific Fleet. In 1942 and early 1943, Lieutenant Commander Drake, the CINCPAC public relations officer, allowed a limited number of correspondents to interview returning submarine commanding officers on an individual basis in Hawaii. In the summer of 1943, Commander E. W. Grenfell, USN, the newly appointed public relations officer for Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, refined this procedure by having the war correspondents question the submarine skippers in group meetings, with public relations officers present to give prompt rulings on matters of security.

The early submarine stories, for the most part positive in nature, were credited with raising morale on the home front. These included the observation of horse races in Japan by one of our submarines operating close-in to the enemy shore, a periscope photograph of Mount Fujiyama, and the sinking of a Japanese carrier in the Battle of Midway. Until May of 1944, however, when the rescue of twenty-two airmen off Truk by the USS Tang was

announced, very minimal publicity about submarines was permitted other than in the general language of the official Navy Department communiques issued from Washington. It was during this embargo period that the submarine branch became known as the "Silent Service."

An example of how stringent the censorship rules were concerning submarine publicity occurred in the Southwest Pacific early in 1945. A Dutch submarine departed Australia on patrol with an accredited Dutch war correspondent embarked. When word of this reached the Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Seventh Fleet, the submarine immediately was recalled to port to debark the unauthorized correspondent and confiscate his film.[94]

A Change in the Censorship Code

In December 1943, the Navy's strict security control over news regarding the German U-Boat war in the Atlantic came to an end. A new revision of the Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press, published by the Office of Censorship, no longer listed the Navy Department as the sole appropriate authority for the release of news about the sinking or damaging of merchant vessels. The War Shipping Administration (WSA) now was authorized to announce such news. If matters of naval security were involved, WSA had to clear its releases first with OWI, which "in practice . . . will check with the Navy Department

on cases involving security."[95]

In the amendments to the censorship code, the Office of Censorship assumed more authority for the clearance of all news materials about the war, including announcements made officially by other government agencies. Byron Price admitted that the revisions reflected the opinion by government leaders that more war information could now be disseminated without endangering national security. "This conclusion in no way presupposes an early end to the war. It does take account of the fact that the war has taken an important turn from the defensive to the offensive."[96]

The Beginnings of a Public Relations Offensive

The improvement of the Allied position in the war contributed to a relaxation of censorship procedures and a more positive approach to public relations by the military. By 1944, naval reserve officers were clearing stories sent to Washington and Pearl Harbor with "little reference to higher authority."[97] Public relations considerations were an integral part of the planning for the Normandy operation. OWI was working closely with both the Army and Navy on the proposed press coverage of the European invasion, and Elmer Davis also met with the President to discuss these plans.[98] As a result of premature disclosures of happenings at the Cairo and Teheran conferences by foreign news agencies,

President Roosevelt directed the War and Navy Departments and OWI in December 1943 to eliminate their practice of issuing advance releases for publication at a specified future time and date.[99] Instead, the President ordered, "all such information will be given out . . . at the earliest possible moment consistent with national security, for immediate publication and broadcast."

In April 1944, an agreement reached with the Army and Navy by OWI brought about a closer control over the authority exercised by theater commanders in the release of news.[100] The agreement called for immediate submission for review in Washington of any news items withheld for security or other military reasons.

Captain Lovette, in a letter to the Commandant of the First Naval District just prior to Christmas, 1943, expressed an optimistic viewpoint over the progress made in the past year by Navy public relations. "Some of our work has been very uphill, but we do feel here in Washington that strides have been made, and that, both in policy and organization, we are well out of the woods."[101] Lovette accompanied Secretary Knox on a tour of European and Atlantic theaters two months earlier, and he reported in his letter that:

> The whole subject [of public relations] is very near the heart of the Secretary. With his broad and long experience in the field of news, public opinion, and politics, he is fully convinced that the good will of

> the public and of the legislators will be a major factor in determining the size of the Navy . . . after the cessation of hostilities. Much of the groundwork in the way of public opinion and good will must be laid now.

The observation was the first hint during the war that the Navy was beginning to think in terms of long-range planning in its public relations program.

Despite the more liberal approach to public relations by the military in late 1943 and early 1944, public satisfaction with government information policies declined. In April 1944, a final survey conducted by OWI's Survey Division prior to its abolishment, showed that only 57 per cent of the public thought that the amount and quality of war news was adequate, compared to 74 per cent in February 1943.[102] As far as handling of news by the Army and Navy was concerned, there also was a downward trend in public confidence, but it was much more pronounced for the Army than the Navy. Seventy-one per cent of those polled had given the War Department a "well done" rating in this area in early 1943, but only 58 per cent voiced this opinion in April 1944. Comparative figures for the Navy during the same periods were 63 per cent and 55 per cent, a decrease of only 8 per cent. The Navy still drew more complaints for not releasing news soon enough, while the Army was criticized more often for incomplete reporting.

A New Director, Admiral Merrill

In May 1944, Rear Admiral Aaron Stanton Merrill, USN, relieved Captain Lovette as Director of Public Relations. "Tip" Merrill, as he was known, was a combat veteran of the South Pacific campaign. Commander of a cruiser-destroyer task force, he led naval gunfire attacks on Japanese positions in the Solomon Islands in March and June of 1943. In November of that year, his force sunk two enemy cruisers and two destroyers during the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay.[103] For bravery and efficiency in these operations, he was awarded the Navy Cross and the Legion of Merit.

Secretary Knox, during his visit to Pearl Harbor in January 1943, had been impressed by the energy and congeniality displayed by Admiral Merrill when he "vaulted up the stairs with a big smile on his face."[104] When Captain Lovette, after almost two years in Washington, yearned for a return to sea duty, the secretary personally selected Merrill to be his successor. The admiral had no public relations experience and "he grumbled at taking his swivel-chair assignment."[105] But he had a great deal of "battle lore and personality," and officers who served under him predicted he would do a creditable job.

Captain Lovette had served as Director of Public Relations during a difficult and critical time for the Navy's information program. When he departed, Newsweek

paid him the following tribute:

> Lovette was fully aware of the barnacles encrusting naval press procedure. He nevertheless scraped willingly. With Knox, he inaugurated off-the-record background conferences, saw that communiques from combat areas were issued simultaneously in Washington to give the home front a swift break on news, and established so close a working tie with the War Department and OWI that he elicited the heartfelt thanks and praise of Elmer Davis for Pacific war coverage.106

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]FAdm. William D. Leahy, USN (Ret.), I Was There (London, 1950), 142-163, passim.

[2]U.S. Office of War Information, News Bureau, Victory, 3:32 (December 8, 1942), quoted in Lamar Mackay, "Domestic Operations of the Office of War Information in World War II," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966, p. 188. Hereafter cited as Mackay, "OWI."

[3]U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, Naval Districts Section, Public Relations Bulletin, No. 3, January 1, 1943, p. 3. Hereafter cited as PR Bulletin. Copy contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, "Historical Records of the Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, Box 156, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "Philibert Collection."

[4]Mackay, "OWI," 202.

[5]U.S. Office of War Information, Public Attitudes Toward Military News, Special Memorandum No. 42, March 6, 1943, cited in ibid., 174-75.

[6]Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, "Navy Public Relations," Army and Navy Journal, special edition entitled "United States at War: December 7, 1942--December 7, 1943" (December 1943), 178.

[7]Memo., Lt. Cmdr. William L. Huggins, USNR, to All Public Relations Officers, January 28, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[8]Naval message, Secretary of the Navy to All Navy Activities, 131411/9, January 11, 1943, ibid.

[9]Ltr., George Fielding Eliot to Frank Knox, March 18, 1943, Frank Knox Papers, Manuscript Section, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 1. Hereafter cited as "Knox Papers."

[10]Ltr., Frank Knox to George Fielding Eliot, March 22, 1943, ibid.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

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[illegible] U.S. Army Engineers, Office of Public Relations, Naval Operations Bureau, Public Relations Bulletin, No. 3, January 1, 1941, p. 3. Narrative cited as Bulletin. Army contracted in U.S. Army Corporation, Office of Information, "Historical Records at the Army Office of Information, 1939-1941." War Series 61-3-1740, Page 32, Box 120, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "Military Relations."

[illegible], "WAC," 120.

[illegible] U.S., Office of War Information, Public Information Control Office, Special Publication No. 43, March 9, 1942, cited as Publ. 119-72.

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[illegible], Lt. Col. William C. Hopkins, Chief, Public Relations Division, January 31, 1941, Publicity Collection, Box 170.

[illegible] Journal, Morning of the Army on All Army Activities, Vol.17, January 12, 1940, 1222.

[illegible], Camp Training Films to Break Even, March 12, 1943, Press Release, Secretary Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 3. Hereafter cited as "Camp Papers."

[illegible], Motion Camp Is Camp Training Films, March 31, 1943, 1940.

[11]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to Naval District Commandants, March 13, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[12]Ltr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to All Ships and Stations, June 7, 1943 (Serial 01792), U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, Operational Archives Branch, Classified Files of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Files of the General Board, Series 441.

[13]Message, Naval Command London to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, 161226, December 16, 1942, U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box 1, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "OI Administrative Files."

[14]Memo., Lt. Cmdr. William L. Huggins, USNR, to All District Public Relations Officers, OOR-6 (15619), February 25, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[15]Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, text of radio interview on Blue Network Company program "This is Official," May 30, 1943, ibid.

[16]U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, "United States Naval Administration in World War II," unpublished narrative history of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC and CINCPOA), 396. Hereafter cited as "Administrative Histories," followed by pertinent command title.

[17]Mackay, "OWI," 200-201.

[18]OWI Regulation No. 4, Supplement No. 1 (M-5890), May 19, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[19]Elmer Davis, remarks made before a conference of naval district, Air Training Command and fleet public relations officers in Washington, D.C., April 26, 1943, recorded in mimeographed minutes of conference, p. 7, ibid. Hereafter cited as "1943 PRO Conference."

[20]Frank Knox, 1943 PRO Conference, 3.

[21]Ltr., Frank Knox to James M. Cox, February 5, 1943, Knox Papers, Box 4.

[22]PR Bulletin, No. 8, July 1, 1943, p. 1.

[23]Ltr., Director of Public Relations to Commandants, First, Eighth and Ninth Naval Districts, OOR-2 (11718), December 9, 1942, OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box 1.

[24]Ltr., Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, to Capt. George B. Wilson, USN, OOR-1 (10584), December 3, 1942, ibid. Captain Wilson was the commanding officer of the USS Alabama.

[25]The above information on Navy photography in early 1943 was compiled from the following sources contained in Philibert Collection, Box 156: PR Bulletin, No. 4, February 1, 1943, pp. 1-2; Navy Department Press Seminar Release, June 30, 1943; and memo., Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, to All Section Heads, Office of Public Relations, January 15, 1943.

[26]PR Bulletin, No. 3, January 1, 1943, p. 3.

[27]Ibid., No. 10, September 1, 1943, p. 2.

[28]Ibid., No. 4, February 1, 1943, pp. 1-2.

[29]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to multiple addressees, OOR-2 (22625), June 2, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[30]Ltr., Lt. Cmdr. Mildred H. McAfee, USNR, to Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, August 4, 1943, ibid.

[31]Ltrs., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to Naval District Public Relations Officers, OOR-2 (24185) of June 28, 1943, OOR-2 (27957) of August 6, 1943, and OOR-2 (27954) of August 6, 1943, ibid.

[32]Memoranda, Cmdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr., USN, to Lt. Cmdr. Kelso Daly, USN, OOR-A (24968), July 3, 1943, and Lt. Cmdr. A. A. Allen, USN, to Director of Public Relations, December 13, 1943, contained in OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box 2, file A7-1 (12) and Box 1, file A2-14 (5), respectively.

[33]J. Harrison Hartley, "Navy Radio Relations and Procedures," remarks made before a conference of naval district public relations officers (First through Ninth Naval Districts), Washington, D.C., September 28, 1942, recorded in mimeographed minutes of conference, p. 77, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[34]Administrative Histories, Office of Naval History, 58-59.

[35]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to Naval District Public Relations Officers, February 19, 1944, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[36]U.S. Treasury Department, War Savings Staff, Field Memorandum No. 607, May 7, 1943, contained in ibid., Box 156.

[37]PR Bulletin, No. 3, January 1, 1943, p. 5.

[38]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to multiple addressees, OOR-A (12966), January 16, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[39]"300,000 Set as Model Plane Goal in 1943," Navy Department news release, January 22, 1943, ibid.

[40]"Statement of Labor Relations in United States Navy," enclosure (a) to letter from the Secretary of the Navy to multiple addressees, August 6, 1942, contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, U.S. Navy Public Relations Manual (Washington, 1943), Art. 5.413A (15-7-43). Hereafter cited as PR Manual.

[41]Ltr., Chief of Incentive Division to Director of Public Relations, December 12, 1942, ibid., Art. 5.420A (15-7-43).

[42]Ltr., Chief of Incentive Division to Director, Office of Public Relations, June 12, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[43]Ltr., Chief of Incentive Division to All District Incentive Officers, September 10, 1943, ibid.

[44]Ltr., Chairman of the Navy Board of Production Awards to multiple addressees, January 12, 1943, PR Manual, Art. 5.424A (15-7-43).

[45]Memo., James Forrestal to multiple addressees, April 13, 1944, OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box 1, file A2-14 (5).

[46]Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy (New York, 1962), 109.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to Naval District and Air Training Command Public Relations Officers, OOR-6 (13222), January 21, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[49]RAdm. Randall Jacobs, USN, 1943 PRO Conference, 55.

[50]Ltr., Chief of Naval Personnel to All Shore Activities within the Continental United States and All Sea Frontiers, Pers-101-MRR, February 1, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[51]Ltr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to Secretary of the Navy, March 8, 1943 (Serial 1429), ibid.

[52]Administrative Histories, Fourth Naval District, 10-11.

[53]Ltrs., Secretary of the Navy to the Chief of Naval Personnel, March 9, 1943, and Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to multiple addressees, OOR-6 (17098), March 18, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[54]Ltr., Cmdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr., USN, to Cmdr. Robert E. Vining, USNR, OOR-A (26918), September 8, 1943, ibid.

[55]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to Commandants All Continental Naval Districts, November 11, 1943, ibid.

[56]Various directories of public relations personnel in OPR, the naval districts, fleets, air commands and other field units, October 1942 to May 1944, contained in file "Directories," ibid., Box 157. A November 15, 1942, directory of district and fleet public relations officers listed only 215 names compared to the 274 in the similar January 1943 directory mentioned above. Although no supporting documentation could be found, it is believed that the November 1942 directory was in error in that it did not contain the names of all public relations officers attached to air commands at that time.

[57]"U.S. War Department Bureau of Public Relations Directory," August 15, 1943, contained in file "War Department Public Relations," ibid., Box 156.

[58]"Annual Report of the Office of Public Relations for Fiscal Year 1943," contained in letter from Director of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy, OOR-1 (27811), July 31, 1943, U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, General Files (NM-117), Record Group 80, War Records Branch, Naval Records Section, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[59]The foregoing data on personnel changes were obtained from monthly OPR personnel directories contained in file "Directories," Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[60]Administrative Histories, Bureau of Naval Personnel, 9-11.

[61]Memo., J. Harrison Hartley to Director of Public Relations, OOR-3, August 2, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[62]Administrative Histories, Eleventh Naval District, 63-64.

[63]Ltr., Assistant Director of Public Relations, West Coast, to All Public Relations Officers, West Coast, October 27, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[64]Memo., Lt. Alan Brown, USNR, to Director of Public Relations, OOR-3, September 29, 1943, ibid.

[65]Administrative Histories, Fifth Naval District, 147.

[66]Memo., Lt. Alan Brown, USNR, to Director of Public Relations, OOR-3, April 7, 1944, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[67]Memo., Lt. Carleton Mitchell, Jr., USNR, to Director of Public Relations, April 10, 1944, OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box 1.

[68]Ltr., Cmdr. J. L. Collis, USN, to Lt. Cmdr. Barry Bingham, USNR, OOR-E (43998), April 11, 1944, ibid.

[69]Ltr., Cmdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr., USN, to Cmdr. Waldo Drake, USNR, OOR-A (12550), January 8, 1943, ibid.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Ltr., Cmdr. Waldo Drake, USNR, to Cmdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr., USN, January 12, 1943, OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box 1.

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[73]U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, Liaison Branch, An Abridged U.S. Naval Chronology of World

War II, NAVSO P-3024 (Washington, June 5, 1967), 8-11. Hereafter cited as Office of Information, Abridged History.

[74]Mackay, "OWI," 391-92.

[75]New York Times, August 18, 1943, p. 17, and August 19, 1943, p. 18, quoted in ibid., 393.

[76]Ltr., Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of the Navy, September 1, 1943, contained in personal file of RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), entitled "Public Relations Policies and Directives." Hereafter cited as "Miller File--PR Policies."

[77]Mackay, "OWI," 394-95.

[78]Ibid., 396. Mackay's source for Churchill's remarks was the New York Times, September 22, 1943, pp. 1 and 12-13.

[79]"Washington Correspondents Incensed Over London 'Beats,'" Editor & Publisher, October 2, 1943, p. 5.

[80]Mackay, "OWI," 398.

[81]Elmer Davis, "Report to the President," House Subcommittee on Government Operations, Hearings, Government Information Plans and Policies, Part 2, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963), 227, quoted in ibid.

[82]"Pearson Charges Washington Uses Gestapo Tactics," Editor & Publisher, October 2, 1943, p. 18.

[83]New York Times, October 1, 1943, p. 11, quoted in Mackay, "OWI," 401.

[84]Ibid., October 28, 1943, p. 10, quoted in Mackay, "OWI," 402-03.

[85]"Navy Censor Relaxes," Editor & Publisher, October 9, 1943, p. 42.

[86]"Foster Hailey Lauds Navy's New Policy," ibid., December 18, 1943, p. 11.

[87]"United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas Press Release No. 166," November 14, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[88]Administrative Histories, CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 396.

[89]"Prompt News is Worth 10,000 Sermons, Says Hoyt," Editor & Publisher, January 1, 1944, p. 8.

[90]Ltrs., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to Naval District Public Relations Officers, OOR-2 (24145), of July 1, 1943, and OOR-2 (37412) of December 31, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[91]Ltr., Lt. Cmdr. Barry Bingham, USNR, to Captain Leland P. Lovette, USN, March 24, 1944, OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 4, Box 2.

[92]Memo., Adm. Ernest J. King, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, October 2, 1943 (Serial 03417), ibid., Box 1, File A16-3 (9).

[93]Memo., Frank Knox to Adm. Ernest J. King, USN, October 12, 1943 (Serial 020900A), ibid.

[94]Administrative Histories, Submarine Commands, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Vol. 1, pp. 349-356.

[95]Ltr., Director of Public Relations to Naval District Public Relations Officers, OOR-10 (35235), December 3, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[96]U.S. Office of Censorship Press Release 51, December 10, 1943, ibid.

[97]Cmdr. Harold Bradley Say, USNR, "Censorship and Security," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 79:136 (1953).

[98]Mackay, "OWI," 411.

[99]Memo., Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of the Navy, December 18, 1943, contained in Miller File--PR Policies.

[100]"Navy's New Voice," Newsweek, April 24, 1944, p. 82.

[101]Ltr., Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, to RAdm. Robert A. Theobald, USN, OOR (37110), December 20, 1943, Philibert Collection, Box 156.

[102]U.S. Office of War Information, Survey Division, "Public Appraisal of War Information," Memorandum No. 77, May 12, 1944, cited in Mackay, "OWI," 370-71.

[103]Office of Information, Abridged History, 8-11.

[104] I. I. Hartz, personal interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1968.

[105] "Navy's New Voice," op. cit.

[106] Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE FINAL PHASE OF THE WAR

On April 28, 1944, Frank Knox died unexpectedly of a heart attack. Twelve days later, Under Secretary Forrestal was named by President Roosevelt to replace him.

Writing of Knox's death, the Little Rock Arkansas-Democrat stressed the importance of his public relations role as Secretary of the Navy:

> His concept of this job did not call for interference with the trained career leaders of the fleet--the admirals headed by stern-visaged Ernest J. King. . . . On the other hand, as he occasionally said, it did call for standing between the Navy and the public.[1]

Knox also served as a buffer between the strong wills of his two chief subordinates, King and Forrestal. The Under Secretary and the admiral were vastly different in temperament and methods of operation. They often opposed each other's plans and recommendations, particularly in the matter of logistical support for the fleet. Had it not been for Knox's conciliatory efforts, the two might have clashed openly early in the war. As it was, they were "held at bay," so to speak, until they could develop a "kind of frosty mutual self-respect."[2]

The strained relationship between Forrestal and

CHAPTER V

THE FINAL CHOICE OF THE MAN

[illegible] April 5th, 1944. Dinner time. Mike [illegible] at Jenny's apartment. Twelve days later, Chief Detective Hammond was joined by Prosecuting Commissioner to discuss the [illegible] of Jenny's death, the [illegible] Detective [illegible] concerned the importance of his [illegible] role as Executory of the Body:

> His conduct as Chief [illegible] was [illegible] [illegible] the brilliant campaign [illegible] Detective [illegible] by straight-laced [illegible] . . . [illegible] the ordeal itself, to be [illegible] [illegible] for arousing [illegible] the city and the police.[1]

Mike also served as a buffer between the enemy [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] the Body necessarily and the natural [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and feelings of [illegible]. They [illegible] opposed even Vidor's plans for [illegible]. Inevitably [illegible] the course of Inspection happen for Jimmy. When [illegible] Jenny's [illegible] evidence, the two [illegible] [illegible] nearly to the end. As it was, they were "held at bay," as it [illegible] until they [illegible] "Duke of Jenny [illegible] Mike."[2]

The [illegible] relationship between Hammond and

King did not prevent the new Secretary of the Navy from planning and implementing a greatly accelerated Navy public relations program in the final year of the war. According to Rear Admiral Robert W. Berry, USN (Retired), the former deputy director of the Office of Public Relations, Forrestal was "tougher than Knox . . . and thus overcame King's security-consciousness."[3]

By this time, however, Admiral King obviously did not feel the necessity for as strict a security posture as he did earlier in the conflict. Time, commenting on the admiral's first report of the war, issued on April 23, 1944, observed: "The Navy, Ernie King could now say, was in good shape. . . . Now he could afford to let the security bars down and tell what sad shape it had been in, early in the war."[4]

The King report was the counterpart of General George Marshall's account of U.S. Army activities in the war, released in September 1943. The Chief of Naval Operations' 50,000-word statement told for the first time many details of naval battles that had not been revealed in the official communiques. For instance, the public had not been informed that ten U.S. Navy combat ships were sunk or damaged in the "first thundering quarter hour" of the naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13-15, 1942.

Forrestal's Public Relations Philosophy

"I don't mind telling all. I guess it's part of my

job; but please when you write the story, would you mind--well, leaving out the drip?"[5]

Although these words were spoken by James Forrestal during an interview with a reporter who was writing a "Horatio Alger-type success story" about the new Navy secretary himself, they provide an excellent insight into his over-all public relations philosophy. Like Frank Knox, Forrestal was intensely mindful of the need to inform the public of the Navy's role in the war; yet, unlike his predecessor, he was determined and prepared to exercise direct personal control over the Navy's public relations. Unguided information efforts, in his opinion, would result in inconsequential "drip" that would not accomplish the important tasks of gaining recognition for the Navy's wartime achievements and support for a strong postwar Navy.

Forrestal's remark to his interviewer also was indicative of his inherent modesty; he shunned personal publicity throughout his governmental career. On the day of the Normandy invasion, he called reporters into his office and immediately turned them over to an assembled group of admirals with the crisp remark, "You've come here for combat news."[6] Although he had a personal hand in procuring the swarm of landing craft and other vessels that carried our troops into France, Forrestal did not want to "shoulder his way into the limelight."

Later in the summer, following a trip to the

Mediterranean to observe the landings in Southern France, the secretary wrote to Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee:

> I am enclosing a diary of my visit to Admiral Hewitt's Fleet which I made primarily with a view of getting for him the credit which it seems to me he deserved. The news out of the Mediterranean area so far as the Navy is concerned has been rather slight, but I think there will now be some improvement. My mission I think was fairly successful on this score, with the qualification that I got a little too much publicity myself . . . It is my view that the Secretary of the Navy can be of only slight use in augmenting Navy publicity.[7]

Although he avoided personal exposure in the news media, Forrestal did use the medium of public speaking to get his message across to the American people. Not a dynamic speaker, the task was difficult for him. Nevertheless, he spoke to a variety of audiences throughout the nation. His first talks were written by the Office of Public Relations, which "was accustomed to grinding out speeches by the dozen for delivery by officials and officers too busy to write their own."[8] After listening to him drone through these early "canned" addresses, however, Forrestal's staff encouraged him to do much of his own speech-writing in order to be effective.

The San Francisco Chronicle, in July 1944, commented favorably about the secretary's personal public relations efforts:

> . . . Forrestal talks to the American people about the situation in the Pacific like an adult man talking to other adults. . . . /He/ discloses no secrets. . . .

> But he talks frankly and officially to the people with a statement of their case that is without needless and mysterious concealment. It is an agreeable novelty.[9]

Forrestal read six newspapers every morning and almost daily telephoned OFR to discuss items appearing in them. He kept a personal clipping file, with many of the articles being sent to him by acquaintances in the newspaper and publishing fields.[10] By cultivating the friendship of such columnists and commentators as Hanson Baldwin, Walter Millis, Arthur Krock, Walter Lippmann, James Reston and the Alsops, he sought to reach the "thinking" minority among the public. In a letter to Krock, he expounded upon his personal philosophy concerning public relations and government service: "When I came down here, I remarked, and I think it may have been to you, that anyone serving in Government had really two functions: (1) he had to do a good job, and (2) he had to convince the public that a good job was being done."[11]

Rear Admiral Harold R. (Min) Miller, USN (Retired), said that Forrestal "likened the American public to stockholders in the Navy."[12] The secretary felt that if the people at home who were working in the war industries were fully apprised of the realities of war and the difficulties faced by Navymen in the Atlantic and the Pacific, they would "redouble their efforts." He also thought that this "desirable public reaction" could be achieved without violating security, by concentrating on full disclosure of

events that had happened and not on what was going to take place.

Merger Threat Spurs Navy to Action

On April 24, 1944, four days before Frank Knox died, hearings began in Congress before the Woodrum Committee to consider an Army plan to merge the armed services into a single department. The long-standing unification issue had remained comparatively dormant in the early part of the war, until it was resurrected by the War Department in 1943 with a specific proposal to create a single chief of staff for the armed forces.

The Army move represented a switch in position. Prior to 1943, the War Department had joined the Navy in opposing the Army Air Force fight to become a separate service within a unified system. The change in attitude by the Army evoked an immediate and predictable reaction from the Navy. Fearing that it would be "submerged," not "merged," the sea service trained its biggest guns on the unification concept. Secretary Forrestal testified at the congressional hearing that, in his opinion, no one person was capable of administering a single service with an annual budget of almost $100 billion. Admiral King and Marine Corps Commandant General Alexander A. Vandegrift also spoke out against the plan; and Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus L. Gates observed that if a merger

was necessary, the Navy should serve as its basis because it could operate on the sea, under the sea, in the air and on the land.[13]

The opposition by the Navy influenced the Woodrum Committee not to make any changes in the composition of the armed forces at that time. But Forrestal knew that the truce was only temporary, and he felt a grave necessity for instilling in the Navy's military hierarchy a sense of urgency to take action before it was too late. In September 1944, he wrote to Palmer Hoyt, who had resumed his duties as publisher of the Portland Oregonian following his resignation from OWI: "I have been telling King, Nimitz and Company it is my judgment that as of today the Navy has lost its case and that, either in Congress, or in a public poll, the Army's point of view would prevail."[14]

One of the first actions the new secretary took to involve naval officers in the political and public relations arena surrounding the merger issue was the establishment of a unique "ad hoc" committee in the late spring and early summer of 1944. Consisting primarily of naval officers, with no civilian public relations specialists included in its membership, the committee was charged with "cultivating views favorable to the Navy among carefully selected groups in the public at large."[15] It was chaired by Captain Lovette, who had been asked by Forrestal to forego for the time being his desires to take command of a

major ship. When the Woodrum Committee hearings ended in June with no immediate threat to the Navy, the new agency was dissolved by Forrestal, primarily in response to Lovette's plea to be allowed to go to sea. Such duty was imperative to a Regular Navy officer's chances for promotion.

Although this first "ad hoc" committee never actually began operations, its establishment was significant in several respects. It marked the first time that such a group, whose tasks were quasi-political and involved "behind-the-scenes" public relations activities, had ever existed in the Navy. And it became the prototype for similar agencies set up by Forrestal in the immediate post-war years, when the merger issue erupted into full-scale and bitter inter-service rivalry. It also was an indication of Forrestal's determination to blend into the Navy's over-all political strategy an organized and systematic public relations campaign, using Regular Navy officers as well as reservists and civilians. "Probably no leader in the Navy's history up to that time, either civilian or uniformed, was more convinced than Forrestal of the political importance of effectively utilizing public relations techniques . . . ."[16]

In a graduation address at the Naval Academy shortly after he took office, the secretary stressed that each naval officer should consider himself a public

relations specialist. A year later, again speaking at the Annapolis graduation exercises, he elaborated on this theme:

> . . . I ask each of you . . . to consider yourself a purveyor of information about the Navy and about our national need for its continuance. Never get tired of the repetition of this story, nor take it for granted that it is already known to your listeners.
>
> There are many barriers to each communication between the officers of the naval service and the public but those barriers must be leveled if we are not to return to the inertia of the 20 years before the war on national defense . . . you have /an/ obligation . . . to constitute in yourselves one means of keeping the American public informed of what the Navy is and what its needs are.[17]

Thus, in the summer of 1944 Forrestal undertook the education of the Navy's officer corps on the necessity for a continuing and expansive public relations program on the Navy's behalf. In this effort, he enjoyed two advantages which Frank Knox did not possess. First, there was the dire threat posed by the merger plan. This alone gave the secretary the attentive ears of the officers. Secondly, by this stage of the war, many of the naval aviators who had shed their public relations inhibitions in the prewar fight against General Billy Mitchell and his supporters were now in positions of authority and influence in the Navy's leadership structure. These officers--Admirals Marc Mitscher, Ralph Ofstie, Arthur Radford, Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., and Forrest Sherman among others--were more receptive to Forrestal's arguments than the older admirals had been to Knox's earlier admonitions. In the opinion of Vincent

Davis, a perceptible change in the attitude of Regular Navy officers to public relations activities already was noticeable in the spring of 1944.[18]

Pearl Harbor Investigations

Another task facing Forrestal in the first month after he became secretary was to direct a Navy Court of Inquiry into the Pearl Harbor disaster. The President had appointed the Roberts Commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the attack shortly after it occurred. This body had placed the major share of blame for the lack of military readiness before the attack on the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii at the time, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. These officers were relieved of their commands and had not been given any other assignments in the war. However, they continued to request an opportunity to present their cases before duly constituted military courts-martial. Congress intervened in their behalf in May 1944, directing the Secretaries of War and Navy to conduct new investigations.

The resulting Navy Court of Inquiry began holding hearings on July 24, 1944, and completed its sessions in October of that year. It reversed the findings of the Roberts Commission, clearing the Navy of any blame in the disaster except for questioning the judgment of Admiral Harold C. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations at the time of

the attack. The Army court came to similar conclusions.

Secretary Forrestal and the White House wanted to give wide publicity to the findings of the two courts. However, Admiral King objected strenuously on the basis that this might lead inadvertently to the Japanese suspecting that their military and diplomatic codes had been broken. King's view prevailed, and complete information on the Pearl Harbor investigations was not made available to the public until after the war was concluded.[19]

The Normandy Invasion

The Navy public relations role in Operation Overlord, the invasion of France on June 6, 1944, was a complicated one in that plans had to be coordinated with the British and the U.S. Army for embarking a large number of correspondents in the invasion fleet. These reporters were to be briefed in advance and their copy had to be censored once they were aboard. Admiral Stark, the Navy commander in Europe, requested from Secretary Knox several months earlier the personal assistance of Captain Lovette in directing these public relations operations.[20] However, Lovette was not available, and the responsibility for supervising the Navy's efforts in this area remained in the hands of Lieutenant Commander Barry Bingham, USNR, Admiral Stark's public relations officer, who before the war and after was publisher of the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal.

One of Bingham's assistants, Lieutenant Jay B. Smith, USNR, was assigned the primary duty of conducting the public relations briefings for the correspondents. According to Smith, these briefings were given on almost a daily basis several weeks before the landings, partially as a device to deceive the enemy as to the exact date for the operation.[21] These "false alarm" sessions came to be recognized as such by the correspondents, who for the most part accepted them graciously if not enthusiastically.

When the time came for the actual final briefing to the press prior to embarkation, Bob Casey of the Chicago Tribune asked Smith to be excused for a moment to get his typewriter. Knowing the past history of the Tribune for receiving "signals" from its reporters when something big was about to happen, the Lieutenant refused. In fact, all of the correspondents were immediately placed under guard and taken directly to the individual ships in which they were to be embarked. One writer, Ernest Hemingway, was ill that day and thus missed the initial coverage of the invasion.

Commander Harold B. Say, the head of the Security Review Section in OPR, had been dispatched by Secretary Knox to assist Admiral Stark in the handling of censorship for the Normandy operation. Procedures for censoring copy aboard ship, Say reported, were refined to the extent that very few problems or complaints were encountered.[22] In a

pre-D-Day meeting with correspondents, public relations officers and censors explained in detail what news could be cleared and what could not. As a result, a Saturday Evening Post story of some 5,000 words was cabled back shortly after the beginning of the operation with only one word changed.

A significant departure from past censorship rules occurred at Normandy when Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the British commander of the naval operations, allowed the names of capital ships participating in the landing to be used by the correspondents. Ramsay told Say, "The Germans can tell these 14-inch shells are not coming from destroyers, and they can see the ships from their airplanes anyway, so why not identify the Texas, Arkansas, Nevada, Warspite, etc.?"[23]

Matters of real security were protected assiduously, however. For instance, no mention was allowed in press copy of the artificial ports constructed by the Allies to receive supplies.

During the Normandy landings, as at Tarawa, facilities were available aboard the AGC command ships for commentators to radio back direct reports of the action.

The Marianas' Campaign

While the Normandy invasion was in progress, a task force of 535 ships, carrying some 130,000 Marine and Army troops, was enroute to the Mariana Islands to conduct

landings on Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The first island to be invaded was Saipan on June 15. D-Day for Guam, originally set for June 18, was postponed when a large Japanese naval force was sighted steaming eastward from the Philippines. The force was intercepted, and during the ensuing Battle of the Philippine Sea on June 19-20, an overwhelming defeat was administered to the Imperial Fleet by ships and aircraft of the U.S. Fifth Fleet.[24]

Guam and Tinian were invaded in July, and organized enemy resistance on both islands ended in early August. The loss of the Marianas, representing a penetration by U.S. forces of the Japanese inner defense ring, resulted in the downfall of the Tojo government, which had ruled Japan since before the war. The victory gave the United States advanced naval and air bases within striking distance of the Japanese home islands. Additionally, the defeat of the Japanese Navy in the Battle of the Philippine Sea virtually destroyed its capability to interfere with future Allied operations in the Pacific.

While the Marianas campaign played a vital role in the ultimate victory in the Pacific, there was a growing feeling on the part of Secretary Forrestal and others that MacArthur and the Army in the Southwest Pacific were outflanking the Navy on the publicity front. Even before Saipan fell, the Columbia, S.C. Record took note of this Navy concern with a rather caustic comment:

> The Navy is beginning to be jealous of what it calls the army's "high-powered publicity setup." . . . But apparently the navy's only remedy is to complain of what the army is doing instead of making available navy information to correspondents. For the navy is itself responsible for its own bad press. It should have corrected this situation long ago. It should correct it now instead of complaining.[25]

Prior to the Tarawa invasion in the fall of 1943, Admiral Nimitz had directed his commanders to cooperate fully with war correspondents and give command attention to the public relations aspects of forthcoming operations. Yet, film taken by civilian and Navy photographers at Saipan arrived in the United States too late to be of timely use, and press copy on the operation also was delayed. Censorship officers steamed away with the fleet while correspondents were left ashore for five days unable to clear their stories.[26] In addition, as was previously mentioned, Admiral Spruance imposed radio silence during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, thus preventing the broadcast transmittal of news reports.

No evidence was found to indicate that Admiral Spruance in any way interfered with or discouraged public relations coverage of the Marianas' campaign other than to impose radio silence for security reasons. However, it is interesting to note that the over-all commander for the operations in the Gilbert, Marshall and Mariana Islands, and later Iwo Jima and Okinawa, avoided personal publicity throughout his wartime service. "The name of Raymond

Spruance is known only vaguely to many in connection with the Pacific War of 1941-45, and too few can recall just what he did, or why they remember the name at all."[27]

In contrast, the name and accomplishments of Admiral William F. (Bull) Halsey in the Pacific are well-known. Halsey had a colorful personality and a flair for the dramatic--he made good press copy. Spruance, on the other hand, was a reserved, intellectual, almost withdrawn individual. The news media experienced great difficulty in glamorizing him. At one point, Spruance explained his reasons for shunning the spotlight to a classmate from the Naval Academy. His philosophy on this subject is sufficiently thought-provoking to merit mention in some detail:

> Personal publicity in a war can be a drawback because it may affect a man's thinking. A commander may not have sought it; it may have been forced upon him by zealous subordinates or imaginative war correspondents. Once started, however, it is hard to keep in check. In the early days of a war, when little about the various commanders is known to the public, and some Admiral or General does a good and perhaps spectacular job, he gets a head start in publicity. Anything he does thereafter tends toward greater headline value than the same thing done by others, following the journalistic rule that "Names make news." Thus his reputation snow-balls, and soon, probably against his will, he has become a colorful figure, credited with fabulous characteristics over and above the competence in war command for which he has been conditioning himself all his life.
>
> His fame may not have gone to his head, but there is nevertheless danger in this. Should he get to identifying himself with the figure as publicized, he may subconsciously start thinking in terms of what his reputation calls for, rather than of how best to meet the actual problem confronting him. A man's judgment is best when he can forget himself and any reputation he may have acquired, and can concentrate wholly on

> making the right decisions. Hence, if he seems to give interviewers and publicity men the brush-off, it is not through ungraciousness, but rather to keep his thinking impersonal and realistic.[28]

Spruance did erect definite barriers for the press when it came to granting interviews or discussing his role in the war. For instance, when he was Chief of Staff to Admiral Nimitz during the interim period between his command of naval forces during the Battle of Midway and the Tarawa landing, he conducted interviews from a stand-up desk with no chairs for visitors. Needless to say, under these conditions, "few loitered and time was conserved."[29]

Irrespective of Admiral Spruance's personal ideas on publicity, the public relations efforts of the Navy were to be concentrated for the remainder of the war on events in the Pacific, since its role in the Atlantic and European theaters was now one primarily of support. In the summer of 1944, however, there was considerable dissatisfaction in many quarters of the sea service over the Pacific Fleet's handling of public relations.

A Period of Soul-Searching

This dissatisfaction actually surfaced earlier in the year. In the spring of 1944, Emmett Crozier, a writer for the New York Times, conducted an informal survey at the request of Assistant Secretary Gates into ways in which naval aviation news and information services could be improved. In the course of his inquiry, Crozier talked to

sixteen newspapermen and naval officers who had been in frequent contact with the Pacific Fleet public relations office in Honolulu. In the opinion of those interviewed, Navy public relations in the Pacific left much to be desired through 1942 and most of 1943. The primary complaints revolved around "needless" delay of press copy and photographs and "unreasonable and arbitrary" censorship. As a result, there was considerable bitterness and tension in the relationship between the press and the fleet public relations officer. At one time, Crozier learned, certain members of the press corps in Honolulu actually decided to boycott the Navy in the Pacific by writing no stories at all about its activities, but their home offices objected. Crozier concluded that while conditions had improved since the fall of 1943, the public relations situation in the Pacific was still very bad.[30]

Going far afield from his original assignment, to study aviation publicity, the New York Times writer leveled a strong indictment against the Navy's public relations efforts in general. He claimed that "there is no clear conception at this critical period in the war of the Navy's informational obligation to the American people or of the sound advantages to the Navy of an enlightened, constructive public relations policy." He described the sea service's public relations office as being that of a "cooperating, not an originating agency," and added, "It is by turns

modest, aloof, secretive and arrogant in its dealings with the press, radio and public." He continued:

> The Navy has failed to give the American people a clear, comprehensive picture of its work and its problems. It has failed to tell, or permit others to tell, the human story of the men who are fighting and dying in its service. It has failed to tell, . . . the great story of naval air power.
>
> If the American people sit by impassively after the war while the Navy's air arm is wrenched away . . . the blame can be laid squarely on the present lack of a constructive public relations policy in the Navy.

Crozier's harsh analysis seems to have had a profound effect on Forrestal's direction of the Navy's public relations program during the final phase of the war. In future correspondence and discussions dealing with the subject, the secretary continually stressed the themes keynoted in the report to Secretary Gates. He also implemented many of the specific recommendations made by the New York Times staffer for improving the Navy's image.

In June 1944, Forrestal wrote to Admiral Merrill outlining his ideas for possible changes in the Navy's public relations program.[31] He recommended that Captain Waldo Drake be replaced as Pacific Fleet public relations officer by a "younger, more vigorous officer" and that some of the "able young" public relations officers in Washington and London be sent to the Pacific. "I believe our public relations team in the Pacific should be the best we have anywhere." He believed, too, that it was time for the Navy to urge the news media to send their best reporters and photographers to the Pacific area. "With a few exceptions

they have sent their second-string men to the Pacific."

For the Washington public relations office, he had the following suggestions:

> (1) /Set up/ a small staff of excellent reporters, officers skilled in eliciting and synthesizing facts. I have in mind that they will handle special projects which will occur to you and me from time to time.
> (2) A very small graphics section should be set up /to produce/ . . . presentations for Congress as well as the public of the Navy budget, its building programs and personnel trends.
> (3) We should consider actually making in the Navy, not turning over to movie companies, about six Navy documentary films a year.
> (4) Books on Navy actions should as security permits be allowed to cover current actions.

The secretary concluded by saying, "The success of public relations depends on the excellence of its staff. I think we should continue to insist upon the best possible officers, releasing any who fall below standard." He particularly was interested in the quality of public relations personnel as opposed to quantity, emphasizing that any increase in numbers of people should be avoided.

The memorandum was a forerunner of many letters and other correspondence by Forrestal which dealt in great detail with specific procedures and activities in public relations. It definitely signaled his intention to exercise personal direction over the Navy's entire information program.

Inspection Trip to the Pacific

In late July 1944, Admiral Merrill headed an eight-man inspection team sent to the Pacific by Secretary

Forrestal to explore ways to speed the flow of press copy and film from the combat zones. Accompanying him were George Healy, OWI's domestic director; Ray Mackland, a representative of the Still Picture Pool; Major John Dillon, USMC, who replaced Frank Mason as Special Assistant for Public Relations to the Secretary of the Navy shortly after Frank Knox died (Mr. Mason returned to New York to give full-time attention to his position as vice-president of NBC[32]); three officers from OPR--including J. Harrison Hartley, the head of the Radio Section, who recently had received a lieutenant commander's commission in the naval reserve--and a Navy radio technician.

With the full backing of the secretary, Merrill was able to gain Admiral Nimitz' approval for the following innovative measures in future operations:

> (1) Plane service would be established between the command ship and Guam as soon after D-Day as the military situation and weather conditions permit. Copy and photographs would be censored aboard the flagship and then flown from Guam to the United States via regular air mail service, without having to be censored at Pearl Harbor as had been the case in the past. This procedure would make it possible to deliver film and stories to the West Coast within twenty-four hours after release from the flagship.
> (2) In order to provide for daily radio voice broadcasts from the scene of action, a portable transmitter would be installed in the command ship for transmission of a five-minute newscast each day, which would be retransmitted over a high-powered transmitter from Guam for further relay to the mainland via Pearl Harbor.
> (3) Facilities for shore press headquarters, to include censorship capabilities, would be set up as soon after D-Day as the military situation permitted.[33]

The major changes from past procedures in the new plans were the arrangements for radio broadcasts and special press planes, and the provisions for censoring copy at the scene of the operation rather than at fleet headquarters.

Two studios were to be constructed to handle the broadcasts from the forward areas, one at Pearl Harbor and the other at Guam. Both facilities were to be equipped with disc recorders; and the studio at Guam was to be used for voice broadcast, filing press copy and radio picture transmission. The Guam station also would serve as a base for network correspondents and recording teams. The Navy staff which handled radio coverage of the Normandy landings was to be transferred to Guam to operate the studio there, with Lieutenant Commander Hartley remaining in the Pacific to supervise the installations and the beginning of operations. A target date of early September was set for the completion of facilities.

In order to ensure uniformity in the new censorship procedures, a system of rotating officers between the Security Review Section in OWI and the Pacific Fleet Censorship Office on a 60-day temporary exchange of duty basis was initiated.[34]

Certain procedures were left unchanged after considerable discussion between Admirals Merrill and Nimitz. The present policy of not accrediting women correspondents

to the Pacific Fleet would continue because of the lack of proper facilities, particularly in the forward areas. And any decision to allow the use of the names of combat ships and personnel in news releases and press copy was to be referred to Admiral King for consideration. It also was decided to continue the simultaneous release of CINCPAC communiques at Pearl Harbor and Washington.

In forwarding Admiral Merrill's report on the Pacific trip to Forrestal, Eugene S. Duffield, a staff assistant to the secretary, expressed his opinion that substantial results had been achieved. However, Duffield cautioned that "we cannot rest on our laurels [because] MacArthur is fitting out a special press ship . . . his whole unit will be on the scene whereas we are dependent on a plane courier service at the discretion of the local commander."[35]

One area in which Merrill was unsuccessful in gaining Admiral Nimitz' approval concerned the replacement of Captain Drake as Pacific Fleet public relations officer. Captain Lovette had warned Merrill that Nimitz was extremely fond of Drake and very appreciative of the fact that he had "taken most of the early knocks."[36] However, after conferring personally with Drake in Washington in September 1944, Secretary Forrestal wrote to Nimitz that he definitely had decided to make a change.[37] The secretary apologized to the admiral for his action by stating, "I realize fully

that . . . commanders should have the untrammeled right to pick their own subordinates." He justified his interference on the basis of the vital importance of public relations at this stage of the war, claiming that it had two aspects--"the treatment of news in the action theater . . . and the results in this country." He added, "You, of course, are the judge of the first; it is our responsibility back here to judge the second."

On October 19, Forrestal messaged Admiral Nimitz that he had procured an assignment for Captain Drake with OWI and that Captain Harold B. (Min) Miller, USN, former head of the Bureau of Aeronautics Training and Literature Section who had been assigned a month earlier as Pacific Fleet Photographic Officer, was to be his relief.[38]

A Forward-Looking Policy

In late August 1944, Admiral Nimitz began to implement the improvements agreed upon in his discussions with Admiral Merrill. In a letter to the Commander, Third Fleet, he stated that public relations officers from his staff would be assigned to the task force commanders of forthcoming amphibious operations for the purpose of censoring and releasing press copy.[39] As to broadcasts, he instituted an even more liberal policy than had been called for in the plans. Civilian correspondents would be allowed to transmit two five-minute voice newscasts daily via naval

radio from the assault expeditionary flagships, and newscasts also were to be originated from shore-based naval radio facilities in the forward areas. Written press copy, too, would be sent over naval communications circuits as operational message traffic permitted. Media representatives were to be afforded the same messing and berthing facilities as commissioned officers and would be landed with the troops after the fifth assault wave.

Shortly after this implementing directive, Secretary Forrestal proposed still another innovative public relations measure to Nimitz. The secretary expressed his desire to embark in as many ships as possible naval officers "who are capable of writing for prompt release an account of that ship's action."[40] These officers would not duplicate the efforts of civilian war correspondents--since, in most cases, they were to be placed on ships which had no newsmen aboard. In many respects, the plan was patterned after the Marine Corps combat correspondents system, except that all material written by the Navy officers would be forwarded to the Fleet public relations office for use by the accredited civilian correspondents rather than being released by the Navy directly.

In explaining to Nimitz his reasons for wanting publicity on virtually every ship in the Pacific, Forrestal again voiced his concern about postwar unification plans:

> I would not impose this task upon you except for my compelling conviction that the future existence of the Navy as an independent military organization depends upon the public's appreciation of the Navy during the next several months . . . . The people at home, who cannot see a single Navy ship or plane let alone imagine a task force in action, may receive a very imbalanced picture in which the Navy seems to be only the transportation service to the beachhead. And these people, through their representatives, will decide . . . whether the Navy is to be consolidated out of existence.
>
> For this reason alone I commend for your very serious consideration the whole subject of public relations and particularly the new proposal suggested in this letter.

A week later the secretary elaborated on his views in another communication to the Pacific Fleet commander: "Whether we like it or not, there is no question but that the Army, through its great size and its multiple avenues of communication and the aggressive publicity actions of the Air Forces, has had a profound effect on public opinion."[41] He pointed out that other interests were often dominant in certain theaters in which the Navy operated. For example, MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific and the British in the Mediterranean . . . "not through any conscious desire to be unfair but just in the very nature of human beings, have certainly not been active in emphasizing the American Navy's part in the war."

Forrestal admitted that there was no easy solution for the Navy's public relations problems . . . "but I am writing to you in this detail, as I have talked to Admiral King, because I consider it part of my duty to interpret

for you the drift of public opinion." He reiterated his belief that at this time the public was overwhelmingly in favor of a single department of defense, and he urged an all-out Navy attempt to reverse the trend:

> The time is late to effect a change but I believe we should make the effort, and I think the start must be in a change of attitude which reaches from the Commander in Chief down to the skipper of the smallest landing craft, to the effect that we shall do our best to: (a) earn the good will of the press as individuals; (b) make constructive use in every possible way of whatever media are available to see that the facts of the Navy's accomplishments are transmitted to the people. . . . all hands need to be indoctrinated with the idea that intelligent transmission of news is as much a part of war today as either training or logistics.

In response, Admiral Nimitz, on September 10, directed his subordinate commanders to assign qualified officers in their units to "prepare narrative accounts of their ship's action, and any other material considered newsworthy."[42] Significantly, he explained that the improvement in the Allied position in the Pacific now made it possible for a more complete account of Navy operations to be given--since security was no longer as vital a consideration.

On September 30, 1944, Admiral King, at Secretary Forrestal's request, instructed all fleet commanders in the Navy to include in their future operation plans and orders a public relations annex "to systematize and clarify arrangements for news services."[43] Although King felt it incumbent upon himself to add to his directive the warning,

"Nothing in the foregoing is to be construed as authorizing any relaxation in standards of security," the step was an extremely important one. Not only did it require task force commanders to plan in advance the information aspects of an operation, but it also placed upon them a direct written responsibility for the proper conduct of combat public relations coverage.

In concert with his desire to facilitate news coverage from the Pacific, Forrestal strongly believed that the war there needed more "personalizing"--that it was remote mentally as well as geographically to the American people. "The sons, husbands and brothers who serve there appear to their families to have disappeared into a void containing nothing but a series of strange place names."[44] The secretary's earlier suggestion to Nimitz to place naval officers on ships as combat correspondents was in part an attempt to increase the number of "personal experience" stories about the Navymen in the Pacific. He also planned in October 1944 to dispatch to Pearl Harbor a close friend, Mr. J. W. Martin, president of Advertisers Services, Inc., of Milwaukee, to discuss with Admiral Nimitz a proposed system for "collecting and distributing to small home town newspapers--stories about the boys in the Navy from those papers' areas." Mr. Martin had worked on a similar program in World War I at Great Lakes, Ill., Naval Training Station.

"Full Speed Ahead" in the Pacific

With the mandate provided by the Secretary of the Navy, the public relations organization and operations in the Pacific began a period of accelerated expansion in the fall of 1944. In addition to the sophisticated broadcasting facilities discussed earlier, a special auditorium for press conferences and buildings to house correspondents and censors were constructed on Guam as part of the new advanced fleet public relations office there. A buildup in personnel actually had begun earlier. By September 1, 1944, there were thirteen full-time public relations officers assigned to the Pacific Fleet staff and eight others on duty in forward areas and with task force commanders. Seven more officers were added to Captain Miller's headquarters public relations section in September and early October. But this was only a modest beginning. By war's end, there were 90 officers and 250 enlisted men in the Pacific Fleet public relations section itself and over 400 officers serving full-time in public relations throughout the Pacific.[45]

In personal letters to Admiral Merrill in the fall of 1944, Captain Miller spelled out his plans for using these personnel.[46] There were to be experienced public relations officers in the Third, Fifth and Seventh Fleet commands, as well as with the subordinate division commanders within those fleets. The primary function of the

officer in each division command would be to keep the civilian war correspondents properly distributed on the four ships within his division. In this way, "We should have no difficulty in insuring that no [sic] ship of the fleet is overloaded to the extent that a commanding officer concludes that War Correspondents are a nuisance," said Miller.

A crucial step undertaken by the captain was the "education" of senior operational officers on the necessity and value of public relations efforts. "I have begun the practice of showing films to the daily 9 o'clock conference of Admirals, Generals, etc. and they eat it up. We have been fortunate in showing some of the combat pictures which the senior officers never knew existed."

The censorship and public relations functions in the Pacific were separated in the fall of 1944, ending the "split personality" of public relations that had existed since the beginning of the war. A special censorship section was established on Admiral Nimitz' staff, and the number of censorship officers in the fleet was increased six-fold to handle the screening of press copy from the combat zones. According to Captain Miller, public relations remained in a "strong position to influence censorship and we have liberalized their policy in almost every way."

By November 1, the expanded radio facilities in the

Pacific already were paying dividends in the form of additional coverage in this medium. At this time, under the continued direction of Lieutenant Commander Hartley, the Pacific Fleet broadcasting station at Pearl Harbor was producing about forty programs per week. Captain Miller also had been able to obtain an agreement from Admiral Halsey to use the battleship Iowa for transmission of direct radio broadcasts during future campaigns. Admiral Spruance, however, remained adamantly opposed to breaking radio silence to relay press copy, and Miller reported that "it is going to be very difficult to plead and prove our cause with Spruance."

The Pacific Fleet public relations officer was receiving full cooperation, though, from Admiral Nimitz and his chief of operations, Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman. Sherman briefed the media representatives on what was to take place three or four days in advance of each forthcoming event. The support from the top echelon of command prompted Miller to observe, "There is little question but that in the past there have been many smiles cast in our direction. I believe that in the past six weeks we have proven that this is a serious job which is closely allied with the total war effort." He cited as one example of the new attitude on the part of the operators the fact that Bill Baldwin of the Blue Network was allowed to embark in a

fleet submarine for a 45-day operation. Since almost complete security was still being maintained on submarine operations, Baldwin was not authorized to release any information at the time, but was rather to record it for future release when restrictions could be lifted.

One problem facing the public relations organization in the Pacific in the fall of 1944 was the lack of coordination with General MacArthur's staff in announcing news about joint Army-Navy operations in the Southwest Pacific. As a result, a "highly garbled report" of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in late October reached the American public. In the three-day engagement, the Japanese fleet was turned back from its attempt to disrupt MacArthur's landing in the Philippines. Although the battle was primarily a naval one, Army bombers did assist Navy carrier-based aircraft in driving back the enemy warships. MacArthur's command issued information on this phase, while the Navy told its side of the story. Thus, "two different versions of the battle came out at widely-spaced intervals."[47]

Despite the absence of coordination, the Navy was pleased with the coverage it received on the Philippine operation. Admiral Merrill wrote to Captain Miller: "Excellent photographs have been coming in with great regularity and the press just eats them up. Admiral Nimitz' over-all communique was a masterpiece of clarity."[48]

OWI took some of the credit for the improved

coverage of actions in the Pacific. Elmer Davis, in a postwar report to the President, stated that his office "got from the Navy a more explicit account of the battle of Leyte Gulf . . . than had originally been proposed."[49]

In the weeks that followed this battle, the Third and Seventh Fleets continued to support MacArthur's further landings in the Philippines. However, as we shall see, the problem of coordinating the release of information between the Army and Navy in combined operations in the Pacific remained a formidable one--until firm agreements were reached between the respective public relations offices just before the close of the war.

Reorganization of the Office of Public Relations

At Secretary Forrestal's request, a survey of all public relations activities of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department was made by the Navy's Management Engineers Office in the summer of 1944. The study, which was headed by Commander Richard M. Paget, USN, resulted in recommendations for improvements in the Navy's public relations organization and ultimately led to significant changes in the makeup and objectives of the Office of Public Relations.

One of the initial areas addressed by the study group was the relationship between OPR and the public relations offices of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. A SECNAV

directive early in the war assigned to OPR the task of supervising the public relations activities of all agencies of the Navy Department, including those of its sister sea services. The Management Engineers survey found, however, that in actual practice the Navy office exercised little or no control over these organizations other than to provide general policy guidance and security clearance and to act as a releasing outlet to the news media. The study group concluded that a vagueness existed as to the proper relationship between OPR and the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, and that "a more concrete definition would appear desirable."[50] No evidence was found, however, to indicate that any specific effort ever was made to do this.

As a result of the survey, it was determined that OPR would adopt a more aggressive general policy in the discharge of its responsibilities. To this end, four broad public relations objectives were formulated:

a. To SATISFY the American public's justifiable interest in the activities of the Navy.
b. To PROCURE for the personnel of the Navy public recognition commensurate with their accomplishments.
c. To INSURE continuing public support for the prosecution of the war.
d. To FOSTER a sustained interest in the Navy in the post-war period.[51]

To help in achieving these goals, each bureau and office was made responsible for gathering and preparing, for dissemination through the Office of Public Relations, "all possible information . . . which will interest or

inform the public." At the same time, OPR was directed to review immediately the current status of the public relations effort of each bureau and office and to "lend full assistance in developing an adequate staff and program." Official public relations officers were to be designated by each bureau, board and office; and these officers were to be assigned additional duty to the Director of Public Relations so that closer coordination with OPR could be maintained.

The Management Engineers also recommended a new organization plan for OPR itself. Secretary Forrestal, impatient for the plan to be implemented, requested from Admiral Merrill in early December a progress report on the reorganization. The contents of the secretary's memorandum are quoted in detail as an additional example of his intense personal interest in and attention to the public relations program of the Navy:

1. What were the principal positions contemplated by the revised organization? Have they been filled? Who are your principal section heads and what are their qualifications?
2. What progress has been made in establishing our Public Relations objectives? What devices and programs have we underway to achieve each of these objectives? Do we have any method for checking up on what progress we are making toward the objectives?
3. What arrangements do we have for communicating our objectives to the District Public Relations Officers and for checking up on their activities?
4. Can you give me each week a very condensed report of activities so that I can keep track of what Public Relations is doing and how we are faring in newspapers, periodicals and photography? I should

> like this report to measure actual results in terms of the use to which our material is put rather than our gross output.[52]

A week later Admiral Merrill answered Forrestal's inquiry, outlining the organizational and personnel changes in his office. The new organization provided for three principal executive assistants to the Director of Public Relations: Assistant Director, West Coast; Deputy Director; and Administrative Officer. Commander Bolton continued to fill the West Coast billet. Captain Campbell, the former Communique and Security Officer who had been promoted in the summer of 1944, relieved Commander Beecher as Deputy Director in August when the latter was detached to sea duty. The former position of Executive Assistant to the Director was merged with that of Deputy Director in the reorganization. Lieutenant Commander H. L. Brown, Jr., USNR, replaced Lieutenant Commander Parker as Administrative Officer on August 1, 1944, with Parker being assigned as executive assistant to Commander Bolton on the West Coast.

The major reorganization of the office consisted of the placing of the individual sections under three main branches--program planning, media and technical services.

Commander William C. Chambliss, USNR, formerly attached to the Incentive Division, headed the new Program Planning Branch. Commander Chambliss, a naval aviator, had been a newspaperman and a public relations counselor before

entering the Navy. Under his direction were three new sections--evaluation, planning and liaison, and combat types. The Evaluation Section replaced the old Analysis Section and had expanded functions. It was to measure usage of official releases to all media, evaluate coverage and effectiveness of news regarding the Navy, and determine subjects in which the public was interested for the guidance of all sections in the office. Lieutenant Joe Belden, Jr., USNR, was named acting head of this section, following the departure from OPR of Commander Galvin, who had headed the old Analysis Section since before the war. Lieutenant Dan Clark, USNR, a market analyst and opinion poll expert in civilian life, was retained on temporary duty to help organize the new section, with Belden officially being named as head in March 1945.

The Planning and Liaison Section was set up to perform some of the functions of the old Naval Districts Section. It assisted the bureaus, districts and media offices of OPR in developing public relations programs and procedures. It was headed by Lieutenant Commander Arthur Newmyer, USNR, a former newspaperman and public relations consultant. The Combat Types Section simply was an extension of the old Aviation Section, with the added responsibility of disseminating special material on combat ships as well as aviation subjects. Commander Walter Neff, chief of the Aviation Section, remained as officer-in-charge of

this new activity.

Five of the old sections--press, radio, pictorial, magazine and book, and motion pictures--were placed under the new Media Branch, along with the former Special Events Section which was renamed "Special Activities." The old Combat Photography Section was abolished, with its functions being taken over by Pictorial. Commander Howard Gordon, USN, who as a lieutenant served as OPR's Administrative Officer from 1940 to 1942, returned from destroyer commands in both the Atlantic and Pacific to head the Media Branch. Lieutenant Commander John F. Conley, USNR, formerly with the Baltimore Sun, succeeded Lieutenant Commander McCarthy as chief of the Press Section when McCarthy was detached for sea duty in the Pacific in December 1944. The other media section heads remained as before--Hartley in radio, Long in pictorial, Kerig in magazine and book, Brown in motion pictures, and Courtney in special activities. The separate positions of Communique Officer and Security Officer were eliminated, with the responsibility for preparing communiques being returned to the Press Section. The sub-section within Special Events, "Organizational Contacts," also was abolished, with Commander Edward M. Seay being transferred to other duty.

The Technical Services Branch was established to coordinate the clearance of information with Admiral King's office. Three sections were included in the new branch--

security review, biographies and research, and the public relations library. Commander J. L. Collis, USN, the former Executive Assistant to the Director, was named as acting chief of this branch. Commander Harold B. Say remained as head of the Security Review Section, while Lieutenant (junior grade) Eloise English moved up from the Photographic Library to take charge of the expanded Public Relations Library. Biographies and Research, a new section, compiled background material on naval personnel and histories of ships and other activities, and researched answers to queries from the general public and Navy public relations offices. It was headed by Lieutenant Commander W. A. Millen, USNR, a former newspaperman who had served in the Press Section.[53]

On August 31, 1944, Secretary Forrestal created a separate motion picture office, which operated under his control and was not a part of the Office of Public Relations. This agency, designated the Office of Navy Photographic Services on November 20, 1944, was under the direction of Captain Gene Markey, USNR, who had extensive experience in the motion picture industry. It represented the Secretary of the Navy in all motion picture matters pertaining to the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps; coordinated the planning and production of motion picture combat reports that were required by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and served as a liaison office with the Army,

other government agencies, and the motion picture industry in the production of entertainment films pertaining to the Navy and the procurement and distribution of films to naval activities.[54]

A significant achievement of the Office of Navy Photographic Services was the liaison with and provision of film to Twentieth Century Fox for the production of "The Fighting Lady." This documentary motion picture was made from 16mm. color film taken by Navy photographers aboard the carrier Yorktown in the Pacific. It was released nationally in February 1945 and subsequently shown to millions of people in the United States. All profits from the film were donated by Twentieth Century Fox to the Navy Relief Society.[55]

A Request for Additional Personnel

In response to an inquiry from Mr. Forrestal, Commander Paget furnished figures on the numbers of personnel engaged in public relations activities in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in December 1944.[56] His personnel table showed a total of 2,156 people employed full-time in public relations in the three services--625 officers, 1,313 enlisted men and 218 civilians. Of the officers, 510 were Navy--97 in the Washington area, 178 in the continental United States and its territories and 235 in other areas, including zones of combat. The latter

figure vividly illustrates the significant increase since the summer of 1944 in the number of public relations officers assigned to the Pacific.

Officer personnel in OPR remained at a stable level throughout 1944. There were seventy-three attached to the office on May 1 and seventy-two on November 1. As officers reported to the fleet commands in the Pacific, however, the number attached to naval district, air training and other field offices in the United States declined. On September 1, 1944, there were 195 of these, with this figure being reduced, as we have seen, to 178 in December. The slack was taken up by assigning officers to part-time or "collateral" duty in public relations. There were ninety-three of these part-time officers serving in district and other field offices on September 1, 1944.[57]

In late January 1945, Admiral Merrill requested an increase in both officer and enlisted personnel for the Office of Public Relations.[58] Citing the acceleration of the war in the Pacific and additional functions assigned to his office as a result of its reorganization, he asked for fifteen additional officers and eighteen more enlisted men. The current allowance for OPR at the time was ninety-two officers, eighty-two in the Washington office and ten on the West Coast. However, as Admiral Merrill pointed out, the Washington office had been operating at about 7 per cent below its authorized strength since the expansion of

public relations personnel in the Navy was halted in March 1943.

Secretary Forrestal endorsed Merrill's request and forwarded it to the Chief of Naval Personnel. However, the secretary did not give "carte blanche" approval to more public relations manpower in non-combat billets. In March 1945, he wrote to Merrill, "I would like to pass on the increases in individual complements as they arise. Frankly, some of them seem a little large to me, especially if we cannot find reductions elsewhere to offset them in large part."[59]

A small reduction was found in March 1945 when the Office of the Assistant Director of Public Relations, West Coast, was abolished. Nine of the ten officers attached to the West Coast office were assigned elsewhere. However, Captain Bolton, who had been promoted from commander a few weeks before, kept his status as Motion Picture and West Coast Radio Liaison Officer of OPR and as Staff Public Relations Officer for the Commander, Western Sea Frontier in San Francisco, a post which he had assumed as additional duty in the fall of 1943.

The San Francisco area, being the terminus for the arrival of news copy and broadcasts from the Pacific Theater, was given top priority in public relations planning in early 1945. To strengthen the organization there, Forrestal decided to order Commander Gordon from OPR to the

Twelfth Naval District as public relations officer. Gordon was detached on April 2, with Commander Chambliss transferring from his post as head of the Program Planning Branch to replace Gordon as chief of the Media Branch. Lieutenant Commander Newmyer moved up from the Planning and Liaison Section to succeed Chambliss, and Lieutenant Commander J. R. Poisson, USNR, took over Newmyer's former position.

Also on April 2, the Combat Types Section was moved from the Program Planning Branch to the Media Branch, with its title being changed to "Aviation and Surface Types Section"; and the Special Activities Section was transferred from Media to Program Planning. Lieutenant Commander Henry Roberts, USNR, relieved Lieutenant Commander Courtney as officer-in-charge of Special Activities at the same time, and Miss Helena Philibert was named to head a Special Research Projects Unit in the Technical Services Branch. An earlier personnel change in 1945 saw Lieutenant Commander Carleton Mitchell, Jr., former head of the Combat Photography Section, replace Commander Long as head of the Pictorial Section.[60]

Special Activities on the Home Front

Throughout 1944, Navy public relations officers became involved in certain special activities connected with the war effort on the home front. In early May, OPR was requested by the Director of Naval Communications to

conduct a publicity campaign to inform the public of the explicit reasons for the unavoidable delays in delivering mail to Navymen overseas and on ships. On July 30, the second anniversary of the establishment of the WAVES was commemorated with another extensive publicity drive. The theme for this observance was a salute by civilians and Navymen to the WAVES. The effort was tied in with a Navy War Bond Drive scheduled in the first week of July, with all bonds purchased by members of the Women's Reserve during this period being applied to the building of two motor torpedo boats, which were launched on the day of the WAVE Anniversary.[61]

A national campaign aimed at civilian defense workers was launched in the summer of 1944, involving public relations and in-plant incentive action. "Victory-flushed headlines, concern over cutbacks and desire for the security of peacetime jobs"[62] were contributing to an alarming labor turnover rate in defense plants and threatening Navy procurement contracts. One of the incentive devices used in the campaign to keep workers on the job was the production of three films in Hollywood and New York, dramatizing for workers the "long road traveled before final victory can be claimed."

Navy art exhibits were given extensive exposure throughout the nation in the summer and fall of 1944. "The Navy at War," a collection of seventy-five paintings and

drawings by official Navy combat artists was shown in department stores in connection with war bond promotion. Paintings of naval aviation and of naval medicine and the submarine service, made under private sponsorship by civilian artists, also were exhibited.[63]

A special photographic display, "Power in the Pacific," a pictorial record of Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard combat operations in that theater, was featured during the year at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. The collection of still photographs, compiled by Captain Edward Steichen, USNR, was put into book form in early 1945, "so that the largest possible number of Americans may see them."[64]

In October 1944, all public relations officers again cooperated with the Navy League in celebrating Navy Day. Posters were distributed, speakers' kits prepared and Navy speakers furnished for the event. On the West Coast, naval district officers provided a "mat service" of ready-made photographs for small town newspapers in the area to use in calling attention to the special ceremonies. The Navy Day observances throughout the war, aided by the prevailing patriotic fervor among the people, were a great success. In 1944, 16,000 radio programs were arranged and more than six million persons participated in luncheons, dinners, school assemblies and parades.[65]

A final project during the year for Navy public

relations officers was to spotlight the third anniversary of the Seabees on December 28. Seabee construction and combat highlights in 1944 and other feature material were given wide distribution to the media by the naval district offices.

In January 1945, the practice of issuing CINCPAC communiques simultaneously in Pearl Harbor and Washington was discontinued, in accordance with the wishes of correspondents in the Pacific. The dual-release procedure had been established at the request of publishers in the United States. With cancellation of the simultaneous release, the 24-hour officer watch in the Press Section of OPR, which had been in effect since May 1941, also was eliminated. A press officer now was on duty in the Washington office only from 8 a.m. to midnight.[66]

Navy Public Relations Policy Statements

It will be recalled that one of the questions Secretary Forrestal asked Admiral Merrill in December 1944 concerned the progress made toward establishing Navy public relations objectives. Merrill replied by reiterating that in his opinion the primary objective should be the "complete and accurate reporting to the American people of the activities of the United States Navy."[67] He added that under this basic policy were three secondary objectives for Navy public relations to pursue during the remainder of the war:

a) Winning public understanding of the problems of the war in the Pacific and winning public support for the vigorous prosecution of the Pacific war subsequent to the end of the European fight;
b) Securing public support for a strong postwar Navy;
c) Contributing to the maintenance of morale of the men serving at sea and overseas by securing public recognition of their outstanding service to their country.

The admiral then listed current individual projects which his office was engaged in or planning to support the general objectives. Among these were the publicizing of the 150th anniversary of Navy Supply activities and recruitment of workers for naval bases and defense plants. Both programs were tied in with the necessity for all-out support of the Pacific war and were built around the theme of logistics in the Pacific. Two projects were mentioned as being planned for the future--one designed to publicize the Navy's personnel rehabilitation program and the other aimed at public understanding of the Navy's demobilization plans and postwar personnel policies.

Admiral Merrill concluded his report by suggesting that he and the secretary hold periodical conferences to review current public relations objectives and programs and to decide "whether any new program should be added to the list." Forrestal responded favorably, agreeing to meet regularly following his receipt of Merrill's monthly report on accomplishments. The secretary requested his Director of Public Relations to elaborate in greater detail on each

a) training public understanding of the problems of the
war in the Pacific and winning public support for
the vigorous prosecution of the Pacific War, culmi-
nated in the end of the European theater.
b) generating public support for a strong postwar policy
c) contributing to the maintenance of morale of the
men serving at sea and overseas by promoting public
recognition of their unswerving service to their
country.

The editorial then listed current institutional problems which the office was engaged in or planning to support the general objectives. Among these were the publishing of the 150th anniversary of Navy Relief activities and observances of weeks to aid Naval Home and Seamen Bethel projects and to help in with the necessity for all-out support of the Pacific war and their basic mission of the Home of Dependents in the Pacific. Two projects were announced as being planned for the future--one designed to publicize the Navy's peacetime rehabilitation programs and the other aimed at public understanding of the Navy's demobilization plans and postwar personnel policies.

Admiral Merrill commented the reports by suggesting that he and the secretary hold periodic conferences to review current public relations objectives and problems and decide "whether and how progress should be added to the line." Expressing unbounded confidence in Navy Relief's capacity to meet temporarily intensified pressure of the Pacific war, he made no suggestions. The secretary reviewed his interest in Pacific activities to illustrate to Merrill how much

one of the major public relations objectives and to circulate this elaboration to the naval districts, bureaus and fleets. "Then it should be made current and recirculated each month in the PRO news letter."[68]

Thus began in January 1945 a series of monthly statements on Navy public relations policy prepared by the Office of Public Relations and distributed in memorandum form to all Navy public relations officers. These policy statements were issued throughout the remainder of the war and for several months following the cessation of hostilities. They were prefaced with the remark, "This memorandum is sent to you for guidance in the carrying out of your duties. It includes: a statement of our permanent basic objective, all current secondary objectives, and all specific programs which are to be given support in order to attain our objectives."[69] The statements also required a monthly report from each public relations unit to the Director of Public Relations on the "concrete steps taken to carry out the individual programs." It was made explicit that "these objectives require the use of methods other than mere reporting of Navy news. They call for vigorous and intelligent use of all of the tools at our command--seminars, speeches and radio addresses; the inspiring of magazine articles; the use of contacts with civic and other organizations, etc."

The objectives contained in the initial policy statement in January 1945 closely paralleled those outlined by Admiral Merrill in his December memorandum to Secretary Forrestal. Explicit procedures were delineated to pursue the over-all objective of winning public backing for a strong postwar Navy. Included were efforts to mold public sentiment in favor of the Navy as a separate military service and for the continuation of naval aviation as an integral part of the Navy. Also, plans were made to solicit support for postwar compulsory military training.

Examples of the type of activities undertaken in early 1945 to promote naval aviation were a tour of air facilities in the Fifth Naval District for a group of editors and publishers from the Eighth Naval District, and a cruise at sea on board an aircraft carrier for persons prominent in the theatrical world.

In March 1945, when victory in Europe was imminent, special projects were added to the policy statement to prevent a "let down" in the war effort after Germany's capitulation. These consisted of the preparation of public statements by appropriate Naval personnel for release on VE-Day in conjunction with other government agencies, and cooperation with the Army-Navy-Treasury Department Pacific War advertising campaign. The latter involved the use by national advertisers of copy designated to maintain public interest in the Pacific war after VE-Day.[70]

Also in March, media representatives were invited to embark in the new cruisers St. Paul and Chicago during their "shakedown" cruises, and arrangements were made to have local correspondents cover portions of the shakedown cruises of all newly commissioned cruisers and battleships. In addition, twenty-three Washington correspondents and five members of the House Naval Affairs Committee were provided air transportation to and from Norfolk, Va., for the launching of the new Midway.

In April 1945, a specific program was designed for the "selling" of delegates and correspondents in attendance at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Arrangements were made for daily visits to naval activities in the area and flights in Navy planes and blimps over San Francisco. There also were air demonstrations, tours of aircraft carriers, film presentations and trips within San Francisco Bay by Navy small craft.

In May, a concerted effort was made to provide public relations assistance for the recruitment of ship repair workers for West Coast yards. The USS Laffey was exhibited at Seattle and Tacoma, drawing 100,000 visitors. The Thirteenth Naval District Public Relations Office arranged extensive local and national press, pictorial and radio coverage for the ship's visit. Five newsreel companies filmed the event, and there were broadcasts on four radio networks. Also in May, an invasion exercise

involving some 200 ships and landing craft was staged near San Diego in connection with the Seventh War Loan Drive. This event attracted 80,000 persons.[71]

On January 1, 1945, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet somewhat belatedly jumped on the Navy public relations bandwagon by appointing officers for this function in all fleet units and issuing an extensive public relations manual for their guidance. Six months earlier, two admirals had voiced concern over the amount of publicity gained by the Coast Guard in the Atlantic and European areas relative to that received by the Navy. One of the flag officers complained that it seemed to him "the public believed that all attack cargo vessels and transports are Coast Guard-manned and -operated."[72]

To assess the impact of its programs, the Navy took steps in early 1945 to gauge the public pulse with regard to the subjects addressed in the policy statements. Mr. Duffield wrote to Secretary Forrestal on December 28, 1944: "A part of the rejuvenation in public relations involves keeping in touch with public opinion and our public relations effect on it. Fortune has agreed to devote one of its polls to the measuring of opinions in which the Navy is interested. We need to give . . . Mr. Elmo Roper a list of questions by December 31."[73] Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Belden, OPR's Evaluation Section chief, visited Princeton University to discuss possible polls with the Office of

Public Opinion Research there. He also planned to contact Dr. Gallup.[74]

As a result of these efforts, at least two surveys were conducted which were pertinent to the Navy's public relations objectives. A Gallup Poll released in the summer of 1945 revealed that while 70 per cent of the public favored compulsory military training after the war, less than half of these thought that action should be taken immediately to set up machinery for such training. A survey by Fortune at about the same time concluded that most of the American people desired to depend on the air arm and the Navy as the first line of defense in the post-war period.[75] However, a June 1944 poll by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Denver, showed that 64 per cent of the public believed a large Air Force was more important to have after the war than a large Navy.[76]

Fleet Hometown News Center Established

The emphasis on "personalizing the news" about Navy fighting men in the Pacific, begun by Secretary Forrestal in the summer of 1944 and made possible by the assignment of naval officer and enlisted correspondents to ships and fleet staffs, created the need for a separate office to process the thousands of stories to hometown newspapers. A form was devised to record basic information in the personnel record of every Navyman, and the goal was set in the

fall of 1944 to send in at least one story on each man in the Navy.

Initially, the naval district public relations office in which the man's hometown was located received the material and forwarded it to his area newspapers. This procedure proved to be quite cumbersome, however, and on March 29, 1945, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Commandant of the Ninth Naval District to establish in Chicago a "Fleet Hometown Distribution Center." The center was to be responsible for "the processing of 'hometown' news stories and pictures received from public relations officers attached to forces afloat and the transmission of such stories to appropriate 'hometown' newspapers, radio stations and other media throughout the continental United States."[77]

Named as the first officer-in-charge of the new activity, which came to be known as the Fleet Hometown News Center (FHTNC) later in 1945 and in subsequent years, was Lieutenant Charles W. Payne, USNR. He was assigned twelve other officers of the rank of lieutenant and lieutenant (junior grade) to serve as editors and reviewers, and 104 enlisted personnel--clerical workers, writers and photographers.

The first month's output in stories alone for the FHTNC was 10,340. This increased to 39,479 in May 1945, and during August 1945, over 100,000 stories and some 7,000

pictures were processed by the center. Altogether, in a seven-month period from April 1 to October 31, 1945, the total number of pieces mailed--including copies of stories, picture prints and mats--amounted to 1,466,140.[78]

The key to the success of the hometown news program were the reporters on the firing line--the Enlisted Navy Correspondents (ENCs) and collateral duty public relations officers.

In the fall of 1944, Captain Miller rounded up 100 experienced newspapermen from the enlisted ranks in the Pacific Fleet and assembled them at Pearl Harbor. As a test, he embarked all 100 in a battleship for three days to write at least one story on each of the ship's crew members for hometown distribution. The battleship skipper was extremely reluctant at first to participate in this experiment, but was finally persuaded to do so. "Within three weeks," said Miller, "the clippings from home town papers began to reach the ship from folks at home. Suddenly this ship's crew showed a marked gain in self-esteem resulting from the personal recognition the men had received from home."[79]

The 100 ENCs were assigned to ships throughout the Pacific for the express purpose of preparing material for hometown release on individual Navymen. The system was later refined to include "roster stories," in which a single account of an exploit by a particular ship was

processed by FMTNC and sent to the hometown publications of each crew member of that ship.

The roster-story system was described quite accurately, albeit with a great deal of satire, in the following passage from Don't Go Near the Water:

> The exec leaned forward excitedly.
> "Do you begin to get it? We get up a story on the event with some blank spaces in it, mimeograph it off, then simply fill in the man's name from the ship's roster, like 'Blank Blank of Blank was aboard the U.S.S. Missouri recently when that ship's sixteen-inchers disabled Yokohama,' and fire it back to the guy's home-town paper. Visualize it! The Missouri alone has 2,700 men aboard. Any time she did anything, just anything at all, that would automatically mean 2,700 stories in papers all over the States!
> ". . . Think of it! The thousands of ships we have! The hundreds of thousands of men--Navy men!--on them! The millions of stories that would be gushing from them to us! From us to the thousands of tanktown papers in the U.S. We'd swamp them under! Why, this thing might be to naval public relations what the invention of the machine gun was to land warfare!"[80]

While not as flamboyant as the "exec" in this fictionalized account, Captain Miller nevertheless was enthusiastic about the potentiality of the ENCs and the hometown news program. On June 1, 1945, he wrote to Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, then commander of an amphibious group in the Pacific, "We will need fifty to a hundred more of these writers /ENCs/ in order that the Navy's story can be told more fully . . . . Out of these men I expect to get not less than 400,000 stories."[81]

During the Okinawan campaign in the spring of 1945, the ENCs and collateral duty public relations officers

were credited with writing "so many good action stories" of the men who manned the invasion ships that "the American public received the sort of information it so deeply craved. . . . Stories containing names and addresses of men who took part in the action proved to have high priority in the columns of home-town newspapers."[82]

The news service on individual Navymen seemed to be very much appreciated by newspapers throughout the country. Typical of the enthusiastic response echoed by the smaller newspapers in particular was the following excerpt from a letter sent to FHTNC by the Claremont (N.H.) Daily Eagle:

> Your news release about the Landry boy from West Lebanon was indeed welcome. In the future we shall send you tearsheets of the articles we receive from you, so that you could see the number one spot the story got on page 1. We are more than grateful at being included on your mailing list. Keep the news coming![83]

In the summer of 1945, a nationwide survey of 500 daily and weekly newspapers throughout the country--conducted for the Navy by the National Opinion Research Center--found that American editors desired more of these hometown stories. Nearly 100 per cent of the editors polled "agreed that distribution of a greater quantity of news about local men is the most important single improvement the Navy can make in its public information program."[84] The editors also believed that the "hometowners" were "one of the most effective ways of presenting the Navy's part in the Pacific war."

Perhaps the best evidence of the effectiveness of the hometown news program was obtained from a content analysis of a representative group of newspapers conducted by the Evaluation Section of OPR from March 24 to July 21, 1945. During the first eight weeks of the study, the Navy received 12 per cent of the space allotted to individual servicemen. In the last half of the period, the average percentage devoted to Navymen jumped to 20 with a peak of 30 per cent reached on July 14. The Navy at this time had 28 per cent of all U.S. personnel in uniform. The striking increase in hometown coverage of Navymen was attributed to the greater number of stories forwarded from the Pacific to the FHTNC and, as we shall see later, the relaxation of censorship rules in the summer of 1945 with regard to publicizing the names of ships, battle damage and submarine operations.[85]

In May 1945, the FHTNC began forwarding recorded radio interviews with fleet personnel to the naval districts for delivery to local stations and subsequently to the families of the men. One hundred seventy-five of these "Voices from the Fleet" recordings were processed in the first month.[86]

In June, a school was set up at Pearl Harbor to train Enlisted Navy Correspondents. Those who were already petty officers kept their old ratings but were assigned full-time as reporters. The non-rated men were designated

Specialists (X)(MC) and given similar assignments.[87]

Accolades for Iwo Jima and Okinawa

The final phase of the naval war in the Pacific began with the invasion of Iwo Jima on February 19, 1945, followed by the assault on Okinawa on April 1.

By the time of the Iwo Jima operation, public relations planning and assets in the Pacific had advanced to the stage whereby full support to civilian correspondents and Navy reporters was being provided. The public relations annex to the Iwo Jima operations plan consisted of detailed instructions on media coverage, including provisions for a large number of well-qualified press censors to accompany the news media representatives and for transmission of news copy from the AGC command ships. A minimum of 5,000 words was authorized for broadcast on D-Day alone. The public relations plan was tested along with other aspects of the operation in a rehearsal held on Maui in the Hawaiian Islands.[88]

Two weeks prior to the Iwo Jima landing, Admiral Sherman briefed the civilian war correspondents in great detail on the strategy for the assault, using maps with phase lines, forces involved, etc. The press representatives "returned the confidence," with no leaks of information occurring. "Of course, it might be parenthetically stated that the Navy controlled all outgoing communications channels,"[89] Admiral Miller noted after the war.

"Nevertheless, mutual confidence had been well established with a respect for common interests."

During the movement ashore at Iwo Jima, "125 cameras --hand-held, mounted in landing craft and aircraft-- recorded history in the making."[90] The exposed film was collected shortly after the Marines landed and flown to Guam by seaplane, where it was parachuted to public relations personnel standing by on the ground and quickly transmitted by radio photo to San Francisco. News of the landing was flashed by radio direct from the USS Eldorado, flagship of the amphibious force commander "while the beach-head was still being secured."[91]

The arrangements made for rapidly getting the photographs and press copy back to the United States and other public relations handling of the operation received high praise from Time:

> Some of the war's best photographs came out of the Pacific last week. The up-close thick-of-battle quality of the pictures was evidence of the bravery and skill of the photographers on Iwo Jima. . . . The speed with which the pictures appeared in U.S. newspapers was evidence of the Navy's growing press sense.
>
> Just 17½ hours after the Marines landed on Iwo, the first invasion shots reached the U.S. . . . The news traveled even quicker, thanks to a radio transmitter which the Navy had installed on a warship a mile off the Iwo shore. Each day U.S. readers and radio listeners thus got the direct reports of newsmen on the scene.[92]

The magazine characterized the Iwo Jima press arrangements as "another notable step toward bringing the Navy's public relations up to its fighting arm's high

standards," contrasting them with the courier arrangements for delivering press copy during the invasions of Saipan and Guam, "which meant it got to the U.S. eight to fourteen days late." Major credit for the Navy's improved press relations in the Pacific was given to Captain Miller, but Secretary Forrestal also was complimented by Time for the impetus he provided:

> Captain Miller's go-ahead stems from the fight of press-conscious Navy Secretary James Forrestal (a spectator at Iwo Jima last week) to loosen the tongues of the Navy's tight-lipped top admirals. Secretary Forrestal has made it plain that the Navy must make friends with its employer, the U.S. people.

Earlier, in a typically modest gesture, Forrestal himself paid special tribute to Admiral Nimitz for his support of the public relations offensive. In a letter to the Pacific Fleet commander, he remarked:

> I appreciate what you say about better coverage stemming from my own efforts, but I am fully aware that my efforts would be meager and unrewarded in results if you were not backing them up, not merely with perfunctory conformance but strong personal interest. Success in getting this tremendous story . . . told to the American people must depend on awareness of its importance all the way down to individual ship commanders. You have been splendid in the way you have gone at this, and particularly in the way you have backed up Captain Miller.[93]

Despite the pressures from the news media and public relations planners to "go all out" in coverage of the Iwo Jima landing, Admiral Spruance maintained his stubborn stance against breaking radio silence while at sea. He wrote to a friend just before the operation:

> Everything went along very smoothly at Pearl this time except that I had to do some arguing with the public relations people to make them understand we were fighting a war and I would not break radio silence just to satisfy the newspaper correspondents. There may be complaints from the latter, but I intend to have TF 58 keep radio silence and lots of it, just as we did going into Truk and Palau. They can send all they want from the landing objective.[94]

Complaints from the press were at a minimum, however, as the correspondents were well-satisfied with the speedy transmittal of news copy from the invasion site. The Marines also benefited from this arrangement. Stories by their combat correspondents were dispatched early in the Iwo Jima action by wire service reporters embarked in the command ship lying offshore. Also, the D-Day message by the Marine commander to his troops "just before their landing craft churned toward the beach" was recorded by combat correspondents and delivered to the radio networks at home the day after the assault, resulting in its broadcast over two national networks.[95]

At Iwo Jima, for the first time in the war, women correspondents were allowed to cover operations in the forward areas. Captain Miller's office had been besieged with requests from female reporters to travel to the combat zones since the capture of Guam in August 1944. Finally, as advance bases were built and other women such as Red Cross workers and nurses were stationed there, provisions were made for the distaff writers to be represented at Iwo Jima. Among those going ashore were Dickey Chapelle and

Barbara Finch. Admiral Miller later recalled an amusing incident concerning Mrs. Finch (see note 90):

> One unusual situation occurred in which Barbara and Percy Finch, a husband and wife writing team for Reuters, were on Guam. Percy covered the Iwo Jima landings from a battleship and it was some time before he got ashore. Imagine his surprise to find that we had put his wife, Barbara, aboard the first plane loaded with nurses flying into the landing strip on Iwo. Barbara thus scooped her husband on the actual "I was there" story.

Before the change in policy, Miller had refused Miss Chapelle's request to accompany the troops ashore at Iwo, exclaiming in a conversation with her, "I'm not going to have 100,000 Marines pulling up their pants just because you're on the beach!"[96]

In the Okinawa invasion, one of the women correspondents was embarked in a hospital ship during the landings. She did not have permission to go ashore, but through subterfuge persuaded a Navy coxswain to take her to the beach in a motor launch. This prompted writer John Lardner to include in a filed story the statement: "This is a new war. We now have a woman in the trenches."[97] Not very long thereafter, Rear Admiral Kelly Turner, the amphibious task force commander, sent a terse message--"Get that woman out of here!"

During the Okinawan campaign, it was not feasible to fly news copy and photographs to Guam as was done at Iwo Jima. Instead, a Navy B-24 Liberator bomber was sent aloft

over the island with four pool correspondents aboard. The plane flew to Manila for refueling the night before the operation and then took off from the Philippines on a schedule which put it over Okinawa at the exact time the first wave of troops was moving ashore. It had just enough fuel to cover the landings for two hours, then had to fly to Iwo Jima for refueling and on to Guam, arriving there eight hours after the start of the invasion. "Press copy and photographs were transmitted to the United States and immediately used nationwide."[98]

Plans were made to handle more than 250 correspondents at Okinawa. The operation was a difficult one from the public relations standpoint, due to the length of the battle and the need for daily coordination of news releases and press relations with the Army commands involved. However, again the media representatives were pleased with the arrangements. John A. Hooley of the Blue Network wrote to Secretary Forrestal from "aboard a very comfortable ship in the cabin provided for the correspondents by the Navy," which was, he said, ". . . symptomatic of the great and real effort the Navy has made to provide the conditions which will help correspondents in their work."[99]

A delicate media relations problem at Okinawa was the censorship imposed by Admiral Nimitz on the "kamikaze" damage to U.S. ships. From their inception in the fall of 1944, a cloak of secrecy enshrouded the suicide attacks by

Japanese pilots. Complete "stops" were put on all information concerning loss or damage to our ships from these raids. The rationale for such stringent security this late in the war centered around the fact that the successful pilot did not return. It was reasoned that the Japanese high command had no way of gauging the success or failure of the kamikaze operations unless we published the results.[100]

In January 1945, James F. Byrnes, director of the Office of War Mobilization, wrote to Secretary Forrestal requesting that the Navy publicize the effectiveness of the kamikaze attacks in order to solidify public support for the war, particularly on the home manpower front. The secretary's reply to Mr. Byrnes elaborated on the reasons for withholding publicity on the raids. It was one of the few instances in which Mr. Forrestal went on record in supporting fully his military commanders on a security issue:

> Admiral King has given much consideration to the matter /of publicizing kamikaze raids/ and has advised that the facts be spread as widely as possible without letting it come to enemy ears. In accordance with this policy, a full statement of recent damages was made to Congress by Admiral King in confidence. . . . I hope it will not be necessary to go beyond this restricted distribution for the present.
>
> . . . any wide publicizing of Japanese suicide bombing places in the hands of the Japanese exactly the kind of hortatory material which they need to persuade their pilots into these attacks. I think our refusal to publicize suicide attacks has contributed to the difficulty which the Japanese have had in procuring volunteers for these attacks.
>
> Later on we may be able to accept the military

> disadvantages in order to arouse more enthusiasm at home, but I hope that this will not be necessary during the course of the current quite difficult operations in the Pacific.[101]

Before the Okinawan campaign, the Navy faced a problem of a different nature which was at least partially engendered by the publicity spotlight its own public relations activities had focused on Iwo Jima. It was concerned over the public's anguished reaction to the heavy losses sustained by the Marines during the bitter fighting on the Pacific atoll. Hoping to offset this reaction, Navy spokesmen took special pains to explain why Iwo Jima's capture was vital even though tragically costly in terms of casualties. However, Ernest K. Lindley, writing in Newsweek, claimed there was an ulterior reason for the sea service's uneasiness, namely "the effect of the Iwo Jima losses on the long rivalry between the Navy and the General of the Army MacArthur over Pacific command and strategy."[102] Lindley concluded that:

> . . . the Navy, knowing from experience MacArthur's grip on the imagination of the American people . . . began to see red last week as stories appeared in the daily press contrasting MacArthur's landings, made at small cost on undefended or lightly defended shores, with the frontal assaults on such heavily fortified bastions as Tarawa, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima--all Marine Corps operations . . . under the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz.

Forrestal expressed his anxiety over public appraisal of the severe Marine losses in a March 1945 letter to Nimitz, in which he introduced Bill Lawrence of the New York Times as a "personal friend of mine who is

going . . . to the Pacific to be permanently assigned."[103] The secretary told Nimitz that he had asked Mr. Lawrence to brief the admiral on "the effect of the Iwo Jima reporting on the public understanding and appreciation of: First, the necessity of taking that Godforsaken spot, and Second, the difference inherent in that kind of assault as opposed to a military campaign on a substantial land mass."

The secretary was quite active in early 1945 in personal correspondance with members of the news media. Following Iwo Jima, he wrote to scores of reporters, complimenting and thanking them for their coverage of the landing.[104]

Truman's Views on Unification Evoke Navy Concern

The Navy was anxious, too, in the spring of 1945 over the succession of Harry Truman to the Presidency following Roosevelt's death. As we have seen, much of the effort exerted by James Forrestal to upgrade the Navy's public image sprang from his belief that the sea service would be swept under the control of the Army after the war. The secretary had plenty of reason to fear this from President Truman.

As a candidate for vice president in 1944, Truman had strongly recommended unification. And, before the year was out, he was urging the Army's plan for merger of the Armed Forces on Congress. Indicative of the new President's

views was a statement made by one of his aides early in 1945 to a Washington group: "During the Roosevelt administration, the White House was a Navy wardroom; we're going to fix all that!"[105]

Forrestal was hampered by personally cool relations with Truman. The secretary stood alone among cabinet members in opposing many of the key policies of the new administration, and he was never personally liked by Truman. However, he remained optimistic, and despite a conviction that President Truman's thinking on the unification issue was "predicated upon his experience in the Army during the last war and in the National Guard since then," he hoped that the President was not "closed-minded," and could be convinced of the reasonableness of the Navy view.[106]

"Admiral" Miller Succeeds Merrill

Admiral Merrill was in ailing health early in 1945, and as far back as January of that year, Forrestal wrote to Admiral Nimitz that he planned to bring Captain Miller back as Director of Public Relations (DPR) in April or May.[107] When sounded out by the secretary concerning this move, Miller himself at first strenuously objected on the grounds that he wanted an important sea command in order to qualify for promotion. Forrestal allayed his concern in this regard by promising him an advancement to the rank of

commodore upon his assumption of the duties of DPR.[108] In actuality, when Miller did relieve Admiral Merrill in May 1945, he was promoted to rear admiral instead, becoming at the age of 42 the youngest rear admiral on the Navy's rolls.

A graduate of the Naval Academy and a naval aviator, Admiral Miller had a variety of assignments prior to his public relations duties in the latter stages of World War II. He had no formal training in public relations, but was a short story and magazine writer and the author of a book entitled Navy Wings. Early in the war, as head of the Training Literature Section of the Bureau of Aeronautics, he wrote instructional pamphlets for Navy pilots and crewmen, stressing the need for safety precautions.

From the moment he became the Navy's new information chief, Admiral Miller made it clear that he planned to change things. Newsmen were "bug-eyed" and "pinched themselves" to see if it were really true when he first briefed them on his public relations philosophy:

> It will be our policy while I am here to tell you just what the hell is going on. If national security is involved, we will tell you that, too, and try to explain why. But we will tell you what's going on. It is our job to tell the country about its Navy. We will try to keep ahead of you in doing that job. My office has three doors, and all of them will be open all day.[109]

This kind of talk was no mere "snow job" for the press. Admiral Miller meant what he said. In a subsequent

letter to Captain Fitzhugh Lee, USN, another naval aviator who had relieved him as public relations officer for Admiral Nimitz in late March 1945, Miller stated, "There has been a very definite feeling of helplessness here [in Washington] which can be converted into one of responsibility and decision. This I propose to do."[110] Miller told Lee he felt the public relations organization had become "nothing more or less than a messenger-boy outfit where copy is received and then is run up to COMINCH by one of our boys." This, he indicated, was a result of the lack of a means of contact between working personnel and "top-side." He described copy being sent up through channels to a captain and then four admirals until it finally reached Admiral King's major deputy, Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, who, Miller said, "hasn't time to go into these things."

For these reasons, he continued, "I have changed all this and have forbidden the Review Section or anyone else to make direct contact top-side. I propose to make all decisions down here and if it gets out of hand and too hot for me, I will carry the ball up above myself." In effect, Miller said, he planned to bring the responsibilities and prerogatives of public relations back to the Office of Public Relations where they belong.

Later in the letter, the admiral wrote a lengthy paragraph which summarized his intentions and revealed a cautious optimism that his ambitious ideas could be

carried out:

> I do not believe that Admiral King or Edwards will in any way stifle our efforts. They appear entirely cognizant of the need for this type of thing and I have had no less than a half-dozen editors tell me that this billet of mine is the most important one in the Navy. There is a definite trend throughout all ranks and branches to assist us and make possible the accomplishment of our objectives which to me is to place the Navy in every home in this country. Granted--that in my time it may not happen. Also--granted that it may be the fear complex which has brought about the changed viewpoint--the fear of losing the Navy's identity. But, whatever it may be, we will make every effort to do the thing we think should be done.

Partial evidence that Miller did have support from within the Navy was contained in separate correspondence to him from two admirals in the Pacific. In late May, Admiral Blandy wrote to complain that the smaller ships were not receiving sufficient publicity. In responding, Admiral Miller declared enthusiastically (see note 81):

> I can't tell you how encouraging it is to me to have officers like you, who have seen the Navy so clearly both ashore and afloat, express their thoughts regarding Public Relations. This perhaps is one of the most hopeful signs . . . that the Navy has become aware of the great importance of its relations with the public and the taxpayers.

On June 27, 1945, Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, chief of staff to the Commander Third Fleet, expressed to Miller that he thought the Navy had a "great story" that was not being told concerning the losses inflicted on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay by Task Force 38 during the re-taking of the Philippines.[111] He strongly recommended that correspondents be invited to "view and describe

the damage" there.

In the aforementioned June 4 letter to Captain Lee, Admiral Miller stressed that he seemed "to detect a definite trend in the Fleet to desire more and more coverage . . . ." On June 26, he wrote to Lieutenant Commander Nate L. Crabtree, USNR, one of Lee's public relations officers. "Frankly, I am delighted that they /members of the cruiser-destroyer force in the Pacific/ are becoming concerned about the lack of public relations in their organization, for this will provide the most healthy stimulus our program could possibly have."[112] In the letter, Miller denied that naval aviation was getting more publicity than the cruisers and destroyers "because I happen to wear wings." Rather, he emphasized, "The real reason behind this is that some three years ago we made a definite effort to make Naval Aviation conscious of good public relations and now Naval Aviation is beginning to reap proper dividends."

Miller suggested to Captain Lee that he ask for fifty more Enlisted Naval Correspondents to help the individual ships in the Pacific get more coverage. He also noted that the number of requests from civilian correspondents to be accredited to the Pacific Fleet had increased significantly since V-E Day. He arranged to upgrade the standing of war correspondents by gaining approval for a change in their insignia from a "fouled anchor" to a "gold

oak leaf." He informed Lee that the reason for this change was "to get the officers aboard ship to give them [the civilian correspondents] some sort of humane treatment commensurate with what we desired."[113] The gold oak leaf was similar to the rank device for a lieutenant commander.

A New Name--Office of Public Information

As evidence of the new direction Admiral Miller planned for his office, he instituted a change in name. Miller had said that he felt "public relations" was an inappropriate title for the job his office was supposed to be doing, so on June 18, 1945, the name was officially changed to Office of Public Information (OPI).[114] The directive by the Secretary of the Navy effecting the change further stated that appropriate title changes would be made at all Navy Department, fleet and local activities. "Public relations officers" would henceforth be called "public information officers."

"The change was made in order that the title might more accurately describe the activities of this Office," declared Admiral Miller, whose title also was changed from Director of Public Relations to Director of Public Information. "Our mission is the distribution to the public of information concerning the Navy and its many activities. We are essentially a news and information service."[115]

Like changes were made for the Marine Corps and

Coast Guard, too. The Marine Corps Division of Public Relations became the Division of Public Information, and the Coast Guard Office of Public Relations became the Office of Public Information.

Taking firmer control of public information activities and changing the name of his office were not the only things Miller had in mind. He promised Captain Lee that he would "go out and beat the bushes" in search of more qualified public information officers to assign to the Pacific. Among them was the former chief of OPR's Aviation Section, Commander Robert A. Winston, who was dispatched as Pacific Fleet Pictorial Officer. At the request of Secretary Forrestal, Winston also assumed the task of assisting in the establishment of a printed daily newspaper for fleet personnel. The Navy newspaper, with wire service copy edited and forwarded from San Francisco, would eventually become "the absolute source of news for all of Guam," Miller predicted. He also anticipated similar newspapers for Navy personnel on other islands, such as Manus and Leyte.[116]

The newspaper project proved to be difficult to get off the ground, however, with one of the main obstacles being the procurement of a press. Finally, one was shipped out to Commander Winston, and on July 25 the first edition of Navy News, a four-page tabloid-size daily paper was published on Guam for personnel ashore and afloat.[117]

A sensitive problem which Miller had to face was that of public relations officers doing writing and newswork on their own--for reimbursement. Many of the Navy information officers, of course, were active newspapermen and writers before they went into the Navy, and it was hard to restrain them. In a July 1945 letter to Lee, the admiral expressed his opinion that the job of public information officers was to stimulate stories from civilian correspondents. "I cannot help but feel that if our officers were writing on the side that they could not honestly find it within their power to give out ideas which they themselves could use after 1800 [6 p.m.] at night."[118] Miller admitted that the Navy information officers who were professional writers could probably do the best job for the Navy, but he admonished Captain Lee to "by all means, discourage and prohibit columnist activities by our personnel."

A July issue of the PACFLEET Public Information Bulletin, a new guidance directive for information personnel in the Pacific distributed twice monthly, spelled out more precisely just what the rules were for "budding Navy authors." All manuscripts had to be censored by a fleet press censor; all material pertaining to professional matters, naval subjects, political or international subjects had to be forwarded through the chain of command to the Magazine and Book Section of the Office of Public

Information; authors should always state whether or not they are public information officers or Enlisted Navy Correspondents; and each article should include the statement that "the opinions or assertions contained herein are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large."[119]

Negro Enlisted Correspondents

Admiral Miller also faced public relations problems engendered by race. In May of 1945, he told Captain Lee that "four or five Negro enlisted correspondents have been ordered to you." The reason, he said, was "an effort to head off any adverse criticism from the colored press."[120] He noted that he was about to receive several inquiries about what work OPR had done for Negro personnel. He also referred to an earlier "move" by Secretary Forrestal to have a Negro officer assigned as a correspondent aboard each Negro-manned vessel and shore establishment. These officers were to send stories through the Negro Press Section of OWI to interested Negro newspapers. In actuality, this plan never saw fruition. Rather, the Negro ENC's whom Miller sent to the Pacific were by June 1945 forwarding stories on Black Navymen to the FMTNC, where a Negro officer especially assigned there distributed them to the Black media.[121]

The bid by Secretary Forrestal to publicize Negro personnel in the Navy was spurred by the launching in April 1944 of two ships which were manned entirely by Black crews, except for the officers and leading petty officers. The experiment in manning for the destroyer escort Mason and patrol craft PC-1264 broke with Navy policy and tradition and was an effort to "wipe out stereotypes about Negroes and the Navy."[122]

The push to get more material published on Negroes in the Navy continued. In July 1945, Miller wrote Lee that "the Secretary is very keen at this time to get out stories on Negroes."[123] He suggested articles on all-Black cargo handling companies. The admiral also said that the Navy was enjoying excellent relations with various "Negro Societies."

In August, Miller moved in another area to get more favorable press coverage on the Navy's treatment of Negroes. He sent a memorandum to Secretary Forrestal relating the efforts of a Negro officer attached to the Ninth Naval District who, at the admiral's direction, attended a conference of Negro publishers in New York. The reaction of the press, Miller said, was "very good."[124] He recommended sending the Negro officer, along with a white officer, to stations in the United States with a large percentage of Negro personnel, with a view toward stimulating the Navy's public information people to give the Blacks more coverage.

The PACFLEET Public Information Bulletin took this message to the field with an article on the "Receptive Field in Negro Newspapers," which told of the 200 newspapers and magazines anxious for stories about Negro servicemen.[125]

The Lifting of Security "Taboos"

Shortly after he assumed office, Admiral Miller began chipping away at the security restrictions which had plagued the Navy's public relations efforts for so long. In the aforementioned June 1, 1945, letter to Admiral Blandy, he wrote that in his opinion security had been overdone. "Even though extremely necessary in the early days of the war, I feel the time has come to change the policy. Our superiority is such today that we can afford to keep up with the times."

A week later, the new Director of Public Relations sent a series of memoranda to Vice Admiral Edwards requesting that publicity "stops" be lifted on several heretofore unmentionable subjects.[126] Among these were the Navy's night fighter aircraft and advanced base sectional drydocks. In the case of night fighter operations, Miller argued that a "well-controlled Public Relations campaign" was necessary in order to attract volunteers for this extremely hazardous duty. Referring to the drydocks, he pleaded that publicity

on their role in the Pacific would do much to "boost morale of construction personnel."

In the area of submarine publicity, Miller asked Admiral Edwards to lift the ban on war correspondents visiting or taking cruises aboard submarines, pointing out that any stories which might result would be subject to strict censorship anyway. While he was still in the Pacific, the then Captain Miller allowed Martin Sheridan of the Boston Globe to embark on a war patrol in the USS Bullhead. He later wrote to Captain Lee that when Sheridan's "I Was Aboard" story is released, "It may be that I will have to confess that I put him aboard" (see note 110).

Miller was aided in his efforts to publicize the silent service by submarine officers. In January 1945, Commander Eli Reich, USN, the newly named public relations officer for Commander Submarines Pacific, was dispatched to Washington to discuss the issue with Admiral Edwards. As a result of this trip, a certain amount of material was permitted to be released after censorship at Pearl Harbor. In May, at another Washington conference, the Pacific submarine commander himself, Vice Admiral Charles E. Lockwood, gained approval for submarine commands to release stories on their own--provided these stories remained within the still rigid security confines.[127]

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within the strict style security matters.[32]

By the middle of July 1945, these security confines were expanded to the point where considerably more details could be given out on submarine operations. The reasons for this further relaxation were included in a message from the Secretary of the Navy prepared for the PACFLEET Public Information Bulletin:

> The war has reached a stage where we can now relax some, but not all, of the security restrictions that have veiled the deeds of men in the silent arm of the Navy, the submarine service.
>
> From the earliest days of the war, they have carried on their missions with a minimum of public attention. Their own safety demanded this silence during the years when they were ranging vast stretches of the Pacific inside the Jap's lines. The reduction of Japanese control and power, which makes a relaxation of security rules possible, is due in no small measure to the submarines themselves.[128]

By this time, submarines returning from Sea of Japan patrols received complete photographic coverage at Pearl Harbor, and their commanding officers filled in details of each patrol at press conferences. Still, the correspondents' copy and all film had to be sent back to Washington for review. The material languished there until a message by Admiral Lockwood in early August secured its release. Ironically, the resulting stories and photographs were published on the same day the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, thus receiving "somewhat less" than front-page attention.

In late 1944, periscope cameras using color film were installed in submarines to obtain motion picture footage for a special film about the undersea craft to be

patterned after the highly successful "Fighting Lady." Lieutenant Commander Dwight Long, USNR, who had helped to produce "Lady," was in charge of the project. Unfortunately, although some excellent footage was obtained, the project got underway too late in the war to be completed.[129]

In his June memoranda to Admiral Edwards, Miller also addressed the problems encountered in the current policy of withholding any announcements that U.S. Navy ships had been sunk by Japanese suicide bombers. He noted that Naval personnel on leave had admitted such sinkings by the "kamikazes," and warned that "the Navy is getting into a position where it can not control censorship on this subject."

There were other reasons why Miller wanted to spring loose the kamikaze stories. For one, he was determined to give the American people an honest report on the realities of war. In his earlier letter to Admiral Blandy, he said, "I have had confirmation from many editors and publishers that the American public is anxious to know the tragic along with the victories. They have been molly-coddled long enough and I propose to inject some blood into the picture." In a June 4, 1945, letter to Captain Lee referring to the new film, "To the Shores of Iwo Jima," he declared, "Everyone has reacted favorably to the grimness and horror of this picture and I suggest that you begin the

release of still photographs showing some of the more unpleasant things of this war."[130] He then reiterated the views of the press in this regard: "There is a strong demand on the part of editors to show their readers what a tough time the boys are having out there. We are relaxing considerably . . . and have the backing of both Elmer Davis and Byron Price."

Another purpose in emphasizing damage to our ships was the acute shortage of workers in West Coast shipyards in the spring and summer of 1945. It was reasoned that an emotional appeal was necessary to recruit new workers and retain the present ones, who were sorely tempted to return to their homes in other parts of the country following the victory in Europe. In a July 1945 report on actions taken to support Navy public relations objectives, Admiral Miller mentioned the release of "damage stories" on the Bunker Hill and Saratoga and the exhibition in Los Angeles of the hospital ship Comfort and destroyer Hallaren, both of which were heavily damaged by the enemy. He noted that the two ships drew crowds estimated at 250,000.[131]

Earlier, wide publicity was given to the USS Franklin upon its return to New York. The carrier had sustained critical damage, yet survived. Admiral Miller told Captain Lee that the Franklin story "has proven to be one of the most beneficial that the Navy has ever had. The emphasis placed upon this was the heroism of American seamen and the

staunchness of our shipbuilding construction."[132] In the same letter he stated, "The reactions of the public to the release of such stories has been splendid. For example, the Comfort /story/ resulted in wide-spread news stories to the effect that the American public were fighting mad over this attack on a hospital ship."

Miller at this time was working on a formula whereby 15 per cent of each type of ship could be named when the ships returned to service after undergoing repair. This was a significant modification of the long-standing "Last Date Rule," in which the name of a ship could not be released in connection with operations subsequent to the last date the ship had been officially identified in a news announcement.[133] Miller emphasized to Captain Lee "that the time has come for the Japs to know how strong we are and that more and more ships are returning to do battle."

In line with this policy, the CINCPAC Public Information Office released more than 200 stories in June and early July describing ship and air unit action against the Japanese homeland. To garner even more news of this type, Admiral Nimitz sent a message (AlPac 64) directing all fleet commanders to nominate by name ships under their jurisdiction "whose accomplishments are considered newsworthy." On July 25, he requested commanding officers to furnish "at regular intervals . . . the unclassified war activities of their vessels" to mayors and governors of

cities and states after which the ships were named.[134] This practice was later extended to include officials of any community or region which had a special interest in a particular ship, such as the birthplace of a man for whom the ship was named. "Even though such letters are personal messages to an official they will often find their way into local newspapers, radio stations and other media," ships' public information officers were told.

Predictably, the relaxation of censorship rules had a palatable effect on Navy public and press relations. Miller elatedly told Lee on June 15 that there was a "widespread feeling among the press that the Navy is now telling its full story" (see note 132). A month later, in complimenting the CINCPAC public relations officer on a communique which included the names of various ships as well as their commanding officers, he said, "The entire story was well played and the press is delighted to see this continuing trend of liberalness and free thinking." He added that he had received no static from his superiors on the story, but rather that it had been "received with wholehearted approval back here." In a June 15 letter to Commander Murray Ward, USNR, chief press censor for CINCPAC, Miller had stressed that he had not experienced the "slightest difficulty in clearing material with COMINCH." Significantly, he added, "I have found very few of the taboos to be more than personal thinking. A certain fear

complex entered the situation in which no one would go to bat."

On June 25, Admiral Miller was able to write Captain Lee, "We have just succeeded in breaking the night-fighter material. We are now working on a break for radar." On July 14, he informed Rear Admiral Arthur W. Radford, commander of Carrier Division Six, that radar would "come out from under the lid" on August 15. "All the way around," he told Admiral Radford, "we have been able to liberalize releases, censorship, etc., and I believe another few months will find practically no taboos remaining." And again, he proudly expressed the opinion, "From the press point of view, the Navy has never enjoyed such a high peak of good will."[135]

Publishers Flock to the Pacific

In line with Secretary Forrestal's desire for greater coverage of the Navy in the Pacific, he wanted to have newspaper and magazine publishers visit the Pacific Theater. Earlier requests for such visits had been turned down by President Roosevelt, partially because the President felt that most publishers--as Republicans--might be hostile toward the administration. On January 2, 1945, Forrestal sent Roosevelt a memorandum listing items "I would like to talk with you about." It included this statement:

> When Arthur Sulzberger returned from the Pacific he expressed the view very strongly that the interest of the public in the Pacific war would be greatly enhanced by permitting publishers to make the same trip he did--he came back greatly impressed with the scale and scope of our operations. I wonder if you would be willing to review your original decision. I do not believe that we would have an avalanche of applicants.[136]

The secretary received no immediate encouragement from President Roosevelt, but he did not lose enthusiasm for the project. He discussed the issue with Admiral King, and on January 20, 1945, King wrote to Admiral Nimitz asking whether or not the visits by publishers might cause any inconvenience. The latter stressed Forrestal's reasons for allowing publishers to visit the Pacific. "The Secretary feels that it would be beneficial to give the publishers the opportunity to observe for themselves the tremendous problems involved in the Pacific war since they, rather than the correspondents, establish the policies which govern the editorials and handling of stories concerning the Pacific affairs."[137]

Despite Forrestal's anxiousness to have publishers visit the war zone, it was not until after Roosevelt's death that the project actually got underway. In a May 1945 letter to Captain Lee, Admiral Miller pointed out that the secretary was able to convince President Truman more easily than Roosevelt "that all publishers were not anti-administration." However, each visit had to be approved by the White House, and the decision was made to send the publishers out in teams, pairing a "Donkey" with an

"Elephant."

At this time, publishers Roy Howard and Henry Luce were already in the Pacific, and despite Miller's intimation in his letter that men such as Luce and Howard would be "difficult to control," the visits proved to be highly beneficial to the Navy's public relations program.

Miller wrote Lee again in June 1945 to reassure him that the time and effort being spent on these important guests was paying off. "Again, I say that in spite of the tremendous nuisance these people are, the net results are nothing short of magnificent in the good will being created for the Navy."

Part of the goodwill might have stemmed from the treatment these publishers received. In his January 1945 letter to Nimitz, Admiral King suggested that consideration be given to the appointment of an officer to act as "host" to these very important guests. He observed that General Eisenhower had a former hotel manager acting in this capacity in Europe. And Miller promised Lee some "snappy Commander" to act as "greeter" for the publishers if he felt it would help. In the summer of 1945, Commander Robert W. Wood, public relations officer for the Bureau of Naval Personnel, was assigned to the CINCPAC staff to act in this capacity.

But it was more than goodwill being created. Miller wrote Lee again in June to inform him that as a

result of Luce's visit a complete issue of Life would be devoted to the Pacific war. He told Lee that "the Secretary is exceedingly keen that we give the widest possible cooperation in order to make a success of this special issue, which, we trust, will make the Nation cognizant of your war." Part of the "cooperation," as it turned out, included asking Lee to allow Luce's photographers to see all of CINCPACFLT's photographs, "both unrestricted and confidential."[139]

Competition With the Army, Army Air Force and British

As soon as Secretary Forrestal persuaded President Truman to allow publishers to journey to the Pacific, an Army public relations officer phoned Admiral Miller's office "to ask if we minded if these people went on to witness Army activities."[139] The Navy offered no objection, and a procedure was worked out whereby joint invitations would be issued. However, on August 2, 1945, Miller wrote to Lieutenant Commander J. Paul Scheetz, USNR, Captain Lee's executive officer, that "the Army tried to pull a fast one on us in the cases of Patterson, O'Donel, and Jackson." He explained, "After our agreement to provide joint invitations to the publishers, they invited these people separately, and we had to follow along. They have agreed not to do this again."[140]

The incident was one of several during the summer

of 1945 which served to point up the spirited competition among the services for public recognition as the war drew to a close. It went beyond a case of professional jealousy --the merger issue was foremost in the minds of all the military leaders, and the service which attracted the most attention stood the best chance of getting money and support in the postwar years.

Chiefly, the Navy was concerned over two issues. It was afraid that General MacArthur would get the "lion's share" of credit for winning the Pacific war; and it was apprehensive that naval aviation would be absorbed into General "Hap" Arnold's Army Air Force after the war. These fears were reflected in internal correspondence within the Navy in the summer of 1945 and led to almost frantic suggestions on the part of some naval leaders to mount a last-minute public relations offensive.

On June 27, Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, the vice chief of naval operations, wrote to Admiral King: "I have learned from a variety of sources that there is apparently a very definite whispering campaign going on in Washington and in the Pacific" to the effect that naval aviation is doing a "poor job" and furthermore is sustaining unnecessarily heavy losses.[141] Admiral Horne cautioned that "unless the public is given specific information as to what Naval Aviation has done and will continue to do in the Pacific, this anti Navy campaign may have unfortunate

results." He suggested that "every speech made by anyone connected with the Navy should hereafter include some mention of Naval Aviation and its importance to the Pacific war."

A month later, Admiral Edwards forwarded Horne's memorandum to Admiral Nimitz along with concrete proposals to combat "this whispering campaign."[142] He recommended that future CINCPAC communiques "repeatedly stress . . . the strategical and tactical importance of Naval Aviation." He also urged the prompt release, "by names," of the individual achievements of ships, carrier groups and men, "as compatible with security considerations." He added, "Further improvement of transmission facilities for news material may be required for this, but it is a requisite for press space during the indicated highly competitive conditions."

Admiral Edwards' remark about transmission facilities was especially pertinent at this time. Only two days before his memorandum to Nimitz, Lyle C. Wilson, representing the United Press in Washington, bitterly complained to Admiral Miller that print media material was being unnecessarily delayed in the Pacific. "The Navy's insistance [sic] on barring newspaper copy from the instantaneous facilities of the voicecast," said Wilson, "is in direct contrast to our experience with the Army . . . ."[143]

Miller moved to correct this situation in subsequent

correspondence with Captain Lee. He also addressed the B29 versus naval aviation controversy in an August 2 letter to the captain (see note 141):

> One of the suggestions made to combat the B29 campaign is to try to get all your Correspondents to continually pound the word "Navy." In other words, a Navy task force. We note that B29 copy is now beginning to talk about air fleets as well as air task forces. It would not be well to let the public become confused on this matter, because should they do so, the first thing we know they will consider that B29's are doing the splendid job currently being done by Halsey. In other words, basically, it is sound to use the word "Navy" before reference to aircraft, task forces, etc. These are small points, but could have tremendous bearing upon the public's understanding of the problems.

Despite his parochial concern, Miller had high respect for the public relations activities of the Army Air Force. He wrote to a friend on August 4, "I attended the Air Forces Day dinner in Washington the other night, and there is no doubt as to the impressiveness of their campaign."[144] Earlier, he discussed with Captain Lee the Army Air Force's plan to establish a group of hand-picked correspondents who would cover the Air Force only. The justification for this group--"which would eat, sleep and travel only with the Air Force"--was that a general writer would be unable to understand the complexities of air power. The Army Air Force asked Miller to accredit these correspondents solely to the B29s. The admiral turned them down, but granted them normal accreditation with the proviso that they could request permission to enter whatever area they needed. Underscoring the intense rivalry

that existed, he added: "Obviously, there is no way we can stop such a deal. Our basic answer remains that of having Josh McCain's outfit go up and sock the hell out of Japan."[145]

Admiral McCain's carrier strike force and other carrier task groups did conduct saturation raids on the Japanese mainland following the seizure of Okinawa. In order to expedite coverage of one of these Navy bombing attacks, a plan was formulated whereby Lieutenant Commander George McGhee, who subsequently became Assistant Secretary of State, "flying on a B-29 weather mission over Tokyo, radioed back a code word confirming the fact that U.S. planes were over Tokyo."[146] This message enabled public relations personnel at Guam to release advance press copy on the raid by Navy carrier aircraft.

The matter of accreditation for war correspondents, which plagued both the Army and Navy at Okinawa, was satisfactorily settled in July 1945 following a series of meetings between Admiral Miller and Major General Alexander D. Surles, Army chief of public relations, along with representatives from the Army Air Force. A system was set up whereby correspondents in the Pacific would be jointly accredited to both the Army and the Navy. The agreement was so worded that the Navy would retain control of the local situation at Pearl Harbor and Guam.

Of course, Miller realized that any control the

Navy retained over press activities in the Pacific was dependent on the joint-command nature of Pacific operations. He noted that there was a "definite trend in the press in the East to call for a single commander for the basic attack on Japan. Should this occur, unquestionably all Public Information activities will stem from that commander, whoever he may be."[147]

Obviously, it would be General MacArthur. There was very little the Navy could do to offset the massive and highly successful public relations campaign carried on in the general's behalf throughout the war. This campaign was not just a figment of the Navy's imagination. On July 30, 1945, Alexander F. (Casey) Jones, managing editor of the Washington Post, complained to General Surles:

> It is obvious from the release from Guam in this morning's paper, . . . that from this point on everything that transpires in the Pacific, from the Army standpoint, is going to be publicized as the exclusive exploit of General Douglas MacArthur. . . . This situation has been true all through the South Pacific campaign and one always has to search to find that there was any other individual connected with the campaign. . . .
>
> The term "Eisenhower's Generals," or "Eisenhower's fliers" never appeared in the public print to my knowledge. Every leader got full credit. And recently Admiral Nimitz not only announced the names of the ships taking part in the attack on Japan, but also all of the Admirals. The Washington Post yields to no one in admiration of the military genius of General MacArthur. But we do vigorously protest the policy of his public relations officers in making it their job to publicize no one except the Commander in Chief and to give the impression that this is a private war.[148]

On August 4, when the assault on the Japanese home islands was still being planned, Admiral Miller expressed to a friend his intention to go to the Pacific to take personal charge of Navy public relations there (see note 144). Also, to better accommodate war correspondents during the invasion of Japan, the Navy in the summer of 1945 was building three "press ships," whose sole purpose would be to provide transportation and communications for media representatives covering the sea service.[149]

The ships were to be patterned after the Army's Apache, a communications vessel used at Okinawa to transmit press and radio copy, and a later Army "press ship deluxe," the Spindle Kyn. The latter was a Victory ship taken over by the Army early in 1945 and remodeled to serve as General MacArthur's "press flagship" during the final assault on Japan. According to Captain Lee, it was equipped with:

> A large auditorium complete with 125 typewriters at press desks.
> Two 5,000 Watt transmitters and several other transmitters.
> A battery of recording machines, and portable wire recorders.
> A sound motion picture studio.
> Two radio broadcasting studios.
> Administrative offices.
> Living accommodations for a large number of the press.[150]

The Navy also had problems in the Pacific in regard to accreditation of correspondents to the British, and eventually formal arrangements were made to station British correspondents with American forces there. Official policy

stated that: "All facilities for the dispatch and transmission of press material of all descriptions, . . . which are available to U.S. correspondents will be equally available to all British correspondents."[151] The agreement was that British correspondents would be allowed on American ships and installations, and American correspondents on British ships. It was made clear, however, that "the number of British and American War Correspondents will be proportional to the forces of each nation which are operating in the Pacific Ocean Areas."

The reasons behind this statement appear in a June 1945 letter from Admiral Miller to Captain Lee. He said that he "foresaw the possibility that when V-E Day came along we would find a sudden influx of British into the Pacific."[152] This was more than a matter of logistical concern. Miller admitted, "Frankly, I have no desire to have the British correspondents convey to the world press the thought that they have won the Pacific war."

Admiral Miller also was afraid that the British would try to sneak extra correspondents into the Pacific under the guise of being something they were not. "You will find," he wrote, "a distinct tendency for them to claim that the Australians, although British, are not English." He suggested to Captain Lee that he stand firm, and that all "Colonials" remain under the British quota. If not, he said, there would soon be a surplus of British

correspondents and "over at BOQS you might as well fly a British Standard."

A Race to the Wire

The Navy public relations "ship" was moving at flank speed in the summer of 1945 toward its dual "destinations" of increasing public awareness of the Navy's role in the Pacific war and gaining public support for a strong postwar Navy.

In the United States, the Office of Public Information was involved in a continuous stream of activities. In June, it arranged for an "air armada of naval planes" to tour smaller communities in the East and Midwest in support of the Seventh War Loan Drive. It sent the chaplain of the USS Franklin on a special speaking tour and provided a series of speakers for the "Fighting Lady" model on display in Rockefeller Center in New York. The captured German submarine, the U-505, was exhibited in ports along the Eastern Seaboard; and cooperation was extended to Saturday Evening Post for a story in its August issue on the carrier Enterprise, which was predicted to be "the best story on Naval Aviation ever carried in a magazine of that type."

On July 10, the "Navy Hour," a new radio program produced by OPI was aired for the first time on NBC. Plans also were made to produce a separate radio show on naval aviation and to salute the 32nd Anniversary of naval

aviation on August 30. Also in July, extensive publicity was given to the Fifth Anniversary of the Navy's shipbuilding program. In late July, another conference of naval district, fleet, field and air training command public information officers was held, this time in Chicago.[153]

In the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz on June 3 issued a directive designed to "strengthen the Public Relations organization in the Pacific Fleet."[154] Its main provisions were the attachment of full-time public relations officers to the "important staffs and commands" of the fleet and a requirement for commanding officers of all fleet units to assign collateral duty public relations officers. Concurrent with the letter was a request to OPI for ninety additional public relations officers for full-time duty in the Pacific. It also was announced that "periodic bulletins" containing guidance in information matters for these personnel would be furnished. As we have seen, the first edition of the semi-monthly PACFLEET Public Information Bulletin was published on July 1. Later in the summer, an Enlisted Correspondents Bulletin also was prepared and sent out to all ENCs; and a "Ship's Editorial Association Clipper," a news service for shipboard newspapers adaptable to both mimeograph and offset reproduction, was planned by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.[155]

The all-out emphasis on gaining publicity in the Pacific produced an abundance of enthusiasm on the part of individual public information officers. For instance, the PIO for Commander Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, sent an open letter "To War Correspondents who want IDEAS!" In it he advertised:

> You want to know <u>where to find</u> feature stories? . . . Public Relations of the Pacific Fleet Service has the answer to that $64 question.
>
> . . . Service Force is jam-packed with stories . . . news features . . . magazine pieces . . . radio copy . . . everything from adventure yarns to logistics and science.
>
> . . . And so this bulletin has been prepared to put you on the trail of this story Gold Mine (and we mean <u>Gold Mine</u>!).[156]

To the invitation, this huckstering PIO attached a list of forty story ideas ranging from "The Filling Station Goes to Sea" to "The Grocery Store Gets Its Feet Wet."

To facilitate transmission of news copy, a multiplex radio teletype system had been set up at CINCPAC public relations office on Guam, providing four direct teletype channels to San Francisco. The system began operating in March 1945, and by the end of June, 2,080,769 words of press copy had been transmitted to the mainland. Broadcasts also were originated from Guam through the radio station of the public relations office, "KUSQ." It was estimated that an average of eighty to ninety programs per week were aired from this station during the summer of 1945 by all four of the national radio networks. In one of his

programs, Tim Leimert of CBS paid special tribute to the broadcasting facilities in the Pacific:

> Today listeners in the United States can hear direct broadcasts from practically any island we have taken and from ships of the fleet. . . . no matter where they are. In the last year facilities have expanded so that we can now give . . . an eyewitness picture of the news as it is happening.[157]

The broadcasts from ships at sea were especially impressive to the media and the listeners back home. Admiral Miller wrote to Captain Lee on July 12, "Your recent broadcast from the Iowa during the strike was a knock-out and all press people back here are talking about it in glowing terms." In another letter to Lee on August 13, he exclaimed, "Each morning at eight, I listen to the broadcast from the third fleet and it comes in like a power house!"[158] On July 17, 1945, "a milestone in war-reporting was passed . . . , when radio commentators broadcast a naval bombardment of Kamaishi while it was actually in progress."[159]

The Navy's combat photographers received plaudits in the summer of 1945, too. Speaking of their work in the production of the motion picture, "The Fleet That Came to Stay," the New York Times "Overseas Weekly" said:

> . . . the Navy has come through with one of the most spectacular films of the Pacific war. This is a blow-by-blow account of the savage attacks made by the Japanese Kamikaze . . . fliers against the fleet units that backed up the Army-Marine assault /on Okinawa/. The 103 cameramen who photographed the action during the three-month campaign displayed cool courage and resourcefulness under fire. This is only a twenty-minute film, but it packs a punch one does not

soon forget.[160]

On August 28, Admiral Miller saluted Captain Lee on the accomplishments of his information personnel:

> The coverage your boys have been providing in radio, press, still and motion pictures is simply magnificent. The enclosed sheet from the New York Times this morning will give you some idea what page three is doing. Page four covers the ENTERPRISE and Page one filled out the current activities. The pictures are excellent as you will note from the small piece on page three. You boys are to be congratulated on the grand job you are doing.[161]

Surrender in Tokyo Bay Aboard USS Missouri

The public relations "juggernaut" that the Navy almost desperately had assembled in the Pacific to counteract unification schemes ground to a halt on September 2, 1945, when the Japanese formally surrendered. The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the end of the war and the diminishing of the public relations effort. The extensive worldwide coverage given to the surrender ceremony aboard the battleship Missouri, however, was symbolic evidence of the tremendous strides made in public relations planning and activities by the Navy since the dark days following Pearl Harbor.

The fact that the Missouri was used for the surrender ceremony in itself was a public relations "coup" instigated by Secretary Forrestal. In his memoirs, James F. Byrnes recorded how the Navy secretary "took advantage of the fact that Truman came from Missouri" to involve the battleship in the ceremony:

> When Secretary Forrestal is really interested in a course of action, he doesn't sleep and he doesn't let others sleep. That night the telephone awakened me. It was Secretary Forrestal suggesting that the surrender ceremonies take place on board the battleship Missouri. I was sufficiently awake to recognize what the Army would call a "Navy trick." Had he said simply "a battleship," it would have remained a debatable question, but when he mentioned the Missouri, I knew the case was closed. The President, upon receiving the suggestion, of course thought it an excellent idea.[162]

Forrestal also was able to convince Byrnes, then Secretary of State, that Admiral Nimitz should participate in the surrender ceremony, since the Navy had played such a prominent role in winning the Pacific war. The arrangement was made to have General MacArthur sign for the victorious Allies as a whole, while Nimitz signed the surrender document for the United States.

To provide coverage of the surrender ceremony, the attack transport Rocamlin was assigned exclusively for public information purposes and accompanied the Missouri into Tokyo Bay. More than 300 war correspondents were embarked in the Missouri itself.[163]

Admiral Miller wrote to Captain Lee on September 11, "The Navy really swept the front pages with photos, press stories, etc., of the ceremonies aboard the Missouri."[164] The blackout at Pearl Harbor indeed had been illuminated by the spotlight on Tokyo Bay.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1]Little Rock Arkansas Democrat, April 28, 1944. A copy of the article is contained in Frank Knox Papers, Manuscript Section, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 4. Hereafter cited as "Knox Papers."

[2]Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal and the Navy (New York, 1962), 11. Hereafter cited as Albion and Connery, Forrestal. See also, pp. 92-93 and 125-27 of Forrestal and the Navy, and Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York, 1952), 629-631.

[3]Radm. Robert W. Berry, USN (Ret.), telephone interview, March 17, 1970.

[4]"Out of the Darkness," Time, May 1, 1944, p. 61.

[5]Royce Powell, "James Forrestal: Expediter Extraordinary," Scrapbook, 4:11 (July 1944).

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ltr., James Forrestal to Carl Vinson, August 30, 1944, quoted in Albion and Connery, Forrestal, 22.

[8]Albion and Connery, Forrestal, 27.

[9]"Straight Talk," San Francisco Chronicle, July 6, 1944, quoted in "Media Comment on the Navy, July 3-8, 1944," a report issued by the Analysis Section of OFR, contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, "Historical Records of the Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, Box 157, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "Philibert Collection."

[10]RAdm. E. M. Eller, USN (Ret.), personal interview, Washington, D.C., April 10, 1969.

[11]Ltr., James Forrestal to Arthur Krock, October 17, 1945, quoted in Albion and Connery, Forrestal, 26.

[12]RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), "Typewriters and the Navy," Shipmate (October 1965), 11. Hereafter cited as Miller, "Typewriters."

[13]Albion and Connery, Forrestal, 258-260. See also, Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), 220. Hereafter cited as Davis, Lobby.

[14]Ltr., James Forrestal to Palmer Hoyt, September 2, 1944, contained in personal papers of James V. Forrestal, National Archives, Washington, D.C., file 86-1-26. Hereafter cited as "Forrestal Papers."

[15]Davis, Lobby, 271.

[16]Ibid., 268.

[17]Ibid., 270. The full text of Forrestal's speech to the Annapolis graduating class on June 6, 1945, is reproduced in the Congressional Record for June 11, 1945, 79th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 5,843-44.

[18]Ibid., 268-69.

[19]RAdm. Julius A. Furer, USN (Ret.), Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, 1959), 88-93.

[20]Ltr., Adm. Harold C. Stark, USN, to Frank Knox, March 29, 1944, Knox Papers, Box 4.

[21]Capt. Jay B. Smith, USNR, personal interview, Indianapolis, Ind., May 10, 1970.

[22]Cmdr. Harold Bradley Say, USNR, "Censorship and Security," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 79:138-39 (February 1943).

[23]Capt. Harold Bradley Say, USNR (Ret.), personal interview, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1968. Hereafter cited as "Say Interview."

[24]VAdm. E. P. Forestel, USN (Ret.), Admiral Raymond A. Spruance: A Study in Command (Washington, 1966), 125. Hereafter cited as Forestel, Spruance.

[25]Columbia (S.C.) Record, July 4, 1944, quoted in "Media Comment on the Navy, July 3-8, 1944" (see n. 9).

[26]Memo., Eugene S. Duffield to Adm. C. H. McMorris, USN, October 19, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[27]Forestel, Spruance, p. xiii.

[28]Ibid., 62.

[29]Ibid., 60.

[30]Memo., Emmett Crozier to Artemis L. Gates, May 26, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[31]Memo., James Forrestal to RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, June 15, 1944, ibid.

[32]T. I. Hartz, personal interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1968.

[33]Memo., Director of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy, OOR (56189), August 24, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[34]Gay Interview.

[35]Memo., Eugene S. Duffield to Secretary of the Navy, August 25, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10. Hereafter cited as "Duffield Memorandum."

[36]Memo., Capt. Leland P. Lovette, USN, to RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, July 7, 1944, contained in personal file of RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), entitled "Public Relations Policies and Directives." Hereafter cited as "Miller File--PR Policies."

[37]Ltr., James Forrestal to Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, October 10, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[38]Naval Message, SECNAV to CINCPAC (192254 GCT), October 19, 1944, ibid.

[39]Ltr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, to Commander Third Fleet, August 26, 1944 (Serial 04353), Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[40]Ltr., James Forrestal to Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, August 30, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[41]Ltr., James Forrestal to Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, September 6, 1944, ibid.

[42]PACIFIC FLEET LTR 48L-44, September 10, 1944 (Serial 7318), ibid.

[43]Ltr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to multiple addressees, September 30, 1944 (Serial 7379), ibid.

[44]Duffield Memorandum.

[45]U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, "United States Naval Administration in World War II," unpublished narrative history of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC and CINCPOA), 397-98. Hereafter cited as "Administrative Histories," followed by pertinent command title. See also, "Directory of Public Relations Officers: District, Air Training Command and Fleet Units," September 1, 1944, pp. 27-28, Philibert Collection, Box 157, and U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, "History of Navy Public Information," undated, p. 1.

[46]Ltrs., Capt. Harold B. Miller, USN, to RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, October 31 and November 8, 1944, Miller File--PR Policies.

[47]Administrative Histories, CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 396.

[48]Ltr., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to Capt. Harold B. Miller, USN, OOR-B1 (62053), November 15, 1944, Miller File--PR Policies.

[49]Elmer Davis, "Report to the President," House Subcommittee on Government Operations, Hearings, Government Information Plans and Policies, Part 2, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963), 228, quoted in Lamar Mackay, "Domestic Operations of the Office of War Information in World War II," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966, p. 408.

[50]Memo., Cmdr. Richard M. Paget, USN, to Eugene S. Duffield, September 7, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[51]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to Chiefs of Bureaus, Boards and Offices, Navy Department, October 16, 1944, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[52]Memo., James Forrestal to RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, December 2, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[53]The preceding information on the new structure of OPR in December 1944 was obtained from two sources: a memo., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, OOR-B1 (64704), December 9, 1944, ibid., and an "Organization Plan--Office of Public Relations," December 20, 1944, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[54]RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), personal interview, New York, N. Y., June 18, 1968. Hereafter cited as "Miller Interview."

[55]U.S. Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, Naval Districts Section, Public Relations Bulletin, No. 26, January 1, 1945, p. 1. Hereafter cited as PR Bulletin.

[56]Memo., Cmdr. Richard M. Paget, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, December 5, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[57]The above figures were compiled from various OPR telephone lists and Navy public relations personnel directories contained in file "Directories," Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[58]Ltrs., Director of Public Relations to Chief of Naval Personnel, OOR-B (68297) and OOR-B (68341), both dated January 23, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[59]Memo., James Forrestal to RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, March 17, 1945, ibid.

[60]Various internal memoranda of the Office of Public Relations, February 24 to April 4, 1945, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[61]Ltrs., Secretary of the Navy (Director of Public Relations) to multiple addressees, OOR-2 (48127) of May 11, 1944, and OOR-3 (50618) of June 13, 1944, ibid.

[62]U.S. Navy Department, Incentive Division, "The Field Exchange," August 7, 1944, p. 1, ibid.

[63]PR Bulletin, No. 22, September 1, 1944, p. 5.

[64]Capt. Edward Steichen, USNR, Power in the Pacific (New York, 1945), p. 5.

[65]Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States (Detroit, 1962), 183.

[66]PR Bulletin, No. 26, January 1, 1945, p. 1.

[67]Memo., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, OOR-B1 (65893), December 21, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[68]Memo., James Forrestal to RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, December 29, 1944, ibid.

[69]Memo., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to All Navy Public Relations Officers, OOR-B1 (67232), January 16, 1945, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[70]Memo., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to All Navy Public Relations Officers, OOR-D (71797), March 6, 1945, ibid.

[71]Memoranda, Director of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy, OOR-D (75549) of April 23, 1945, and OOR-D (78339) of May 23, 1945, and Director of Public Information to Eugene S. Duffield, OOR-D (81675) of June 21, 1945, all contained in Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[72]Memo., Capt. G. W. Campbell, USN, to VAdm. R. S. Edwards, USN, OOR-A (59674), undated, Philibert Collection, Box 157. A copy of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Public Relations Manual also is contained in Box 157.

[73]Memo., Eugene S. Duffield to Secretary of the Navy, December 28, 1944, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[74]Ltr., Lieutenant Joseph Belden, USNR, to Dr. Hadley Cantril, OOR-D1 (67135), January 6, 1945, U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 1, Box 9, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "OI Administrative Files."

[75]U.S. Navy Department, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, PACFLEET Public Information Bulletin, No. 3, August 1, 1945, p. 6. Hereafter cited as PACFLEET Bulletin. Copies of these semi-monthly newsletters for public information personnel in the Pacific, which were initiated on July 1, 1945, and continued for several months following the war, are contained in Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[76]"Public Opinion on a Post-War Navy," an undated Naval Districts Bulletin issued by the Analysis Section of OPR, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[77]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to Commandant Ninth Naval District, A3-1/ND9, March 29, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 95-2-24.

[78]Memo., Director of Public Information to Secretary of the Navy, OOR (93114), November 8, 1945, ibid.

[79]Miller, "Typewriters," 12.

[80]William Brinkley, Don't Go Near the Water (New York, 1956), 92.

[81]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to RAdm. W. H. P. Blandy, USN, OOR (79791), June 1, 1945, contained in personal file of RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), entitled "Capt. Lee & Pacific." Hereafter cited as "Miller File--Pacific."

[82]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 3, August 1, 1945, p. 3.

[83]Contained in memo., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, April 28, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 95-2-24.

[84]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 4, August 15, 1945, p. 3.

[85]Ibid., No. 5, September 1, 1945, pp. 4-5, and No. 6, September 15, 1945, p. 7.

[86]Memo., Director of Public Information to Eugene S. Duffield, OOR-D (81675), June 21, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10. See also, PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 3, August 1, 1945, p. 9.

[87]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 4, August 15, 1945, p. 3, and U.S. Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Journalist 1 & C (Washington, 1961), 6.

[88]Administrative Histories, CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 398.

[89]Miller, "Typewriters," 11-12.

[90]Ibid., 12.

[91]Administrative Histories, CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 399.

[92]"A Tight Lip Loosens," Time, March 5, 1945, p. 63.

[93]Ltr., James Forrestal to FAdm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, January 14, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 95-2-30.

[94]Forrestal, Ephemera, 170.

[95]Robert Lindsay, This High Name (Madison, Wis., 1956), 64.

[96]Miller Interview.

[97]Miller, "Typewriters," 13.

[98]Ibid.

[99]Ltr., John A. Hooley to James Forrestal, April 14, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 95-2-38.

[100]Say, "Censorship and Security," 140 (see n. 22).

[101]Ltr., James Forrestal to James F. Byrnes, January 29, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 95-2-31.

[102]Ernest K. Lindley, "MacArthur and the Navy," Newsweek, March 5, 1945, p. 44.

[103]Ltr., James Forrestal to FAdm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, March 19, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 95-2-38.

[104]These Forrestal letters to members of the press and broadcasting industry are contained in ibid., files 95-2-36 and 95-2-38.

[105]Albion and Connery, Forrestal, 261.

[106]Davis, Lobby, 185-86.

[107]Ltr., James Forrestal to RAdm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, January 31, 1945, Forrestal Papers, file 95-2-30.

[108]Miller Interview.

[109]Washington Evening Star, June 3, 1945, p. A-13.

[110]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (79809), June 4, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[111]Ltr., RAdm. Robert B. Carney, USN, to RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, June 27, 1945, OI Administrative Files, Job Order 76-A-2140, Item 2, Box 9.

[112]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Lt. Cmdr. Nate L. Crabtree, USNR, OOR (81979), June 26, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[113]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (82286), June 26, 1945, ibid.

[114]Naval Message, Secretary of the Navy to All Navy Commands (ALNAV 138), June 18, 1945, U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, Operational Archives Branch, Classified Files of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Files of the General Board, Series 441. Hereafter cited as "Series 441."

[115]"Navy Public Relations Becomes Office of Public Information," Navy Department news release, June 19, 1945, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[116]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (81426), June 16, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[117]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 4, August 15, 1945, p. 7.

[118]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (83230), July 5, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[119]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 2, July 15, 1945, p. 4.

[120]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (70350), May 14, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[121]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (81249), June 14, 1945, ibid. See also, ltr., Director of Public Relations to multiple addressees, OOR-D-2 (71884), March 7, 1945, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[122]"All-Black Crews Recalled in Book," Navy Times, September 9, 1970, p. 31. The book referred to is Eric Purdon's Black Company: The Story of a Naval Experiment.

[123]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (84726), July 21, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[124]Memo., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Secretary of the Navy, OOR (85527), August 6, 1945, ibid.

[125]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 3, August 1, 1945, p. 4.

[126]Four of these memoranda, OOR (80440, 80441, 80446 and 80447), all dated June 7, 1945, are contained in Miller File--Pacific.

[127]Administrative Histories, Submarine Commands, Vol. I, 352-53.

[128]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 2, July 15, 1945, p. 2.

[129]Administrative Histories, Submarine Commands, Vol. I, 354-57. See also, Miller, "Typewriters," 12.

[130]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (80134), June 4, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[131]Memo., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Eugene S. Duffield, July 20, 1945 (Serial 0458100R), Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[132]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (81254), June 15, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[133]Memo., RAdm. A. Stanton Merrill, USN, to VAdm. R. S. Edwards, USN, December 4, 1944, Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[134]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 3, August 1, 1945, p. 5, and No. 5, September 1, 1945, p. "0". The directive to furnish data on ships to mayors and governors was contained in CINCPAC Letter A7-1, Serial 6012, of July 25, 1945.

[135]The above information and quotations are from the following letters from RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN: to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (83653), July 11, 1945, and OOR (81976), June 26, 1945; to Cmdr. Murray Ward, USNR, OOR (81420), June 15, 1945; and to RAdm. Arthur W. Radford, USN, OOR (84060), July 14, 1945--all contained in Miller File--Pacific.

[136]Albion and Connery, Forrestal, 135.

[137]Ltr., FAdm. Ernest J. King, USN, to FAdm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, January 20, 1945, Series 441.

[138]The following letters from RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, were consulted and quoted in the above section: to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (79324), May 29, 1945, OOR (80451), June 13, 1945, OOR (81438), June 16, 1945, and OOR (82410) of June 26, 1945; and to Lt. Cmdr. J. Paul Schaetz, USNR, OOR (83908) of July 12, 1945--all contained in Miller File--Pacific.

[139]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (79324), May 29, 1945, ibid.

[140]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Lt. Cmdr. J. Paul Scheetz, USNR, August 2, 1945, ibid.

[141]Memo., VAdm. F. J. Horne, USN, to FAdm. Ernest J. King, USN, June 27, 1945. This memorandum was one of four enclosed in a letter from RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, August 2, 1945, ibid.

[142]Memo., Adm. R. S. Edwards, USN, to FAdm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, July 30, 1945 (Serial 83540000R), ibid.

[143]Ltr., Lyle C. Wilson to RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, July 28, 1945, ibid.

[144]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Frank W. Mead, August 4, 1945 (Serial 8552600R), ibid.

[145]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (83653), July 11, 1945, ibid.

[146]Miller, "Typewriters," 13.

[147]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (86400), August 6, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[148]Ltr., Alexander F. Jones to Maj. Gen. Alexander D. Surles, USA, July 30, 1945. A copy of this letter was enclosed in a letter from RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, August 2, 1945, ibid.

[149]Miller Interview. The three press ships also were discussed in several letters contained in Miller File --Pacific.

[150]Ltr., Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, to RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, December 12, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[151]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (80133), June 4, 1945, ibid.

[152]Ibid.

[153]Memoranda, RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Eugene S. Duffield, July 20, 1945 (Serial 84588100R) and August 22, 1945 (Serial 8612300R), both contained in Forrestal Papers, file 70-1-10.

[154]PACIFIC FLEET LETTER 28-45, June 3, 1945 (Serial 28L-45). OI Administrative Files, Job Order 63-A-2502, Item 3, Box 72.

[155]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Lt. Cmdr. J. Paul Scheetz, USNR, August 6, 1945 (Serial 8552900R), Miller File--Pacific. See also, PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 2, July 15, 1945, p. 4.

[156]A copy of this undated letter is contained in Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[157]PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 5, September 1, 1945, p. 6. The information on the radio teletype channels at Guam was obtained from PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 4, August 15, 1945, p. 6.

[158]Ltrs., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (03919) of July 12, 1945, and OOR (Serial 8698700R) of August 13, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

[159]Administrative Histories, CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 400.

[160]New York Times "Overseas Weekly," July 29, 1945, quoted in PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 5, September 1, 1945, p. 7.

[161]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, August 28, 1945 (Serial 8796200R), Miller File--Pacific.

[162]James F. Byrnes, quoted in Albion and Connery, Forrestal, 180.

[163]Administrative Histories, CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 400.

[164]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (Serial 8112200R), September 11, 1945, Miller File--Pacific.

CHAPTER VI

IN PERSPECTIVE

> "Sailors," said the exec, when the officers were settled /at a hastily called conference/, "something called nuclear fission . . . has just rammed the Navy below the belt. . . . There'll be press conferences by the admirals to place this thing in its proper perspective. Meantime let's don't let this incident throw us. Don't . . . let us lose the public relations war after all our months and years of work."[1]

This imaginary scene from Don't Go Near the Water was not so farfetched. When the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, one could almost sense a kind of disappointment among the Navy's public information leaders that their "great" story had come to an end. Admiral Miller conveyed this feeling almost as succinctly as author William Brinkley when he wrote a Pacific Fleet information officer in October 1945: "The folding up of the Japs suddenly raised cain with all of our plans. . . . It is pretty tough going with the . . . cessation of headlines . . . ."[2] Earlier, he had written to Captain Lee:

> Now, with the fleet activities ceasing, we are hard put . . . to do much about the press. We are going to town on "How-it-can-be-told-stories" as well as demobilization plans and conversion to peacetime activities. For the most part, these are not particularly exciting and all hands are pushing us to get the Navy back on the front pages.[3]

CHAPTER VI

In Retrospective

The rash of "now it can be told" episodes, made possible by an almost total lifting of the security lid at war's end, were an attempt to capitalize on residual public interest in individual war exploits. However, Miller was concerned that such public attention would soon wane. He urged Captain Lee to expedite the telling of these deeds, cautioning: "Unless we get the Navy's story out at once, it will be a dead duck."[4]

The War's Aftermath

Thus, there was a conscious effort in OPI and the Pacific Fleet in the fall of 1945 to enhance public recognition of the sea service's role in the conflict. Writers were assigned to peruse heretofore highly classified battle reports "to extract the magnificent tales that abound," according to Admiral Miller. Collateral-duty public information officers and ENCs were encouraged to dig out "individual stories which give a true picture of the important part the Navy has played in winning the war."[5] Special themes were to be stressed--such as the destruction of the Japanese Navy, blockading, seizure of stepping-stone bases, maintaining supply lines and the bombardment of the enemy's homeland by carrier-based aircraft.[6]

The individual accomplishment stories, of course, were targeted for hometown distribution. Shortly after V-J Day, the Evaluation Section in OPI conducted a survey

of newspapers and radio stations to determine whether or not such material was still desired. The results were overwhelmingly in favor of continuing the program.[7]

Emphasis also was placed on publicizing the Navy's part in the occupation of Japan and Japanese-held territory and the return of Navy personnel to civilian life. Navy Demobilization Pictorial Project Teams, consisting of one JOC and one photographer, were assigned to separation centers to cover discharges; and a special office was set up at Pearl Harbor to produce "quickie" stories on servicemen being brought back to the States in the 316-ship "Magic Carpet" fleet.[8] The latter proved to be an ingenious system for gaining mention of Navy ships in material about personnel from all the armed forces of obvious and immediate interest to the public.

In October 1945, huge welcome-home ceremonies were staged for Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, and forty-eight Pacific Fleet ships visited East Coast ports during the "biggest ever" Navy Day celebration. From a press relations standpoint, however, the transit of the ships through the Panama Canal was marred when seventy correspondents, sent down to cruise north with the fleet, "apparently . . . found a very cold reception down there in the District."[9] According to Admiral Miller, the poor treatment of the media representatives was a throwback to the "fear complex of the individual commanding officer" that was so prevalent

before and during the early part of the war. He attributed its reawakening to the postwar cancellation of censorship regulations, which returned the responsibility for security to the local commanders.

At war's end, Congress renewed its debate on a unified defense department, and the top military leaders of both the Army and Navy took turns at testifying. To help prepare the Navy's case, Secretary Forrestal resurrected the "ad hoc" committee he had created in the spring of 1944, naming Vice Admiral Arthur Radford as its new head.[10] Inevitably, OPI also became involved, and in December 1945 Miller wrote to Captain Lee "that everything is being dropped to take care of the merger angle."[11] Despite the all-out effort, the Navy's information chief was pessimistic over the sea service's chances of winning the reorganization battle. His lack of confidence stemmed from his belief "that we were about two years too late, to say nothing of our old tradition of silent service."[12]

Miller also was frustrated over the rapid loss of experienced information personnel through demobilization. When the war ended, there were some 750 officer specialists alone serving full-time in this field throughout the Navy.[13] Most of them were naval reservists who were anxious to resume their civilian pursuits. The admiral estimated that 50 per cent of these personnel would be lost by March 1, 1946.[14]

In an attempt to entice some of the reservists to remain in the Navy in a public information capacity, Miller recommended to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Personnel that a special designator be established for officers serving in this duty, so they would not have to compete for promotion with contemporaries who had much more sea and operational experience. Forrestal immediately approved the proposal, and it was favorably considered by a special board headed by Rear Admiral George C. Dyer in late 1945. However, with the merger issue freezing practically all military legislation in Congress, action on the measure was not taken until 1947. By that time, the majority of the information-experienced reserve officers had long since departed.

As partial compensation for the loss of the reservists, Admiral Miller was able to procure about fifty Regular Navy officers to help maintain as much as possible of the public relations structure built up during the war in the naval districts, the fleets and in Washington. "We have proven our value too completely to let it slip by us now," he professed.[15]

Secretary Forrestal supported Miller's contention by writing to the Chief of Naval Personnel in March 1946, "It is considered essential that the service of Navy public information continue to function in peace as in war."[16]

He ordered the establishment of information billets in "all staffs, ashore and afloat, and in those other Naval activities which special circumstances may render necessary . . . to assure adequate public relations coverage." He also directed that the Enlisted Naval Correspondent be included in the permanent rating system of the Navy and that the Fleet Hometown News Center be retained as a distribution point for stories about individual Navymen. He further stated that he wanted provisions made for the training of personnel assigned to public information duties.[17]

Forrestal's continued emphasis of public relations was instrumental in keeping Office of Public Information personnel strength at a level only slightly lower than its wartime average. A 1946 table of organization for OPI listed billets for sixty-six officers and twenty-two enlisted men. By April 1947, the agency--known once again as the Office of Public Relations--had actually expanded to include allowances for eighty-four officers, forty-five enlisted men and seventy-two civilians. At that time, it was headed by a vice admiral with two rear admirals in charge of separate public information and civil relations divisions.[18]

An Overview

Prior to World War II, the Navy adhered rather

closely to its long-standing silent service tradition in its dealings with the press and the public. With a few notable exceptions, such as the extensive publicity given to the sailing of the Great White Fleet in 1908, public relations in the sea service was handled on an informal, sporadic and often reactionary basis. A Navy News Bureau was set up in World War I to assist the news media, but austere economic conditions and public apathy toward the military in the two decades which followed relegated this formal organization to a caretaker status buried in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

Early in 1939, however, as war clouds gathered in Europe, ONI was compelled to enlarge its meager four-person public relations branch and to establish subsidiary field offices to meet heightened public and press interest in naval affairs. In July 1940, Frank Knox, publisher of the Chicago Daily News and newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, directed a mobilization of the sea service's information function to a wartime footing. Naval reservists from the ranks of the mass media and related professions were brought on active duty; and separate sections were added to the public relations branch to service the specialized needs of the various media, coordinate field activities and monitor trends in news reporting and public opinion.

In May 1941, Knox transferred the function from naval intelligence, creating an independent Office of Public

Relations (OPR) directly under his control and naming Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn as its head. A short time later, the Chief of Naval Operations made public relations a function of command. Personnel in the Washington office increased from thirteen in the summer of 1940 to over ninety on the eve of Pearl Harbor. The naval district public relations offices also were augmented, including personnel to man branches in various metropolitan centers throughout the nation. In the fall of 1941, when full-time information officers were assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, the Navy's wartime public relations structure was virtually complete.

Soon, however, the age-old nemesis to full disclosure in wartime--the necessity for military secrecy--reappeared. As far back as 1938, the Navy already had instigated a series of security measures designed to minimize publicity on new ship construction and fleet maneuvers. In early 1941, Secretary Knox himself instituted a system of "voluntary censorship," in which the news media were asked to refrain from mentioning certain naval subjects unless previously released by appropriate authority.

Upon America's entry into World War II, formal censorship was imposed on many facets of war information. President Roosevelt outlined the rules, stressing that nothing should be revealed which would give "aid and comfort to the enemy." Significantly, he vested the

interpretation of what data would fall in this category in the hands of the military.

The first year of hostilities was primarily a naval war, and Admiral Ernest J. King, the Navy's top military commander, exercised his censorship powers to the utmost. Only sparse details were released about the damage at Pearl Harbor; news of ship sinkings in the Atlantic by German submarines was closely guarded; and announcements of our ship losses in the Pacific were delayed up to 100 days. These actions aroused suspicion by the press and public that the government was deliberately "sugar-coating" war information, since the Navy seemed to be stifling bad news while promptly issuing the good. Elmer Davis, chief of the new Office of War Information (OWI), personally took the Navy to task over its news policies and, with an assist from the President, was able to obtain timelier and more complete disclosures by the fall of 1942.

The war took a new direction in November of that year when Allied forces invaded North Africa. With the news spotlight somewhat diverted from sea engagements, Captain Leland P. Lovette, who succeeded Admiral Hepburn as Director of Public Relations (DPR) in August 1942, was free to concentrate on improving Navy releasing procedures. Secretary Knox also urged Admiral King to relax certain of his security restrictions, particularly with regard to submarine operations. However, press complaints over

military handling of war news continued throughout most of 1943, and in September of that year, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to direct the Army and Navy to cooperate more closely with OWI.

A turning point in Navy reporting occurred two months later when a "play-by-play" account of the landing on Tarawa was relayed through the sophisticated communications facilities of a new amphibious command ship. This practice was not to become standard for many months, however, since the commander of the Pacific island-hopping campaign, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, frequently refused to break radio silence for public relations purposes. Also, strict security was maintained on the new techniques and equipment used in amphibious warfare.

While controversy surrounded the flow of Navy news from the battle zones during the early and middle stages of the conflict, OPR and the field offices at home were busily engaged in a myriad of activities designed to enhance the sea service's over-all public relations. Combat photography and combat art programs, begun during the mobilization period prior to the war, were fully operational in the fleets by early 1942. In Washington, a "beat system" was set up whereby press officers from OPR culled news items from the various Navy Department agencies, and a 24-hour watch and extensive photographic library were maintained to assist the news media. Weekly press seminars also were

conducted to provide background information that could not be divulged in the regular press conferences held by the Secretary of the Navy.

Early in 1942, branch offices were established in New York to service radio networks and magazine and book publishers. An assistant director of public relations for the West Coast was named in September 1943 to coordinate efforts there, especially those connected with the motion picture industry.

In the fall of 1941, the Navy had taken steps to work closely with defense plants in promoting morale among war workers. Secretary Knox created a special industrial incentive division in his office in July 1942 which enlisted the aid of naval district public relations officers in presenting the famed Army-Navy "E" Awards and other production citations. Radio networks and local stations also were called upon to assist in industrial morale and played a prominent role as well in support of Navy recruiting publicity, war bond promotions, Red Cross blood drives, and such unique ventures as the solicitation of civilian binoculars for use in the fleets.

Navy public relations personnel throughout the war maintained close liaison with OWI and other government information agencies and with their counterparts in the Army, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Public relations efforts of the latter two services came under the general

jurisdiction of OPR and the naval district offices. The Navy also was involved on a continuing basis in setting up displays and exhibits of war materials, arranging interviews for returning combat veterans, projects on behalf of the Navy Relief Society, Navy Day celebrations and the preparation of war posters.

In the mid-war years, OPR began to adopt a more creative approach by actively seeking media coverage of and public interest in specific naval activities such as the launching of the new Lexington, the transit through mid-America of the submarine Reno, the USS Alabama firing trials and the first anniversary of the WAVES. In addition, it sought to educate Navy information personnel through annual public relations officer conferences, a monthly Public Relations Bulletin and the issuance of a detailed Public Relations Manual in 1943. OPR reached a personnel strength of 140 shortly after the war began; and there were 274 public relations officers in field commands by the end of 1942, including "flight" information specialists attached to new air training units formed in the summer of that year.

Beginning in 1943, the improvement in the war's outlook tended to neutralize security precautions and resulted in a gradual but steady increase in the dissemination of Navy information. Despite the more liberal policy,

however, public relations in the sea service was considered to be in a state of doldrums in the spring of 1944 when James Forrestal replaced the deceased Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy. Particularly in the Pacific, where there was a shortage of public relations personnel and war correspondents encountered unacceptable delays in the censorship and delivery of their material, were shortcomings noted.

Forrestal's immediate concern, however, was with an Army plan then before Congress to merge the nation's armed forces after the war. Fearing that the Navy would be "submerged" rather than merged in any such scheme, the new secretary ordered a revitalization of its entire public relations program for an all-out effort in the final stages of the conflict. The focus of the campaign was to be in the Pacific, since the Navy's role in the Atlantic and European theaters was by that time one primarily of support. In the Pacific, however, the sea service faced stiff public relations competition from the Army and Army Air Force.

Following an inspection trip to that theater in the summer of 1944 by Rear Admiral A. Stanton Merrill, who had relieved Captain Lovette as DPR three months earlier, numerous innovative measures were taken--not only to speed the flow of press copy and film from the combat areas but also to convince Navy commanders of the importance of public relations to the war effort. Information "annexes" were

included in future operational plans; fleet censors accompanied correspondents wherever they went for on-the-spot screening of press material; and scores of full-time public relations officers were dispatched to the Pacific, their number totaling more than 400 by war's end. A forward base was set up on Guam to handle the increasing number of reporters who flocked to the Pacific following V-E Day. Modern transmission outlets were installed there and at Hawaii to beam radio and press copy, including photographs, back to the States. Broadcasts also were originated from ships at sea.

The turnabout in the Navy's "press sense" received high praise from the news media, with special accolades handed out for the arrangements at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The public relations conscious Forrestal was not finished, however. In consonance with Captain Harold B. (Min) Miller, the new public relations officer for the Pacific commander, he moved to "personalize" the Navy's war role by assigning a cadre of 100 Enlisted Navy Correspondents and hundreds of collateral-duty information officers to write stories on individual Navymen. To distribute these articles to hometown newspapers, he established the Fleet Hometown News Center in Chicago in March 1945.

The secretary took steps, too, to improve the central supervision of the Navy's information program. In the fall of 1944, OFR was completely revamped, with more

emphasis given to the planning and evaluation phases of the public relations process. Monthly statements of specific objectives were begun in January 1945, and "feedback" reports on actions taken to achieve them were required from all Navy public relations offices. In May 1945, Forrestal transferred Captain Miller from the Pacific to head OPR, promoting him to rear admiral. Miller in June changed the name of the function to "public information" and succeeded in removing virtually the last traces of security restrictions preventing a free flow of news.

When the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Navy was about to launch three "press ships" to be used exclusively for public relations coverage of its part in the invasion of Japan. Instead, it had to settle for a "bright spotlight of publicity" surrounding the surrender ceremony aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

An Appraisal

Frank Knox set the machinery in motion for a full chronicling of the Navy's World War II story. However, as we have seen, stringent security measures and a lack of understanding and appreciation for public relations by many naval officers seriously handicapped its telling, particularly in the early and middle stages of the conflict.

In retrospect, with the Pacific fleet severely crippled at Pearl Harbor and the Germans mounting a

potentially disastrous submarine campaign in the Atlantic, it is most difficult to dispute the sagacity of Admiral King's tough security stance early in the war. Nevertheless, it was inevitable in our democratic society that such rigid censorship would soon run at cross purposes with the public's appetite for news, which had been aided and abetted for years by a highly competitive free press insistent on full and speedy disclosure. The problem was compounded in World War II by the massive personal involvement of the American people in the prosecution of the war and the recent advances in communications technology that served to make it the most widely reported conflict in history up to that time.

It is doubtful whether the degree of necessity for military secrecy in wartime ever will be satisfactorily resolved for either its proponents or opponents. In all probability, the issue will hinge in future wars--as it has in the past--on the special set of circumstances operative in each case. Secretary Knox pinpointed the dilemma when he said in 1941 that security versus publicity is "not a conflict between right and wrong but between two rights--the right of the public to know all about its Navy . . . and the right of the Navy to preserve national safety by not revealing anything of value to a potential enemy."[19]

For the most part, the public and press conceded the latter right to the Navy at the beginning of World

War II. Yet, it must be concluded that at the very outset of hostilities the sea service instituted an unnecessarily restrictive set of censorship rules. Furthermore, it failed to educate the public and press properly as to the reasons for these rules and did not make sufficient provision for their periodical review and liberalization--despite the steady improvement in the tactical situation. The public information portion of the official wartime history of the Pacific Fleet command contained the admission that "after an initial vital need for security, the brakes were not taken off fast enough."[20] And Elmer Davis, in his postwar report to the President, "observed . . . that Naval officers, in deciding on what information would give aid and comfort to the enemy, 'leaned over backward' in interpreting the phrase in the interests of security."[21]

This attitude, of course, had its genesis in the longtime tradition of reticence on the part of naval officers and the related "security syndrome" evolving from the isolationist environment of naval operations--both of which were personified in Admiral King. With this policy emanating from the very top, it is not surprising that a certain "fear complex" over the release of information developed in Navy commanders, censors and even public relations officers. In the case of the latter, the decision by the sea service before the war began to include the responsibility for security in the information function created a

"split personality" in its public relations officers which inhibited their natural inclination to fight for a more liberal approach. "We are inclined to be 'No' men," said a speaker at one of the Navy's public relations officer conferences, ". . . while . . . we ought to realize that we are the 'Yes' men."[22]

A significant factor in perpetuating the Navy's wartime intransigence in security matters was the apparent justification of secrecy in the light of certain operational events. For instance, the strict silence maintained on the breaking of the Japanese naval code early in the war led to the ambush of Admiral Yamamoto over the Solomon Islands in April 1943 through the deciphering of an enemy message.[23] And Admiral King remained convinced as late as May 1944 that his withholding of the fact that two additional American cruisers were sunk in the Battle of Savo Island in the summer of 1942 saved the day for our embattled Marine forces on Guadalcanal. He claimed in his first report on the war, "The Japanese did not take advantage of this opportunity to engage in a fleet battle with the balance of power on their side, probably because they did not know--and we did not let them know--how severe our losses were."[24]

A begrudging acceptance of and in some cases wholehearted support for stringent security measures by the news media, combined with the public's general approval of such

policies, also contributed to the Navy's reluctance to abandon its strict stance on operational secrecy. A patriotic fervor permeated the entire nation, considerably diluting the hue and cry raised by a vocal minority for a freer flow of war news. Ray Daniell of the New York Times London Bureau typified this undercurrent of patriotism when he exclaimed in 1943, "There isn't any story in the world that is good enough to justify risking the life of a single American soldier."[25] And Dale Minor wrote long after the war that "the press more or less voluntarily constricted its own role, and abetted by the military, which gave them not only uniforms but officers' ranks and prerogatives to go with them, reporters went to war more as civilian adjuncts to the Public Information Office than as representatives of the public's right to know."[26]

The Navy, in consonance with the Office of Censorship and OWI, did attempt to balance the need for secrecy against the morale benefits to be derived from releasing certain information, even though classified. As early as Labor Day, 1942, Secretary Knox decided to widely publicize the launching of new ships--data of obvious value to the enemy--in order to boost the incentive of shipyard workers. In October 1944, the vice chief of naval operations, Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, elaborated on this policy:

> It is of great importance to us to publicize the accomplishments of ships and individuals because it

> does keep up . . . morale; and I am always well aware that news keeps the public in a mood to back the war effort in general and to appreciate what the Navy is doing. Now we have to balance that against how much benefit we are going to give the enemy.[27]

Of course, as we have seen, the wraps were removed from practically all classified subjects toward the end of the war, when victory was no longer in doubt. It is debatable, however, whether this would have been done if the tactical situation had suddenly reversed itself. Elmer Davis claimed, "The attitude of the services might have been very different /later in the war/ in the case, say, of a great naval disaster; especially if it had occurred in . . . a night battle, or an air-sea battle at long range--when it was doubtful if the enemy knew the extent of his success. . . ."[28]

Such speculation raises the question of whether the Navy, even with the spur of the merger threat and the prodding of Secretary Forrestal, would have been able to pursue as enlightened a public relations course as it did in the final stages of the war if operational secrecy had still been as vital a determinant in the release of information. The weight of evidence from this study would seem to indicate that it could not have. Therefore, it can be concluded that security considerations were the major force in shaping Navy public relations policies throughout the entire war.

Aside from the need for secrecy, the very nature of

sea engagements in itself played a prominent role in delaying news of naval battles. Especially early in the war, the Navy was often unfairly criticized for shortcomings in its releasing policies that were due in no small part to this basic problem. The New York Herald Tribune emphasized this point in a postwar editorial: ". . . the conditions of naval warfare in the Pacific made it extremely difficult to judge losses. This was particularly true in the first frenzied months after Pearl Harbor, but it clouded the war picture--so far as the public was concerned--for virtually the duration of the war."[29]

Within the parameters of censorship and security, the sea service developed a sophisticated and at times highly effective public relations program during the war. In this regard, the hypothesis stated in the introductory chapter that its efforts were primarily responsive rather than creative until circumstances dictated a more enlightened stance toward the end of the conflict was not completely borne out by the evidence. It is true that attempts to "sell the Navy" were ruled out in the prewar mobilization period and the dissemination of information to the public was stressed as the Navy's main public relations mission after hostilities began. However, the campaigns on behalf of recruiting and industrial morale, the establishment of combat photography and combat art programs, the wooing of the mass media through extensive services and contacts, and

other sea service information activities during the early and middle stages of the war definitely fell within the realm of "image-building" techniques. The fact that these methods became more overt and expansive in the last part of the conflict under the dynamic leadership of James Forrestal and in the face of the unification menace does not detract from the creative nature of the earlier efforts.

Still, it was not until the final phase of the war --when the Navy entered the public relations arena in full force and in direct competition with the other services-- that its program produced the kind of results it desired. The previously cited accolades from and increased coverage in the media, the wide public and press appreciation of the highly innovative hometown news programs, and the internal reports of accomplishments and other in-house correspondence all attest to the considerable degree of success attained by its information efforts in the last year of the war.

Although Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Miller both were pessimistic at times that their intensified campaign to get the Navy's story across to the American people was "too little and too late," it is the author's opinion that the ultimate disposition of the unification plan--in which the Department of the Navy retained not only its separate identity but also its Marine and aviation arms--can be attributed at least partially to the aura of good will and faith in its fighting ability created in the

public mind because this was exploited by effective public relations. The message of the Navy's role in winning the Pacific war was communicated "loud and clear." In addition, the extensive hometown publicity given to individual combat achievements greatly enhanced the traditional image of the sea service as a uniquely adventuresome military activity. Of course, the return of massive numbers of Navymen to civilian life at war's end contributed a great deal to this favorable climate.

Two objectives of the sea service's long-range public relations plans in 1945 were not achieved. As at the end of World War I, both the Army and Navy were unsuccessful in their attempts to forestall postwar disarmament; and the Navy failed to gain public support for compulsory military training, a program it strongly fostered.

How close did the Navy's wartime public relations approach the Cutlip and Center definition of the function? There was much evidence that by war's end the sea service was well-equipped and motivated to undertake "the planned effort to influence public opinion through socially acceptable performance based on two-way communication." The four basic steps for an effective public relations process--research-listening, planning-decision making, communication and evaluation--had been established.

The necessity for research-listening was recognized

as early as the fall of 1940 when an analysis section was set up in ONI's public relations branch to provide a daily digest of pertinent media comment to naval leaders and public relations officers. Trends in news reporting and public opinion subsequently were monitored throughout the war by OPR in coordination with the Army and OWI.

Planning also was stressed in the mobilization stage of Navy public relations, but this phase of the process received far less emphasis than it should have in decision-making during the early and middle years of the war due to a lack of time and personnel and the rapidly changing events. In December 1943, following a tour of the European theater by Secretary Knox, detailed plans for censorship and public relations handling of the Normandy invasion were formulated by the Navy in conjunction with the Army and the British. Also at this time, the first long-range plans for the postwar period began to take shape in OPR. When Forrestal reorganized Navy public relations in the fall of 1944, primary importance was attached to planning with the issuance of monthly policy statements containing specific objectives and programs.

The third step, communication, was probably the Navy's "long-suit" in the public relations process. From the very beginning, aided by the eagerness of the media to report the war and cooperate in the war effort, OPR and the field offices utilized all the avenues of mass

communication--the press, radio, magazines and books, still and motion pictures, newsreels, advertising, and art and posters--in publicizing Navy activities. Furthermore, except for the criticism leveled at its early news release policies and handling of war correspondents, the sea service enjoyed mostly favorable media relations. A report to the Secretary of the Navy in the fall of 1944 claimed:

> We can, as a result of the excellent relations fostered by this office /OPR/, express the Navy's view via civilian outlet whenever necessary. We have obtained millions of dollars worth of free advertising via radio and press and pictures which could not have been obtained otherwise. . . . This "good will" has been secured in a large part as a result of direct and personal contact and by fair and impartial treatment of all media. . . .[30]

Finally, the fourth phase--evaluation--was included in the public relations structure when an evaluation branch was established as part of OPR's reconstitution in the fall of 1944. Detailed monthly reports of actions taken in support of objectives were provided by all public relations offices in the field and summarized for Secretary Forrestal by Admirals Merrill and Miller. Additionally, OPR furnished questions on subjects of concern to the Navy for public opinion polls by George Gallup and the National Opinion Research Center and conducted its own content analyses and other surveys of newspaper coverage.

The extent of the influence of the "uniformed civilians" employed in the Navy's program during the war is difficult to assess. These professionals were brought into

its information offices on the premise that public relations "required a certain sort of expertise that officers of the Regular Navy were unlikely to possess."[31] The study has shown that reserve public relations officers in OPR, the naval districts, fleets and other commands helped to pave the way for good media relations and provided much of the impetus and ideas for an effective program. Moreover, the Enlisted Naval Correspondents and collateral duty public information officers in the Pacific, the majority of whom were naval reservists, were the very backbone of the hometown news system. Yet, it is striking that throughout the war the positions of director and assistant director in OPR were filled by Regular Navy officers. Apparently, the reservist experts were relegated to functional and advisory roles and played a relatively insignificant part in decision-making. James Stahlman, publisher of the Nashville Banner, hinted at this possibility in an editorial prepared for his newspaper in January 1945: "My old friend Paul Smith has gone back in the Navy. I hope the top-side is smart enough to give him leeway to handle Navy news from the Pacific as it should be handled."[32]

The civilians at the top, however, the two wartime Secretaries of the Navy, exercised great influence on the thrust of the Navy's information efforts--as we have seen throughout the thesis. In particular, James Forrestal was

a shining example of a basic truism for any effective public relations policy--those at the highest level of management must want it and support it, or it cannot succeed.

Frank Knox wanted it as much as Forrestal, but, as has been mentioned, the latter enjoyed certain advantages in his pursuit of the goal that Knox did not have. First of all, Forrestal was not as hung up on the horns of the security dilemma as his predecessor. He believed that publicizing events which had already occurred would not adversely affect the Navy's future operations. Moreover, if it had been necessary, Forrestal was more willing and able to successfully challenge Admiral King on security matters. Of course, as we have seen, King's tough security stance had been considerably softened in the spring of 1944 by the nation's favorable strategic position. As a result, a direct confrontation between the admiral and secretary on censorship policies was averted.

Secondly, the sudden emergence of the unification issue shortly after Forrestal became secretary gave him a powerful lever for galvanizing the Navy's military leadership into action on the public relations and political fronts. He was helped in this regard by the wartime rise to positions of authority of naval aviators, who did not share the public relations inhibitions of their surface and submarine counterparts. Also, due to the ailing health in 1944 and the death in 1945 of FDR--who often acted as his

own Secretary of the Navy during Knox's tenure--Forrestal was able to assume firm control and leadership of all aspects of naval affairs. Because of this, he quickly earned the respect and confidence of naval officers to a much higher degree than that experienced by Knox.

Even with these assets, however, Forrestal probably would not have been able to effect the turnabout in Navy public relations in the final stages of the war if it had not been for his personal direction of the program and his intense campaign to change the long-standing negative attitudes in the sea service toward the function.

How much were these attitudes truly changed? What were the forces behind their change? And how permanent was the change? The last two questions are predicated on the assumption that there was indeed some kind of change as a consequence of the wartime experience. The bulk of evidence in this study supports this supposition.

The very dynamics of World War II forced the Navy to consider the public relations implications of this unique conflict concurrently with its operational aspects from the very beginning. At first, as had been the Navy's practice in the past, there was a noticeable tendency among the military leadership in the sea service to leave the handling of information to Frank Knox and his uniformed civilians, despite the directive by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1941 making it a function of command.

However, the early demands by the press and public for faster and more complete operational news; the admonishments from Secretary Knox, OWI and later the President himself; and the vital necessity for recruiting, industrial and other support on the home front obliged these leaders to view public relations in a different light from the fall of 1942 on. This begrudging obligation in itself served as the initial catalyst for attitudinal change.

But, "evolution within the Navy is necessarily deliberate," as was pointed out by a postwar study of Navy public relations.[33] "In building a ship, for instance, too much is at stake to articulate it hurriedly. So there is that curious, and generally estimable, caution against accepting something new without complete understanding and . . . a Missouri man's kind of proof." Thus, in the middle years of the war, the sea service's enthusiasm for public relations was restrained, to say the least--particularly among the operators at sea, who only occasionally were "bothered" by an information officer or war correspondent. And when these operators were reluctantly involved in public relations, their natural reaction often was one of loathing toward anything not directly connected with the fighting effort. William Brinkley humorously portrayed this "revulsion" in the following outburst from the fictional Admiral Boatwright:

> I've got a plan cooked up. Next island we invade I'm going to put all the correspondents on one ship and all those Public Relations legions over there on another. Then I'm going to issue secret orders to the skipper that will steer the two ships into Tokyo Bay, where the Japs will capture them both and be obliged to take care of all the correspondents and Public Relations oddballs and freaks for the rest of the war. It'll drive the Japs nuts, free our hands to fight the war and get the war over a year earlier.[34]

The merger conflict in 1944, however, afforded a "Missouri man's kind of proof" of the necessity for the function. Vincent Davis observed:

> The attitude of the officer corps of the Regular Navy towards public relations . . . began to change perceptibly in the spring of 1944. The reasons for the change, . . . were the dawning awareness of the dimensions and apparent stakes of the snowballing political battle between the Navy and the other services on the reorganization issue and the emergence of the Navy's new Secretary, James Forrestal, as its fighting political leader.[35]

From this point on to the end of the war, as the thesis has demonstrated, there was ostensibly a dramatic attitudinal change among the admirals toward the viability of information activities. With the exception of Admiral Spruance and a few others, these Navy leaders were eager to jump on the public relations bandwagon in search of ways to salvage the sea service's strength and separate identity in the postwar period. Furthermore, as a direct result of the new "respectability" and sense of urgency attached to the function by the top leadership, there was a shift of opinion all the way down the line. Also, by this time, many Regular Navy officers had performed public relations duties or experienced interfaces with the press as briefing officers,

censors or roommates of correspondents. Such familiarity with the function tended to at least dilute their estrangement from it. The boost to morale provided by the hometown news program in 1943 further served to solidify attitudinal changes toward public relations at all levels in the Navy.

Just how "solid" were these changes, however? Admiral Miller wrote to Captain Fitzhugh Lee in October 1945, "We are having tremendous numbers of requests to fill vacancies, all of which is a healthy sign indeed, and I hope and am sure that the fleet at last has come to realize that the Public Information Officer can be of use to them."[36] Despite this note of optimism, however, there was a predictable letdown in enthusiasm for public relations in the Navy when the uniformed civilians began returning home in the immediate months following the war and the opportunities for dramatic coverage in the hometown and national media diminished. What's more, the letdown occurred in the face of the "heating up" of the unification controversy in the fall of 1945.

Ray Coll, Jr., writing in the Honolulu Advertiser, alerted the Navy to this situation and cautioned against it:

> During the course of the war the Navy grudgingly relaxed from its long-held antipathy to publicity and correspondents for the most part were cordially received and given valuable material and facts. An elaborate public relations . . . service was established and the service became humanized as well as glamorized in the public press.

> It is hoped that this pleasant relationship between the Navy and the press will not be permitted to die. Unfortunately, there has been noted in some quarters a tendency on the part of certain higher-ups in the service to crawl back into their brass shell.
>
> It is this correspondent's . . . opinion that the Navy is going to need a good press, in the months, yes, in the years to come.[37]

The sea service heeded this warning by taking some of the actions already described to preclude a regression to its prewar negativism toward public relations. It created a specialized corps of public information officers and maintained the complement and functional objectives of the Office of Public Information at near wartime levels. It retained the Fleet Hometown News Center and the Enlisted Navy Correspondent rating, and instituted a training program for both information officers and enlisted journalists. In the immediate postwar years, when the merger issue was still on the "burner," it even convened special conferences on public relations for the benefit of commanding officers from fleet and shore units. It also continued the annual wartime meetings of information officers and made the public relations annexes permanent appendages to operation plans and orders.

All of these actions were the direct consequence of the Navy's World War II experience with public relations. Further evidence of the impact of the war on the function in the sea service is contained in a December 1945 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article. The author, Lieutenant William H. Long, USNR, declares that "during these war

years certain beginnings have been made . . . toward continuing a strong and well-balanced naval public relations policy."[38] He cites the following indicators:

(a) a Navy public relations structure does exist in the Naval Districts and in most of the larger commands afloat and ashore;
(b) officer and enlisted personnel assigned to public relations duty have familiarized themselves with primary elements of constant Navy policy;
(c) the press and other elements . . . have become accustomed to obtaining their information from official Navy sources . . . rather than from outside sources or hearsay;
(d) the Navy occupies a unique place in the public mind and consciousness, and therefore can more easily maintain this position;
(e) many naval personnel have contributed to national publications and have taken part in programs reaching the public, thereby gaining favorable attention for the Navy among millions of citizens.

These positive conditions did exist at the end of the war. Nevertheless, the attitude of many senior naval officers toward the function regrettably relapsed to the prewar state of disinterest, ignorance and even antagonism. Captain Arthur H. Ashton, one of the original specially-designated Navy information officers, reminisced in 1967 about the difficulties encountered by this group in the immediate postwar years:

> These pioneer PIOs were not always regarded as bona fide staff officers and in some instances they had neither direct access to the "old man" nor a seat in the staff meetings. Too frequently they received the role of a fire department official and were called to the scene of a public affairs problem only after it was out of control.
>
> There was a general inclination to refuse media requests for information about the Navy if even the slightest unfavorable publicity might result. "No comment" was the formula in some public affairs plans

> for coping with the crises that attracted the press. The Navy Public Information Manual lacked authority, and command directives concerning PIOs often prescribed more don'ts than dos for the conduct of their duties.[39]

Vincent Davis, in an analysis of the ups and downs in Navy public relations since World War II, lists many examples of definite interest and attention being paid to the function. However, he still concludes:

> Notwithstanding these evidences of an increased belief by the naval officers in the political importance of a continuous and active public relations campaign on the Navy's behalf, other evidence suggests that this belief never became permanently strong nor widespread within the officer corps. The intentional seeking of publicity remained odious to many, and probably most, sea service officers. The old conviction persisted that the Navy's record and its continuing importance to the nation would "speak for itself."
> . . . This attitude was the same as it had been traditionally throughout most of the Navy's history; selling the Navy's case to the public should not be necessary and, in any case, it was uncomfortably political in nature, not in accordance with the dignity of the profession. The inhibitions were overcome only when the officers were so fearful for the continued existence of the Navy that this anxiety transcended the subcultural restrictions.[40]

The last sentence in Davis' observation would seem to indicate that the attitudinal change toward public relations on the part of the admirals and others in the Navy during the latter stages of World War II was more of an accommodation with the dynamics of war, particularly the merger threat, than a true "change of heart."

The author, after eight continuous years of personal experience as a naval public affairs officer on active duty, must agree in essence with Davis' conclusion.

Certainly, for some twenty years after the war, the impassioned plea of James Forrestal to the new ensigns at the Naval Academy in June 1945 to "consider yourself a purveyor of information about the Navy" was not heeded to any significant degree. However, it must be stated in closing that the present civilian and military heads of the Navy have instituted in the last several years an increasingly enlightened public relations program that is rapidly making inroads into the last vestiges of the silent service tradition. It is the author's opinion that the World War II experience, which served to institutionalize the function in the Navy for the first time in its history, set the stage for the present day climate. Although the spotlight on Tokyo Bay has been dimmed in the intervening years, the blackout at Pearl Harbor definitely has been illuminated.

Topics for Further Study

Due to the wide scope of this thesis and consequent peripheral treatment of many facets of Navy public relations in World War II, a number of subjects relevant to the history of mass communications were only touched upon. Several of these are deserving of and present interesting opportunities for more detailed and critical investigation.

For instance, the entire area of Navy media relations is, in the author's opinion, fertile ground for additional study. The sea service's use of and cooperation

with the still fledgling radio and motion picture industries, including the newsreel companies, especially falls into this category. But the extent of its utilization of and liaison with the print media, and its cooperation with commercial advertisers--a topic not dealt with at all in the thesis--also are of special interest and importance.

In the case of the print media, a separate study on press coverage of the Navy's wartime activities would have value not only in detailing the scope and direction of wartime reporting but also in measuring the effectiveness of the sea service's information program and, conversely, the limitations imposed by its censorship policies. In this regard, the views and experiences of war correspondents assigned primarily to the Navy would be quite illuminating if recorded en masse. Rear Admiral Harold B. (Min) Miller has maintained close liaison with many of these correspondents through an informal organization known as "Upchuckers, Unlimited."

Referring to security restrictions on the flow of World War II information, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., wrote in 1947, "I hope that a scholarly account will eventually be given of the practical operation of military censorship during this war . . . ."[41] To the best of the author's knowledge, such a study has not been completed. Lamar Mackay discusses military release of information policies in his Ph.D. dissertation, "Domestic Operations of the

Office of War Information in World War II," and the Navy's role in censorship has been covered in considerable detail in this thesis. However, this vital aspect of the sea service's wartime public relations story merits more thorough individual investigation.

The Navy's efforts, both overt and covert, to cultivate favorable public, press and congressional opinion for its views on the Armed Forces merger issue during and after World War II provide a particularly fascinating area of study for future public relations researchers. The subject has received only superficial treatment in this thesis, primarily as the catalyst for the Navy's public relations renaissance in the final stages of the war. It is dealt with in greater depth in Vincent Davis' The Admirals Lobby and Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946. However, many specific details of this interesting lobbying campaign still remain to be uncovered and published. A certain amount of material on the topic is contained in Boxes 157 and 158 of the Philibert Collection and in the Forrestal Papers deposited in the National Archives.

Inextricably tied in with the merger-related endeavors, of course, is the strong influence of James Forrestal on Navy public relations. Although his role in this regard during World War II is woven throughout Chapter Five of the thesis, his information activities on

behalf of the Navy after the war and during his tenure as the nation's first Secretary of Defense are worthwhile topics for further study. Vincent Davis, in the above mentioned books, goes into some detail about Forrestal's great interest in and personal direction of public relations while Secretary of the Navy, but does not cover his period as head of the Defense Department. Also, Davis' treatment of the subject is intertwined with many other facets of the secretary's leadership. As has been stated, Forrestal's detailed attention to public relations was unique for a Secretary of the Navy and rare for any head of a major governmental agency. It is the author's belief that his relationship with the information function throughout his career would be a most suitable and valuable subject for a completely independent study.

Other pertinent topics for further investigation are the Navy's combat photography and combat art programs during the war, its internal relations activities--including the development of All Hands and other command information publications, the publicity on behalf of naval recruiting, the industrial incentive efforts in both military services, and the naval district and other field command public relations offices--especially that of the Pacific Fleet in the last year of the war.

The establishment of the Fleet Hometown News Center and the Enlisted Naval Correspondent rating in 1945 also are

subjects deserving of special attention. Histories of the PHTNC and the current Navy enlisted journalist specialty, a continuation of the ENC system begun in World War II, have never been written. Yet, both are integral parts of the sea service's public affairs program today.

The Navy's attempts to publicize the activities of its Negro members through the creation of the small group of Black ENCs and public relations officers toward the end of the war, mentioned only briefly in the thesis, is definitely worthy of additional coverage--especially in light of the modern day emphasis on minority relations in the military.

Finally, the World War II public relations programs of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard, and the establishment after the war and subsequent operations of the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, are special topics that should be considered for separate study. Robert Lindsay in This High Name gives an overview of the Marine combat correspondent and other phases of Corps information efforts during the war, but his coverage is within the context of the entire history of Marine Corps public relations and does not go into sufficient detail. The author is not aware of any history of Coast Guard public relations ever having been written. Yet, this service was quite active and successful in this field during World War II.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1]William Brinkley, Don't Go Near the Water (New York, 1956), 315-17.

[2]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Cmdr. R. D. Thompson, USNR, October 25, 1945 (Serial 9273400R), contained in personal file of RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), entitled "Capt. Lee & Pacific." Hereafter cited as "Miller File--Pacific."

[3]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, September 11, 1945 (Serial S112200R), ibid.

[4]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, August 13, 1945 (Serial 9698700R), ibid.

[5]U.S. Navy Department, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, PACFLEET Public Information Bulletin, No. 4, August 15, 1945, p. 4. Hereafter cited as PACFLEET Bulletin. ALPAC 142, a message from Admiral Nimitz to all Pacific Fleet commands issued a few days after the Japanese surrender, directed an all-out effort by commanding officers and public information personnel to secure "recognition of the accomplishments of the Navy and its enlisted personnel and officers of the lower ranks" (PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 5, September 1, 1945, p. 3).

[6]Ibid., No. 6, September 15, 1945, p. 3.

[7]Ibid., No. 8, November 1945, p. 4. Ten thousand ballots were mailed out, and in the first week more than 3,000 were returned. Some 3,100 newspapers indicated they wanted to continue receiving Navy hometown news releases, while only 11 said "no." One hundred ten radio stations said "yes" compared to just ten negative replies.

[8]Ibid., No. 7, October 1, 1945, pp. 4-6, and No. 8, November 1945, p. 4. See also, a memorandum from Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, to multiple addressees, December 21, 1945, contained in U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, "Historical Records of the Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, Box 157, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. Hereafter cited as "Philibert Collection."

[9]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, October 22, 1945 (Serial 9217600R), Miller File--Pacific. For details on the Navy Day visit of fleet units, see "Fleet En Route to New York," Army and Navy Register, October 13, 1945, p. 1.

[10]Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), 285-86. Hereafter cited as Davis, Lobby. The other members of the committee were Rear Admirals Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., Robert B. Carney and Forrest Sherman, and Captain Walter Karig of OPI. The group was called "The Secretary's Committee on Research and Reorganization," or SCORER as it was informally known.

[11]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, December 17, 1945 (Serial 9570500R), Miller File--Pacific.

[12]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, October 22, 1945 (Serial 9217500R), ibid.

[13]Davis, Lobby, 268.

[14]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, September 1, 1945 (Serial 8827100R), Miller File--Pacific.

[15]See n. 2. The proposed special designator for Navy public information officers and the assignment of Regular Navy officers to such duty after the war also are discussed in various letters from Admiral Miller to Captain Lee from September 13, 1945, to January 10, 1946, contained in the same file. For further citing of action taken on the special designator, see Davis, Lobby, 272-73.

[16]Ltr., Secretary of the Navy to Chief of Naval Personnel, March 15, 1946 (Serial 110900R), contained in personal papers of James V. Forrestal, National Archives, Washington, D.C., file 70-1-10.

[17]Such training was initiated in April 1946 when an eight-week course for Enlisted Navy Correspondents was held in Chicago (Lt. Cmdr. Gilbert Shaw, USCG, personal interview, Indianapolis, Ind., March 14, 1972. Lt. Cmdr. Shaw was an ENC in 1946.). In the summer of 1946, ten Navy officers were sent to the University of Missouri School of Journalism for a two-month indoctrination class in newspaper makeup, magazine article writing, photography and public relations (Lt. j.g. Gerard A. Donohue, USN, "Public

Relations Training," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 72:1347 (1946)).

[18]"Office of Public Information (OOR)," a table of organization dated July 1, 1946, and ltr., Director of Public Relations to multiple addressees April 9, 1947, both contained in Philibert Collection, Box 158.

[19]Frank Knox, "Navy News and Defense Secrets," a speech made in July 1941. A typewritten copy of Mr. Knox's notes for the speech is contained in Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[20]U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, "United States Naval Administration in World War II," unpublished narrative history of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC and CINCPOA), 401.

[21]Elmer Davis, "Report to the President, House Subcommittee on Government Operations," Hearings, Government Information Plans and Policies, Part 2, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963), 228-29 (hereafter cited as Davis, "Report"), quoted in Lamar S. Mackay, "Domestic Operations of the Office of War Information in World War II," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966, p. 416. Hereafter cited as Mackay, "OWI."

[22]Lt. Cmdr. Stuyvesant B. Wright, USNR, "The Newsreels," remarks made before a conference of naval district public relations officers in Washington, D.C., July 28-31, 1941, recorded in mimeographed minutes of conference, p. 122, Philibert Collection, Box 155.

[23]U.S. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Field Press Censorship, OPNAVINST 5530.5A of June 1967, p. 19.

[24]Adm. Ernest J. King, USN, quoted in "Out of the Darkness," Time, May 1, 1944, p. 61.

[25]Ray Daniell, quoted in Lt. Cmdr. L. Rohe Walter, USNR, "Public Relations in War and Peace," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 69:1580 (1943).

[26]Dale Minor, The Information War (New York, 1970), 6.

[27]VAdm. R. S. Edwards, USN, remarks made to the press, October 6, 1944. A mimeographed copy is contained in Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[illegible] Training," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 73:1267 (1946).

[illegible] of Public Information (June)," a table of expenditures dated July 1, 1946, and its., Director of Public Relations to Captain Schumacher April 8, 1947, both contained in Military Collection, Box 139.

[illegible] Owen, "Army Navy Air Defense Program," a speech made in July 1946. A typewritten copy of Dr. Bowman's notes for the speech is contained in Military Collection, Box 139.

U.S., Army Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division, "United States Naval Administration in World War II," unpublished history of Commodore H. Smith, U.S., Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (Current and Classified), 604.

Harry Hopkins, "Report to the President, Secretary-ship[illegible] as Commander in Chief," Hopkins, Documents Pertaining Close and Privileged, Part 2, 80th Congress, 1st Session (1963), 729-30 (hereafter cited as Hopkins, "Report"), quoted in James E. Dooley, "Domestic Operations of the Office of War Information in World War II," unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1949, p. 414, hereafter cited as Dooley, "OWI."

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[illegible] Adm., The Intervening Time (New York, 1973), p.

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[28]Davis, "Report," 228, quoted in Mackay, "CWI," 416.

[29]"Statistics of Victory," an editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, December 10, 1945. A reprint is contained in Philibert Collection, Box 157.

[30]Memo., Director of Public Relations to Secretary of the Navy, Philibert Collection, Box 157. Although this memorandum is undated, its subject is a review of the Navy Management Engineers' survey of OPR, which strongly suggests that it was written in the fall of 1944.

[31]Davis, Lobby, 267.

[32]James G. Stahlman, "From the Shoulder," an editorial in the Nashville (Tenn.) Banner, January 30, 1945. A reprint is contained in personal file of RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN (Ret.), entitled "Public Relations Policies and Directives."

[33]Cmdr. James C. Shaw, USN, and Capt. John B. Shipman, USN (Ret.), The Case for Navy Public Information, U.S. Navy Department, Office of Information, Washington, D.C., 1952, p. 41.

[34]Brinkley, Don't Go Near the Water, 56-57.

[35]Davis, Lobby, 268.

[36]Ltr., RAdm. Harold B. Miller, USN, to Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, USN, OOR (Serial 90614008), October 9, 1945. Miller File--Pacific.

[37]Ray Coll, Jr., Honolulu Advertiser, quoted in PACFLEET Bulletin, No. 8, November 1945, p. 3. The exact date of Mr. Coll's article is not given, but it is identified as a "recent story."

[38]Lt. William H. Long, USNR, "Public Relations and the Peacetime Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 71:1470 (1945).

[39]Capt. Arthur H. Ashton, USN, "Navy's Senior PRO Reviews Busy Years," Direction (August 1967), 11.

[40]Davis, Lobby, 279-283, passim. The analysis of Navy public relations after World War II is contained in pp. 272-287. Phil G. Goulding, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, backs up Davis' contention that the attitude of naval officers toward public relations

was still comparatively negative as late as the 1960s. In his book, Confirm or Deny (New York, 1970), Goulding states: "If it was a Navy problem, . . . we were less confident of being read into the picture that rapidly. . . . the Navy was not always overly anxious to share its private bad news even with the Secretary of Defense. . . . It is simply a little withdrawn from the rest of the world and even a little peculiar." (p. 141).

[41]Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Government and Mass Communications (Chicago, 1947), Vol. 1, p. 457.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

A major portion of the primary source documents cited in the thesis were found in the Helene Philibert collection of materials pertaining to Navy public relations before, during and after World War II. With an eye toward its historical potential, Miss Philibert carefully compiled this data through almost thirty years of continuous service as a Navy civilian information assistant, beginning with the Navy News Bureau in World War I and ending in 1947 when she moved with James Forrestal to the Defense Department.

The Philibert Collection was of immense value to the author because it included in a single source much of the information needed to detail the development of Navy public relations policies, procedures and organization. Its contents represent a true cross-section of Navy activities in the information field, encompassing materials of considerable variety and scope. Many of the documents contained in the collection--such as the OPR and Pacific Fleet public relations bulletins, minutes of the annual information officer conferences, and personnel directories and telephone lists--were not found elsewhere.

Officially titled "Historical Records of the Navy Office of Information, 1919-1951," the collection consists

of six boxes numbered 153-158 in Job Order 61-A-2740, Item 10, at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. The contents are not indexed in any meaningful manner and are arranged only in a loose chronological order, with the early materials in Box 153 and the post-World War II data in Box 158. Access to the collection must be obtained through the Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, located at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C.

In addition to the Philibert papers, many other administrative files and materials kept by the Navy Office of Public Relations during World War II are on deposit at the Suitland records center. These include library reference material; Navy Department and CINCPAC communiques and news releases; speeches and press conferences by Frank Knox and James Forrestal; data on censorship, films, radio programs, combat photography and war correspondents; scrapbooks of Navy Day activities; general correspondence of a classified and unclassified nature; press clippings concerning the Navy's part in the war; source material for the naval administrative histories; and naval district public relations activities. Job Order information and access to these records also can be obtained through the Operational Archives Branch.

Classified files of the offices of the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations from 1939 through

1946, catalogued under the general subjects of public relations and public information, are located at the Operational Archives Branch itself. Unclassified files of these two offices under those headings are deposited at the National Archives, War Records Branch, Naval Records Section. Also at the Archives are unclassified general files of the Office of Public Relations (NN-117, Record Group 80) and the restricted set of personal papers collected by James Forrestal.

The Forrestal Papers were extremely beneficial in helping to set the tone and spirit of the secretary's great influence on Navy public relations in the final stage of the war. The portion of the collection relating to public relations consists of only four boxes, but contains personal memoranda and other documents not available elsewhere. Permission to peruse the Forrestal Papers must be granted by the Secretary of the Navy, and they can be examined only under close monitoring and supervision. The point of contact is Mrs. Mildred C. Baruch, Chief of the Records and Reference Unit of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Room 4D706 in the Pentagon.

Supplementing the Forrestal Papers as the focal point of information for the last year of the war was the personal interview with Rear Admiral Harold B. (Min) Miller, USN (Retired), and his two personal files--"Public Relations Policies and Directives" and "Capt. Lee & Pacific." The

letters from Admiral Miller to Captain Lee and others, contained in the latter file, were especially valuable as a source of specific details on the accelerated public relations campaign in the Pacific. Admiral Miller retired from the Navy in December 1946 and became Director of Public Relations for Pan American World Airways. He resigned from that position in the late 1960s and is presently serving as Vice President for Public Relations at Hofstra College, Hempstead, N. Y.

The interviews cited in the footnotes are listed in the Bibliography, along with descriptive information on the interviewees. The author gained further background data through personal and telephonic conversations with the following individuals: Mr. Daniel D. Kimball, who served in the reference and research section of OPR from May 1943 to the end of the war; Mrs. Harry E. Thurber, widow of Vice Admiral Thurber, USN (Retired), who headed the Public Relations Branch in the Office of Naval Intelligence from July 1940 to May 1941; Vice Admiral W. G. (Slim) Beecher, Jr., USN (Retired), who served in various capacities in ONI's public relations branch and in OPR from 1942-1945; and Commander Merle Macbain, one of the first specially-designated Navy public information officers in the postwar period.

At the Library of Congress, the author screened the Frank Knox personal papers deposited in the Manuscript

Section. Being a journalist who relied more on memory rather than the written record, Knox's collection is limited to eleven small boxes containing miscellaneous correspondence, speeches and newspaper clippings. However, it did turn up several interesting letters to friends and colleagues which provided additional insight into his public relations-oriented philosophy.

Also screened were the personal papers of Frank E. Mason, the special assistant for public relations to Secretary Knox, which are located in the Mass Communications History Center of the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison. This collection revealed little of value to the thesis other than the transcripts of several Knox press conferences.

Public information sections of the unpublished wartime narrative histories of Navy commands, contained in the Navy Library in Washington as a series entitled "United States Naval Administration in World War II," furnished many details on the operations of the naval district, fleet and other field public relations offices. A partial manuscript on the history of the Navy's Office of Public Relations was prepared in the last year of the war by George Marvin, a civilian specialist in OPR. However, an intensive search of Navy and other government records and numerous inquiries by the author to persons associated with OPR and the Office of Naval History during and after the

war have failed to uncover any part of this manuscript.

The unpublished Master's thesis by F. Donald Scovel, "Helm's A Lee: History of the Development of the Public Affairs Function in the United States Navy, 1861-1941" (University of Wisconsin, 1968), traces the evolution of Navy public relations from its embryonic beginnings in colonial times to the period immediately preceding World War II. It includes pertinent background for this study and provided specific data that served as a natural lead-in to the start of the World War II Navy public relations story, i.e., the establishment of the Office of Public Relations in May 1941.

The doctoral dissertation by Lamar S. Mackay, "Domestic Operations of the Office of War Information in World War II" (University of Wisconsin, 1966), covers in considerable detail the coordination of military information activities with those of OWI. Of particular value to this thesis was Mackay's treatment of the difficulties OWI Director Elmer Davis had with the Navy over releasing policies early in the war. A related Ph.D. dissertation, "The Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information," by Robert L. Bishop (University of Wisconsin, 1966), deals with American propaganda efforts overseas during the war and the coordination of these efforts between the OWI and the Army and Navy.

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